

Integrative Mechanisms for Addressing Spatial Justice and Territorial Inequalities in Europe

D4.1 Summary of Previous Surveys - Report

Version 2

Authors: **Linda Basile, Pierangelo Isernia (UNISI)**

Acknowledgements: We are thankful to Domenica Panzera (Ud'A) for her valuable contribution in collecting most of the survey questions included in the Inventory. We also thank the students of the master's course in Surveys and Data Analysis at the University of Siena for their work of coding the survey questions.

Grant Agreement No.:	726950
Programme call:	H2020-SC6-REV-INEQUAL-2016-2017
Type of action:	RIA – Research & Innovation Action
Project Start Date:	01-01-2017
Duration:	60 months
Deliverable Lead Beneficiary:	UNISI
Dissemination Level:	PU
Contact of responsible author:	basile7@unisi.it

This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under Grant Agreement No 726950.

Disclaimer:

This document reflects only the author's view. The Commission is not responsible for any use that may be made of the information it contains.

Dissemination level:

- PU = Public
- CO = Confidential, only for members of the consortium (including the Commission Services)

Change control

VERSION	DATE	AUTHOR	ORGANISATION	DESCRIPTION / COMMENTS
1.0	9.5.2020	Linda Basile	UNISI	Delivered on 28.8.2020 for internal review
2.0	13.10.2020	Linda Basile	UNISI	This version integrates reviewers' comments and suggestions.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

AES	Academia di Studii Economice din Bucuresti
AU	Aberystwyth University
AUEB	Athens University of Economics and Business
CG	Coordinating Group
CM	Communication Manager
DPEM	Dissemination and Public Engagement Manager
EU	European Union
EUGEO	Association of Geographical Societies in Europe
ESRC	Economic and Social Research Council
HU	Helsingin Yliopisto
HUA	Harokopio University
IfL	Leibniz-Institut für Länderkunde
INRA	Institut national de la recherche agronomique
IGSO PAS	Institute of Geography and Spatial Organization, Polish Academy of Sciences
NUIG	National University of Ireland Galway
RUG	Rijksuniversiteit Groningen
TNS	TNS Opinion
TUD	Technische Universität Dresden
Ud'A	Università degli Studi 'G d'Annunzio' Chieti-Pescara
UNIBAS	Universität Basel
UNIOVI	Universidad de Oviedo
UNISI	Università degli Studi di Siena
US	University of Stirling
WP	Work Package

Table of Contents

Change control	2
Acronyms and Abbreviations	3
Table of Contents	4
Figures and Tables	5
1. Introduction.....	7
2. WP4 Survey and the core IMAJINE's concepts.....	7
2.1 <i>Spatial inequalities and injustice</i>	7
2.2 <i>From inequalities to solidarity (and cohesion)</i>	8
2.3 <i>The other consequences of spatial inequalities and justice: regional autonomy and migration</i>	9
3. Inventory development.....	10
4. Territorial inequalities in surveys	12
4.1 <i>The concept of territorial inequalities within a spatial justice framework</i>	13
4.2 <i>From the concept to the survey measurement of territorial inequalities</i>	16
5. Territorial Cohesion and Solidarity in public opinion	24
5.1 <i>The concept of Territorial cohesion within a spatial justice framework</i>	25
5.2 <i>From the concept to the survey measurement of Territorial cohesion</i>	26
6. Territorial autonomy	36
6.1 <i>The concept of Territorial autonomy within a spatial justice framework</i>	36
6.2 <i>From the concept to the survey measurement of Territorial autonomy</i>	37
7. Immigration and Emigration	40
7.1 <i>The concept of Migration flows within a spatial justice framework</i>	40
7.1 <i>From the concept to the survey measurement of Migration flows</i>	41
Concluding Remarks	46
References.....	48
Appendix.....	50
A1. <i>Inventory – Codebook</i>	50
A2. <i>Keywords used for search in ZACAT engine</i>	53
A3. <i>List of sources used for the Inventory</i>	54

Figures and Tables

Figure 1 Support for interregional solidarity, by experimental treatment (receiving information about the actual region's ranking or not) in Italy (NUTS1) – PERCEIVE 2017 unweighted data (%)	22
Figure 2 Support for territorial solidarity across different levels, by country (% Agree- weighted) – EUEngage Survey 2017.....	28
Figure 3 Importance of EU regional policy investments on areas of intervention - Flash Eurobarometer 452 (2017) (N=27,713).....	29
Figure 4 Level at which political decisions should be taken - % of Regional level (INTUNE 2009 – selected countries)	39
Figure 5 Propensity to move away from home country - % of Yes (Euengage 2017, N=12,911)	42
Figure 6 Emigration as a problem (% of Very serious problem – selected countries) – TTS 2014.....	43
Figure 7 Successful integration in country or city/area (% Very/Fairly successful – N=9125; Respondents per country: from 1016 in Spain to 1554 in Germany).	45
Figure 8 Support for restrictive policies on immigration (average scores – PERCEIVE survey 2017). ..	46

Table 1. Frequencies of collected survey question on inequalities, by Territorial dimension variable	13
Table 2. Questions measuring indirect perceptions of territorial inequalities, classified according to a spatial justice approach (overview)	17
Table 3. Questions measuring direct perceptions of territorial inequalities, classified according to a spatial justice approach (overview)	20
Table 4 Support for interregional solidarity, by experimental treatment (receiving information about the actual region's ranking or not) – PERCEIVE 2017 unweighted data (%)	22
Table 5 Frequencies of collected survey question on solidarity, by Territorial dimension variable.....	25
Table 6 Questions measuring territorial cohesion, classified according the type/level of redistribution (overview).....	27
Table 7 Questions measuring territorial cohesion, classified according the type of motivation (overview).....	31
Table 8 Motivations for solidarity at the EU level (%) – EB 76.1 (2011)	32
Table 9 Motivation for supporting EU regional policy – PERCEIVE survey (2017)	33
Table 10 Questions measuring territorial cohesion, classified according the type of deservingness (overview).....	34
Table 11 Regions deserving help, by country (selected countries - %) – Flash EB 234 (2008) and 452 (2017)	35
Table 12 Frequencies of collected survey question on Territorial autonomy, according to the two classification's variables	36
Table 13 Support for independence - % (ISSP 1995 and 2003).....	38
Table 14 Research questions on migration flows in WP4 survey, according to a spatial justice approach.....	41
Table 15 Attitudes towards migrants: Economic and sociotropic effects (EUENGAGE 2017 - % N=11,141)	44

Box 1. Review of socio-economic conditions, determinants and potential remedies of spatial (in)justice	15
Box 2. Key components of Spatial Justice	15
Box 3 Main components of redistributive/solidarity measures, according to a Spatial Justice perspective	26

1. Introduction

The Inventory of surveys on Territorial inequalities, Territorial cohesion, Territorial autonomy and Migration flows (hereinafter: Inventory) collects, reviews and analyses the existing surveys dealing with the core IMAJINE's topics. The Inventory aims at identifying the measures that best capture the main concepts to be explored in the experimental survey that will be conducted in WP4. These measures, and the underlying conceptualisation, will then serve as the basis for the design of the WP4 survey questionnaire.

The present report will, firstly, frame the WP4 survey within the broader theoretical framework of the IMAJINE project (section 2). Then, it will describe the procedures and criteria followed to create the Inventory (section 3). Finally, sections 4 through 7 will review and analyse the collected survey questions across the four relevant dimensions of the IMAJINE project, by providing examples of analyses using data from the Inventory's questions. Based on this review, the report will help identifying the survey items that best apply to the core IMAJINE's concepts, grounded on theory.

2. WP4 Survey and the core IMAJINE's concepts

WP4 survey aims at studying the key topics developed across the other WPs, from the public opinion's perspective. In this respect, it reviews the main concepts and results emerging from the analyses carried out by the other project's units and "translates" them into survey questions.

The IMAJINE project develops around four core themes: (1) To understand and map **spatial inequalities** across territories within contemporary Europe (i.e. across regions in countries, countries in Europe, and regions in Europe) - WPs 1, 2, 3 and (2) **how to address them** – WP6; (3) To analyse whether and to what extent socio-spatial inequalities trigger political regionalist actors' mobilisation, demanding for greater **territorial autonomy to empower subnational levels** – WP7; and (4) To examine the link between territorial inequalities and **migration flows** – WP5.

Within this framework, WP4 survey will explore citizens' perceptions, attitudes, and policy preferences concerning **spatial inequalities** and the **cohesion policies** that can be adopted (at regional, national, and European level) to reduce such disparities, people's **support for territorial (regional) autonomy**, and public's opinions about relationship between **migration flows and inequalities**. Accordingly, these four domains will represent the core structure of the survey, around which consortium's researchers will develop research hypotheses to be examined using survey data.

2.1 Spatial inequalities and injustice

Inequalities and injustice can occur at both societal and spatial level. At the societal level, inequality refers to differences between people **within a society**, such as income unbalances, or other group differences (e.g. young versus old generations, low versus middle- or high-class people, women versus men). On the other hand, the **territorial or spatial inequalities**, on which IMAJINE project focuses, refer to differences between territorial units within a political system (be it national or supra-national).

Disparities between, and within, EU countries and regions are growing deeper after the global and financial crisis that hit Europe since 2008 (Jones et al 2019), with almost 83 million of European citizens living in “lagging regions,” featuring low levels of economic growth or income. Although such disparities are primarily understood in terms of difference in economic measures like the GDP per capita, however, scholars and policy analysts converge on the need to complement them with other measures that would better capture the variety of factors that lie behind inequalities, as well as the multiplicity of their socio-economic implications (Widuto 2019). For instance, territorial inequalities might also refer to the uneven access to healthcare or knowledge within a country, or the connectivity gaps and mobility issues in disadvantaged and “left behind” places. Such a novel approach to understand spatial inequalities, based on the concept of **spatial injustice**, is at the core of the theoretical background of the IMAJINE’s project.

The spatial justice approach therefore requires to focus on other aspects beyond the economic development, so to frame (and address) inequalities as a matter of “inequality of opportunities,” “unequal access to services,” “right to,” or, in other words, in terms of **spatial (in)justice** rather than simply as a question of economic unbalances (IMAJINE Deliverable D1.1). To think of inequalities in terms of injustice, however, yields important policy implications also for its empirical measurement, as it will be thoroughly discussed in the section 4.

2.2 From inequalities to solidarity (and cohesion)

To address inequalities, be they at societal or territorial level, individuals, societies or political systems can adopt a vast array of measures or behaviours. Since inequalities, by definition, feature the presence of a stronger (wealthier, richer, more developed, luckier) actor over a weaker one, they are closely linked to the notion of **solidarity**, that is the action by which the stronger actor – i.e. the donor - allocates resources to the weaker – i.e. the receiver - in order to narrow this gap.

A typical example of individual solidarity might be the charity of the rich toward the poor. At societal level, unbalances can be addressed by the means of welfare and social policies within a political system (city, region, state, or supranational actor like the EU). Looking at the territorial gaps, solidarity measures mostly refer to mechanisms of redistribution of (economic) resources from the best-performing to the under-performing territories (Lengfeld and Kley 2017). This kind of measures has been adopted at state level, such as the State’s equalisation fund enshrined in the Italian Constitution (art. 119) “destined to regions with reduced fiscal capacities per inhabitants,” which coexists alongside with the fiscal autonomy of the Italian regions. At the EU level, measures such as the structural funds are a consolidated component of the EU policy of **territorial cohesion** that aims at “reducing disparities between the levels of development of the various regions and the backwardness of the least favoured regions” (Art. 174 TFUE). Though often considered as a fuzzy, contested, and context-specific concept, territorial cohesion can be conceived as an approach to territorial policy that scales up the principle of solidarity to the European level, thus challenging “nation-state centred forms of identification” (Jones et al. 2019, p. 102).

However, to conceive of socio-economic disparities in terms of spatial justice, as earlier argued, somewhat upends the underlying rationale behind territorial cohesion, as it entails to go beyond the mere economic and financial approach. Rather, it requires to provide under-performing territories with an increased “capacity to shape their own future,” to grant them greater power and to let them

be able to “shape their own socio-economic destiny,” rather than simply transferring (economic) resources (Ibidem, pp. 112-113).

2.3 The other consequences of spatial inequalities and justice: regional autonomy and migration

Conceiving of inequalities in spatial justice terms, as before argued, yields further implications, and namely those concerning territorial autonomy and migration.

As for the former, the spatial justice approach would ideally encourage regions’ territorial autonomy as an instrument to empower territories and make them responsible for their own development. Moreover, greater autonomy would allow a context-sensitive approach to public policies that better takes into account the specificities of each place (Jones et al. 2019, p. 104) and provides regions with “the necessary capacity to shape their own socio-spatial future”, as already observed (Ibidem, p. 112). In line with this reasoning, spatial inequalities represent likely sources of **regionalist mobilisation**, fostered by political parties and movements aiming at demanding more autonomy for regions and reducing state’s control over decision-making at subnational level. This mobilisation is likely to develop into two main directions: on the one hand, better performing territories claim to keep their own resources and manage them by themselves. On the other hand, the lagging regions might blame the wealthier territories for their condition, which they consider as the result of long-term exploitation, thus demanding for more autonomy from the central state to be able to decide by themselves of their own destiny (IMAJINE Deliverables D7.1 and D7.2).

Regarding migration flows, the IMAJINE project considers both internal flows, that is to say movements from one region to another within the same country, and people’s migrations across different countries (within or also outside the EU). Mobility relates to spatial inequalities on at least three aspects. Firstly, inequality represents a **push factor** for the increased mobility of people who decide to migrate from poorer to richer territories. Secondly, migratory flows have inevitably an **impact on the receiving territories** and their inhabitants, by creating further sources of socio-economic inequalities within these territories and triggering a competition for resources between **migrants and residents**. Thirdly, the flows of people who decide to leave their home region are likely to impoverish **origin territories** of their human capital, resulting into a further increase of socio-economic inequalities between sending and receiving territories (IMAJINE Deliverable D5.1).

To sum up:

Based on such premises, and in line with IMAJINE’s theoretical background and preliminary findings, the WP4 Survey will seek to: (1) Operationalise and measure people’s perceptions of socio-spatial inequalities, as well as their understanding in terms of spatial (in)justice (**Inequalities and Spatial justice**); (2) Measure people’s preferences towards policies to reduce such inequalities, by differentiating between the traditional approach of territorial cohesion and more far-reaching strategies to fill socio-economic gaps, based on the concept of spatial justice (**Solidarity and territorial cohesion**); (3) Measure people’s support for forms of territorial autonomy at regional level and the main reasons behind such support (**Territorial autonomy and regionalist mobilisation**); (4) Measure people’s perceptions towards incoming migrants and the likely socio-economic (perceived) consequences that these flows have on sending regions, as well as the impact of emigration (**Migration and mobility**).

These four themes will represent the main sections around which the WP4 questionnaire is structured.

Sections 4 through 7 will examine thoroughly each of the above-mentioned concepts and identify the survey questions that would best serve for their operationalisation, using the questions collected in the Inventory as likely templates for the survey design.

3. Inventory development

The Inventory has been developed in two stages. In the **first stage**, a team of researchers from UNISI and Ud'A, coordinated by UNISI, has reviewed the codebooks and questionnaires of the main publicly available datasets on public opinion dealing with the IMAJINE's topic. The list of collected sources is provided in the Appendix A3. Most of them are cross-national studies, although some relevant, case-study surveys have been included in the collection as well.

The sources' selection has been based on a "purposive sampling" strategy, based on researchers' knowledge of the main comparative and case-studies databases in public opinion research in social sciences. Moreover, other sources have been included in order to take into account the data used in the literature reviewed for drafting the present document and dealing with public opinion on the IMAJINE's core topics. In order to narrow the potential actual number of sources to examine, the selection has been limited to surveys conducted in European countries, both comparative and case-studies. The studies included in the Inventory cover a time period from 1982 to 2019.

Most of questions have been drawn from the Eurobarometer survey series (EB), which covers most of the topics addressed by the Inventory, over a long-time span and across different EU countries. Other comparative and longitudinal surveys examined are the European Election Survey (EES), the European Values Survey (EVS), the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) and the Transatlantic Trends series (TTS), with a focus on the special series on Immigration (TTI). The Inventory also collects questions from some of the most recent comparative surveys carried out within the framework of EU-funded project, in order to look for affinities and likely connections with other relevant researches in the field. These surveys are: Cohesify, EUEngage, Perceive, Solidus, TransSol, RescEU and the European Quality of Life Survey (EQLS). Finally, a few case-study surveys have been examined, especially for the Autonomy section, where there is a limited number of available comparative researches. Among them, ITANES (Italian National Election Studies) in Italy and the CIS (Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas) in Spain, offer a wide selection of survey questions on several policy issues of interest for IMAJINE, over a long time-span. On the other hand, single case-studies like the GERPS (German Emigration and Repatriation Study in Germany), the Italian Prejudice Survey, the DISPOC-GfK and the Laps Survey (in Italy) have been included in the selection as they provide interesting insights for the topics at stake.

Researchers have been instructed to search for survey questions dealing with the following topics: (1) inequalities; (2) solidarity/cohesion; (3) territorial autonomy/regional empowerment; (4) immigration/emigration (mobility). The topics were broadly defined, so to allow for the widest possible collection of questions:

- (1) **Inequalities**”: questions dealing with disparities, differences, assessment of individual or contextual conditions, fairness of personal condition, causes of disparities, unbalances in societies or in countries;
- (2) **Solidarity/Cohesion**: questions dealing with transfer of resources from disadvantaged to advantaged categories, deservingness of help, institutional aid to disadvantaged categories and groups, motivations for solidarity; EU cohesion policy;
- (3) **Territorial autonomy/regional empowerment**: questions dealing with the transfer of powers and competencies towards subnational levels of government, independence of territories within the state;
- (4) **Immigration/emigration**: questions dealing with immigration and emigration, such as attitudes towards migrants, motivations to migrate, perceptions of the impact of immigration on sending and receiving places.

Depending on the source, different methods of data collection have been applied. For the EUROBAROMETER data, relevant survey questions have been searched by keywords through the ZACAT search engine (see Appendix A2 for the list of keywords used). For the other sources, researchers have gone through the codebooks and identified the relevant questions based on the provided indications.

The relevant questions were stored into an Excel file, along with a number of metadata, containing information for questions’ identification and classification. The codebook with all the variables used to code the Inventory’s question is presented in the Appendix A1.

Questions repeated more than once were included in the inventory in order to capture the presence of available time-series on certain measures. They can be particularly useful to show trends over time. The variable on frequencies is used to avoid counting the same question more than once in the review and analyses of these questions, as well as to check how many times the same question has been found in the reviewed surveys. The number of times in which each question is repeated in the identical formulation is captured by the variable **“Frequency”**.

In the **second stage**, after a cleaning process with the removal of irrelevant questions, the Inventory has been submitted to a group of 16 students of the master’s degree course in “Surveys and Data Analysis” at the University of Siena, held by Prof. Linda Basile. Students were divided into three groups, working on, respectively, (1) Inequality questions; (2) Solidarity/Cohesion questions; (3) Territorial autonomy and migration questions.

Students conducted a content analysis of the Inventory, by coding each survey question according to a **codebook** provided by the instructor. The codebook is based on the relevant literature on the four topics and will be thoroughly discussed in sections 4 through 7. Students’ coding has been then checked and reviewed by the instructor.

Students were also asked to identify patterns of similarity among non-identical survey questions. The final Inventory therefore includes also a variable on **“Similarities”**, which indicates whether a question has been formulated in a similar though not identical way elsewhere, with the indication of the similar question. Examples of similarities are:

Version 1: *“For each of the following statements, please tell me, if this always, sometimes, rarely or never happens to you? You feel safe in [CITY NAME]”* (ID: INEQ_76).

Version 2: *“I will read you a few statements. Please tell me whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree with each of these statements? I feel safe in [CITY NAME]”* (ID: INEQ_198-199).

Though the two questions are similar and capture the same concept (i.e. perceived safety in city), the first formulation asks about frequency of such perception, while the second formulation asks about the overall perception of safety, with inevitably different answer options (always, sometimes, rarely or never in Version 1; agree/disagree in Version 2). As pointed out by Fowler (1995, p. 55) using a frequency or an agree/disagree scale often pursue the same research goal; however, a frequency scale might yield different answers than an agree/disagree. In the example by Fowler, a person who “sometimes feels depressed” on a frequency scale, might disagree with the statement “I usually feel depressed”. Similarly, in the example above, a person who “sometimes feel safe in city” (Version 1) might disagree with the statement “I feel safe in city”, because this answer option somewhat overestimates the sense of security.

The final version v.1.0¹ of the WP4 inventory (Excel file named “**D4.1_Inventory_v1.0**”) is divided into four sheets (one for each topic’s dimension), named as follows: **Inequalities, Cohesion, Autonomy, Immigration-Migration**. Each sheet contains different set of variables, besides the common metadata and the variable on similarities.

4. Territorial inequalities in surveys

Overall, researchers have collected 396 survey questions broadly dealing with Inequalities. Among them, 141 questions were found only once, while the others were repeated from 2 to 9 times; accordingly, by counting the repeated questions only once, there is an overall number of **215 unique survey questions on inequalities**. Moreover, 20 questions show similarities with each other.

The content analysis conducted by students for the section on Territorial Inequalities was based on two variables:

- 1) The first variable “**Territorial**” discriminates those survey questions referring to territorial inequalities from those measuring disparities between individuals in a society. Questions measuring territorial inequalities were coded as “Yes” (or value 1), while they were coded as “No” (value 0) if otherwise.

For the coding scheme, territorial inequalities were defined as the *geographical heterogeneity of socio-economic conditions*, such as basic services, wealth, employment etc. (IMAJINE Deliverable 1.1). On the contrary, non-territorial disparities refer to unbalances in the distribution of resources, services and rights between individuals, regardless from their location.

¹ Although students were asked to follow an internal procedure of inter-coder reliability, some error in coding, especially concerning the similarity variable, has been found and amended. However, since the main goal of the Inventory is to look for the relevant dimensions for the survey, supervisor’s checks focused mostly on the substantial coding (i.e. variables on concepts – see also sections 4 through 7). This means that some coding on similarities, whose identification is not always straightforward, might be subjected to further revisions in future versions of the Inventory.

For instance, a survey question like “Please say how much you agree or disagree with each of the following statements? In our society, the rich get richer and the poor get poorer” (Eurobarometer 56.1, 2001) measures people’s attitudes towards social inequalities, regardless from any spatial dimension. An example of survey question coded as territorial, on the other hand, is: *In general, how would you rate the justice system in (OUR COUNTRY) compared to other justice systems in the EU? In comparison, the justice system in (OUR COUNTRY) is... -Much better - Slightly better -More or less the same -Slightly worse -Much worse* (Flash EB 385, 2013).

The survey questions on inequalities coded as territorial amount to 205. Among them, 105 are present only once in the inventory, while 32 survey questions are repeated from 2 to 6 times, for a total of **137 unique survey questions on territorial inequalities** (Table 1) Consistently with the IMAJINE’s theoretical framework, the WP4 survey will focus just on **territorial inequalities**. Accordingly, the remainder of this section will explore the use and potentialities of the collected survey questions coded as territorial, although some non-territorially related measures have been examined as well, as they could be adapted to the spatial dimension.

Table 1 Frequencies of collected survey question on inequalities, by Territorial dimension variable

Territorial	Frequency									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	9	14	Total
No	36	38	24	8	25	30	7	9	14	191
Yes	105	24	27	32	5	12				205
Total	141	62	51	40	30	42	7	9	14	396

- 2) Questions coded as Territorial, are further coded using the second variable, named “**Dimension**”, which has four possible categories: **Direct, Indirect, Justice and Cause**. This variable will be thoroughly discussed in subsection 4.2.

4.1 The concept of territorial inequalities within a spatial justice framework

As before argued, key to IMAJINE’s theoretical framework is the concept of **spatial justice**, which is closely related to the concept of territorial inequalities before discussed. In particular, dealing with **inequalities** entails a **quantitative assessment** of the geographical heterogeneity of any socio-economic conditions; accordingly, measuring territorial inequalities equals to ask “how much unbalance is there on condition X across [sub-units] in [geographical units]? How is condition X distributed across these territories”? On the other hand, the concept of **spatial justice** is a **qualitative assessment** of such objectively measured heterogeneity, therefore addressing the question “How much fair/just is it this unbalance”? (IMAJINE’s deliverable D.1.1).

The concept of spatial justice basically applies the ideas of social justice, mostly inspired by John Rawls’ seminal work (1971) to geographical thought (Jones et al. 2019, p. 107). According to Rauhut (2018), the concept of spatial justice has indeed sought to tie social justice to space as a way to fight social injustices, to the extent that the uneven spatial distribution of resources, services and opportunities leads to limited participation to the public life of the individuals who live in the weakest areas and deprives them of recognition (p.110).

Based on this premise, the WP4 Survey will aim at **measuring people’s perceptions of geographical disparities, according to a spatial justice perspective**. In other words, the section on inequalities aims at addressing the following research questions:

Do people perceive spatial inequalities within their own country (i.e. across regions) and across the EU?

Do they perceive such inequalities as unjust?

The Inventory actually include several questions measuring people’s perceptions of the geographical unbalances of the distribution of socio-economic conditions at different levels, ranging from the city to the country where people live in, that is to say what has been defined before as the quantitative assessment. But how to frame them in a spatial justice perspective? In other words, what is the qualitative assessment that would allow to argue that the (perceived) disparities pose a question of spatial (in)justice?

To address this theoretical and conceptual issue, we rely on spatial justice’s literature, as reviewed in IMAJINE’s Deliverable 1.1 and in Jones et al. (2019). As a guiding principle, we assume that thinking of inequalities in terms of spatial justice means to consider that **people’s life chances and quality of life largely depends on the region where they grew up**, besides – when not even more than – social class (Rauhut 2018, p. 110). In this respect, “the place” becomes a further element to take into account as conditioning an individual’s life and opportunities, in the so-called “natural lottery of birth”, and this would inevitably call into questions arguments of justice when uneven socio-economic conditions across territories ultimately pose actual constraints to people’s choices and opportunities of life.

Accordingly, inequality in a spatial justice perspective implies to take into account the unbalanced distribution not just in terms of economic resources or GDP per inhabitant. Rather, a **spatially unjust inequality refers to an uneven distribution of services and opportunities**. Spatial justice, in other words, requires a distribution of **services, infrastructures and other resources of high social value** (Soja 2009) “that is **proportional to the needs** of the population, regardless of the territory they live in” (Rauhut p. 111, Davies 1968).

Based on this definition, the measurement of the perception of inequalities as a matter of spatial (in)justice requires the identification of those services, infrastructures and other resources of high social value whose uneven geographical distribution is likely to pose a justice question, as well as of its main determinants and likely remedies.

Box 1, below, summarises some of the elements, as outlined by literature on spatial justice, that would help identifying those **socio-economic and political conditions holding justice implications on a spatial dimension**.

*Box 1 Review of socio-economic conditions, determinants and potential remedies of spatial (in)justice**(Review based on Deliverable D1.1., Jones et al. 2019, and Rauhut 2018)**Socio-economic conditions*

- Distribution of local services (Davies 1968), access to services such as transport, education, health care (Sen 1999).
- Distribution of capabilities that allow people to be and to do (opportunities and life chances) (Israel and Frenkel 2017).
- Mobility capital (Sheller 2014).

Determinants and potential remedies

- Structural patterns of systematic exclusion and dominance (Dikeç 2001; Young 2011).
- People's right to take part in processes of (urban) transformation, which implies active participation in the political life, i.e. shifting the perspective from the "access to" to "right to" (Lefebvre 1970, Dikeç 2001).
- Patterns of inequalities created and reproduced by policy (Soja 2010).

Based on these elements, WP4 survey will aim at measuring people's **perceptions of inequalities within a spatial justice perspective** by looking at the following aspects:

*Box 2 Key components of Spatial Justice***Spatial justice components**

- a) Distribution of and access to basic services with high social value, like health, education.
- b) Presence in the area of residence of capabilities and opportunities to change own's life, like job opportunities, business facilities etc.
- c) Access to infrastructures that allow connections and mobility.
- d) Individuals' active participation to public life and right to take part to the transformation of space.
- e) Sense of exclusion, dominance, exploitation of one territory over another.
- f) Inequalities as a product of politics and policy choices.

Another important element to take into account is the **level** at which disparities should be assessed. While most studies on spatial justice have a focus on the urban level, recent developments in the literature of spatial justice have proposed to conceptualise injustice "beyond the city", by taking into account the "multiscalar geographies in which we live" (Soja 2010, p. 20 – See also Jones et al. (2019), p. 108). In line with the purposes of the IMAJINE project, WP4 Survey will focus on inequalities between subnational levels such as NUTS2 regions, both within the states and in Europe. However, some questions will also take into account patterns of inequalities at lower levels (city of residence), as well as between member states in the EU. Of course, the sampling design and the limited

survey length will pose inevitable limits to the possible research questions to be explored in the survey. The above outlined conceptualisation of spatial justice serves as a basis for the identification of the survey questions from the Inventory, to be used for the questionnaire design.

4.2 From the concept to the survey measurement of territorial inequalities

As earlier argued, survey questions on inequalities coded as territorial were further coded according to the variable **Dimension**, with the following four possible categories: (1) Indirect; (2) Direct; (3) Justice; (4) Cause:

- 1) **Indirect (perception of inequality):** questions asking respondents' assessments of services, or socio-economic conditions in the area/region/country of residence.
Comparing answers to these questions would provide a map of the heterogeneity of socio-economic conditions and services across the territories, based on individuals' perceptions (E.g. *"Generally speaking, please tell me if you are very satisfied, rather satisfied, rather unsatisfied or not at all satisfied with each of the following issues in [CITY NAME]? Schools and other educational facilities"* – Flash Eurobarometer 156, 366, 419).
These questions address the research question: "Do people within the same country/the EU perceive differently the quality of key services and the presence of opportunities in the place where they live?"
- 2) **Direct (perception of inequality):** questions asking people's perceptions of the differences between different areas. (E.g. *"In terms of the per person economic wealth, as in GDP per head, if we were to rank all EU regions from wealthiest to poorest and put them into four equal groups, with group 1 being the wealthiest group and 4 the poorest group, which of the 4 groups do you believe your region is in today?"* – PERCEIVE survey 2017).
These questions address the research question: "Do people perceive that the distribution of services and opportunities in country/the EU is unequal?"
- 3) **Justice:** questions asking people's evaluation of patterns of inequalities as unjust. (E.g. *In your opinion, does the EU treat all member states fairly and with equal respect or does it favour some countries over the others? Please position yourself on a scale from 0 to 10, where '0' means "The EU treats all member states fairly and with equal respect" and '10' means "The EU favours some countries more than others"* – REScEU survey 2016).
These questions address the research question: "Do people consider inequalities as unjust?"
- 4) **Cause:** Questions aiming at exploring causes and responsibilities for inequalities. These questions provide an indirect assessment, but to a certain extent more precise, of the perception of inequalities as unjust. Indeed, lay citizens might find hard to answer to questions on fairness, whereas the use of words like "fairness" or "justice" might have a priming effect. On the contrary, asking whether people consider inequalities as the result of a territory's own limits and political responsibilities or, rather, as a result of exploitation from other territories or conditions outside the their own control, might provide a better measurement of the perceived sense of injustice (E.g. *"I will mention now some of the reasons that are usually given to explain why the economic situation and the quality of life are better in the North than in the South. For each of the following statements, can you tell me whether you agree strongly, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat or disagree strongly? -The problem of the South come*

from the fact that all of the industries have been created in the North of Italy, to the detriment of the Southern economy” – Italian Prejudice Survey, 1994).

These questions address the research question: “Do people consider inequalities as a result of a territory’s own responsibility or as a product of external events, like exploitation and dominance from other territories?”

Indirect perceptions of inequality

In this group of questions, we can identify spatial justice’s components from a) to d) and f), namely questions assessing people’s evaluation of social value services, capabilities and opportunities, infrastructures, active participation to public life and engagement, and political determinants of inequalities. Out of the 137 questions dealing with territorial inequalities, 174 were coded as Indirect, which represents the largest category of the section. Since some of them are repeated more than once, there are overall **106 unique questions on the indirect measurement of inequalities**. Table 2, below, provides an overview of these questions, by looking at the specific spatial justice component they address.

Table 2 Questions measuring indirect perceptions of territorial inequalities, classified according to a spatial justice approach (overview)

Question	Spatial Justice component	Source	Measured attitude
<i>Generally speaking, please tell me if you are very satisfied, rather satisfied, rather unsatisfied or not at all satisfied with each of the following issues in [CITY NAME]? Schools and other educational facilities</i>	Social value services	Flash EB (various years)	Satisfaction
<i>Thinking of physical access, distance, opening hours and the like, how easy or difficult is your access to the following services? Banking facilities - Public transport facilities - Cinema, theatre or cultural centre - Recreational or green areas - Grocery shop or supermarket - Recycling services</i>	Social value services	EQLS 2016	Assessment/Evaluation
<i>Generally speaking, please tell me if you are very satisfied, rather satisfied, rather unsatisfied or not at all satisfied with each of the following issues in [city name]: Public transport in the city, for example the bus, tram or metro</i>	Infrastructure	Flash EB (various years)	Satisfaction
<i>I will read you a few statements. Please tell me whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree with each of these statements? It is easy to find a job in [CITY NAME]</i>	Capabilities and opportunities	Flash EB (various years)	Assessment/Evaluation
<i>How successful do you think the government in [Country] is nowadays in each of the following areas? Fighting unemployment?</i>	Capabilities and opportunities	ISSP	Assessment/Evaluation
<i>Thinking about the quality of the public services (healthcare, school, transportation, etc.) in the area where you live, would you say that in the last two years it has ...improved/worsened</i>	Social value services/infrastructure	REScEU	Retrospective evaluation
<i>I will read you a few statements. Please tell me whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree with each of these statements? The administrative services of [CITY NAME] help people efficiently</i>	Capabilities and opportunities	Flash EB (various years)	Assessment/Evaluation

<i>From your own experience and/or from what you know from your friends and relatives who are currently working, what do you think the working conditions are like in (OUR COUNTRY) today?</i>	Capabilities and opportunities	Flash EB (various years)	Assessment/Evaluation
<i>How much would you say the political system in [COUNTRY] allows people like you to have a say in what government does? - Not at all, very little, some, A lot, A great deal</i>	Participation to public life and engagement	ESS 2019	Assessment/Evaluation
<i>And how much would you say that the political system in [COUNTRY] allows people like you to have an influence on politics? - Not at all, very little, some, A lot, A great deal</i>	Participation to public life and engagement	ESS 2019*	Assessment/Evaluation
<i>How much do you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust (Country's parliament/the legal system ...)</i>	Participation to public life and engagement	ESS 2019*	Trust
<i>And on the whole, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in [COUNTRY]? 0 Extremely dissatisfied 10 Extremely satisfied</i>	Political determinants	ESS 2019*	Satisfaction
<i>All citizens are treated equally in the public health care system in my area (1-4, Agree, rather agree, rather disagree or Disagree')</i>	Political determinants	QoG-Eq1	Assessment/Evaluation
<i>How much would you say that decisions in [COUNTRY] politics are transparent, meaning that everyone can see how they are made?</i>	Political determinants	ESS 2019	Assessment/Evaluation
<i>On a 0-10 scale, with 0 being that there is no corruption and 10 being that corruption is widespread, how would you rate the following institutions? The EU-COUNTRY's national government - Your regional/local governing institutions</i>	Political determinants	PERCEIVE 2017	Assessment/Evaluation

Note * Questions largely used in social science surveys. In the inventory they have been included once.

A first aspect that emerges from the Inventory concerns **the territorial level to ask about** in the survey. As the table shows, questions about the assessment or satisfaction with social value services and infrastructures are often asked at the city level, although there are also examples of questions asking about the satisfaction with health and education system in country (e.g. see ESS 2019 in the inventory). The question is not trivial, as people might, for instance, consider the overall level of a country's education system as quite good, but the personal experience of the education system, living in a disadvantaged area, might be negative, or vice versa.

In order to ascertain the best level to ask about in WP4 survey, a comparison can be done between different survey data, by taking Italy as an example. On the one hand, the Flash Eurobarometer 419 (2015), conducted in 79 European cities, reports an average satisfaction about the level of satisfaction (very/somewhat satisfied) for the health system in 5 Italian cities of 55%, ranging from 76% in Bologna (Northern Italy) to 37% in Palermo (Southern Italy), while the other cities are somewhat in between (Torino 72%, Roma 47%, Napoli 45%). These data reflect quite well the north-south inequalities in the country, although they do not account for the differences between small and large centres. On the other hand, ESS data (2019) have asked the same question on satisfaction for health services, but on a 0-10 points scale. In this case, by breaking up data at NUTS1 level, the average score for Italy is 5.8, with the highest value in the North-East and the lowest in the south (4.7), which mirrors the north-south divide observed at the city level in the Flash EB. This finding seems to suggest that, even when asked about the satisfaction with services in country, people are likely to think

about the closer level they have experience of, and more specifically to their area of residence. Accordingly, it makes sense to ask in WP4 survey people's **perceptions of the quality of services in the city/town where they live**, since we are interested in exploring people's personal perception of their own actual access to services to assess whether there are share of population that are systematically excluded or limited from the access to services or capabilities².

A second feature of survey questions on inequalities emerging from the Inventory is that there are at least two ways of measuring indirect perceptions of inequalities, namely by asking either about a rather "subjective" people's **satisfaction** with service (*Are you personally satisfied with...?*) or asking them a more "objective" **assessment and rating** of the quality (*How would you rate/judge...?*).

Looking at the political components of the spatial justice perspective, there are those questions that, in line with Lefebvre's argument, aim at measuring the level of **people's engagement in public life**, since spatial justice implies the right of people to take part to the urban transformation processes. On the other hand, questions dealing with inequalities could also include measures of **people's perception of their government's quality**. This kind of items recall Soja's argument of inequalities as a product of policy choices and contribute to the explanation of inequalities, by allowing to explore possible correlations between governments' performances and access to social value services that determine patterns of spatial (in)justice. In order to measure the government's quality, the Quality of Government Index has paid a lot of emphasis on aspects like corruption, by asking respondents to provide their judgement based on the experience of the **area** where they live. Other works, like the ESS, use more standard questions about the satisfaction with democracy or the assessment of the transparency of government's decision, by taking the country as reference point the **country**.

In order to see whether asking people's judgement about the quality of the democratic system at region or at country level makes a difference in judgements, we compared QoG (2017) question on "Elections in my REGION are free from corruption", on a 0 (disagree) - 10 (agree) point scale and the ESS (2018) question on satisfaction with democracy (where 0 means completely dissatisfied and 10 completely satisfied). Although not directly comparable, the two questions measure two close concepts, since elections free of corruption can be considered as a proxy for a satisfactory level of democracy. By taking, once again, Italy as an example, and comparing results at NUTS1 level, it emerges that people from the south (score: 6.14) and the islands (6.36) tend to perceive some corruption in regional elections, although there is a narrow distance from people of the north west (6.44) and centre (6.43); only people from the North East tend to perceive the electoral process in the region as

² It should be pointed out, however, that the available studies do not allow to ascertain whether people living in the suburbs of metropolitan areas are likely to think about their local centre or the entire metropolis, as there could be substantial difference between the quality of the services offered in the two areas. This may affect the responses obtained in various countries (depending on the administrative divisions used, and also as a consequence of intensive suburbanization processes, such as in Poland). The number of respondents living in large metropolis in large comparative studies at country level, however, do not allow for an analysis controlling for the effect of residence in suburbs or central areas. Indeed, usually the option "city or city suburbs" are presented together in the question about the type of city/town where people live in, in order to get a relevant number of answers to obtain significant results. Such an analysis, on the contrary, could be carried out only in studies conducted at the city level, yet. Unfortunately, the available dataset of the Flash EB 419 on cities does not contain a variable on the kind of area the interviewed lives in to allow for such control.

transparent (6.90). On the other hand, ESS data about satisfaction with democracy in COUNTRY show, once again, high dissatisfaction in the south (4.8) and the islands (4.5), with a slight distance from north-west (4.9), while satisfaction appears higher in the north-east (5.5) and the centre (5.7). Although, as already argued, this comparison should be taken with caution, both for the different measured concepts and the different structure of the surveys, the comparison between QoG and ESS data provides some evidence of the fact that, even when prompted about the country, people tend to be influenced by the closer context where they live in, which might explain why the differences in the satisfaction with country's democracy somewhat mirrors the patterns of perception of regional levels of corruption. Of course, these considerations are like to be country-specific, especially when the regional level is taken into account. In contexts like Poland, where the operating time of NUTS2 regions is relatively short, respondents might find easier to answer questions about the local unit (city, commune), or the historical and functional area that does not coincide with the current administrative division. Accordingly, questions about the quality of democracy and political life in the same questionnaire should look for a more articulated approach, that could allow measuring attitudes at local, regional or country level.

Direct perception of inequalities

The Inventory includes only 21 questions, repeated only once, that can be used to measure a direct perception of the existence of inequalities between different territories. Although the measures of direct perception can be framed within the spatial justice perspective, by considering the above-mentioned components, the collected questions do not provide the same range of options that were observed for the measures of indirect perception. They can be nevertheless used as templates to formulate original survey questions on direct perceptions of inequalities. Table 3 provides some examples of the collected questions:

Table 3 Questions measuring direct perceptions of territorial inequalities, classified according to a spatial justice approach (overview)

Question	Spatial Justice component	Source	Measured attitude
<i>In general, how would you rate the justice system in (OUR COUNTRY) compared to other justice systems in the EU? In comparison, the justice system in (OUR COUNTRY) is... -Much better - Slightly better -More or less the same -Slightly worse -Much worse</i>	Political determinants	Flash EB 2013	Assessment/evaluation
<i>In terms of the per person economic wealth, as in GDP per head, if we were to rank all EU regions from wealthiest to poorest and put them into four equal groups, with group 1 being the wealthiest group and, 4 the poorest group, which of the 4 groups do you believe your region is in today? a. Group 1 (In the wealthiest 25% of EU regions) b. Group 2 c. Group 3 d. Group 4 (The poorest 25% of EU regions)</i>	-	PERCEIVE 2017	Estimate
<i>In your opinion, how large or small are the differences between the judicial systems of the Member States in each of the following aspects? Would you</i>	Political determinants	Flash EB 2013	Assessment/evaluation

<i>say the differences are ... Efficiency-Very large - Quite large -Quite small -Very small</i>			
<i>It can occur to make comparisons between Italy and other European countries, like France, Great Britain and Germany. For each of the following areas, do you think Italy is less advanced or more advanced than these European countries? – The quality of our artistic and natural heritage</i>	Social value services?	Laps-Unità d'Italia 2011	Assessment/evaluation
<i>Thinking about the distribution of wealth between the different Spanish Autonomous Communities, would you say that there is a lot of inequality, enough inequality, or a lot of equality?</i>	-	CIS - 2009	Assessment/evaluation

These formulations can be used as templates to design survey questions that ask people to ask whether they perceive a different treatment than other territories, by triggering feelings of “jealousy”, like the CIS survey question on the treatment of the Spanish Autonomous Communities, or pride, like in the example from the Laps-Unità d'Italia Survey.

Moreover, even this group of questions might address different territorial levels addressed, with items asking both about differences between states in the EU or between regions in the same country.

Interestingly, the example from the PERCEIVE survey shows another way to look at the direct perception of inequalities, by asking the estimated ranking of their own region. In their survey report, Charon and Bauhr (2018) show that the wealthiest and the poorest regions are more likely to correctly identify their position in the ranking. This question on knowledge and estimation is associated with an experimental treatment, in which only half of the sample received the correct information after answering this question. The underlying hypothesis is that learning about a worse economic situation of their own region than expected would increase support for redistributive measures, while learning the opposite would discourage support for redistribution. This argument recalls a similar experiment conducted by Balcells et al. (2015) in Spain, who found evidence that learning about the true relative regional wealth, as compared to the other regions, influences preferences for inter-regional redistribution.


PERCEIVE data reveal that there is not statistically significant effect of learning about the actual economic ranking of respondent's own region on preferences for redistribution. However, these results should be analysed at regional, rather than at aggregate level (Table 10).

Table 4 Support for interregional solidarity, by experimental treatment (receiving information about the actual region's ranking or not) – PERCEIVE 2017 unweighted data (%)

<i>Support for interregional solidarity</i> ³	Received information	Did not receive information
Agree	80	80
Disagree	19	19
DK	0	0.4
N	8,566	8,581
Total	100	100

Looking, for instance, at data on Italy (Figure 1) by NUTS1 area, it emerges in fact that the experimental treatment is never significant but in the regions of the centre of Italy, where learning about the actual ranking reduces support for solidarity by 17 percentage points. One likely interpretation to this finding is that people living in centre's regions tend to underestimate their own region's ranking⁴, while learning to be among the richer regions (that should contribute more than receiving) has the likely effect to reduce support for solidarity measures.

Figure 1 Support for interregional solidarity, by experimental treatment (receiving information about the actual region's ranking or not) in Italy (NUTS1) – PERCEIVE 2017 unweighted data (%)



³ As you might have heard, EU cohesion policy aims to reduce regional differences within the EU in things like economic development, and employment. While all members contribute and receive some funds, the wealthier EU countries generally contribute more, and poorer EU regions receive more funding on average.' "In your opinion, the EU should continue this policy, where wealthier countries contribute more, and poorer EU regions receive more funding."

⁴ More specifically, 38% of people from centre regions selected the third group of four in the ranking (among them, respectively, 42% of them received the information afterwards, while 33% did not receive such information). This underestimation is particularly evident in region Lazio, for example, where 38% respondents selected group 3, while the region is actually in the first group, according to the information provided to respondents in the treatment group.

One problem with questions on estimates, however, is that they measure not just the actual people's knowledge of fact, but they can be rather related to their unfamiliarity with relevant numbers, a phenomenon known as innumeracy, that ultimately leads to misperceptions (Lawrence and Sides 2014). This might lead to biased findings, if analyses do not adequately control by other socio-demographic measures like education. Also, PERCEIVE's experiment on ranking among EU regions is likely to require respondents to make a more complex reasoning than, for instance, that one required by Balcells et al's experiment, which focuses just on Spanish regions, which refers to more contexts that are more familiar to interviewees.

Cause and Justice

Questions on Inequalities also include three items coded under the category "Justice" and 7 under the category "Causes".

An example of questions on the perception of inequalities as a matter of justice comes from the REScEU survey and asks whether people *"think that the EU treat all member states fairly and with equal respect or does it favour some countries over the others"*. Similarly, the CIS survey in 1994 asked whether people think that their Autonomous Community (in Spain) receive a worse treatment than the majority of the other Communities, or not. Likewise, asking whether the economic backwardness of the South is an important problem (Laps-Unità d'Italia 2011), can be considered as a measure of people's evaluation of inequalities as a matter of injustice.

These questions, however, tend to be rather generic and, to a certain extent, do not address specifically two key components of the concept of spatial injustice, and precisely the "sense of exclusion, dominance, exploitation of one territory over another" and "Inequalities as a product of politics and policy choices", as outlined in Box 1, points e) and f) (Section 4.2.1). In other words, asking whether inequalities are the result of exclusion, exploitation, dominance, or rather the product of politics and policy choices, represents a theoretically grounded way to assess whether people consider inequalities as "unjust".

In this respect, questions coded under the category "Causes" might be more useful to operationalise the sense of injustice behind the perceived inequalities. For instance, Sniderman et al. (2000) use a battery of items in which they present "some of the reasons that are usually given to explain why the economic situation and the quality of life are better in the North than in the South"; then, they list statements like: "People of the North have a greater commitment to work than people of the South"; or "The problem of the South come from the fact that all of the industries have been created in the North of Italy, to the detriment of the Southern economy". Those who agree on the first statement, for instance, do not consider the inequality as unjust but, rather, as a natural consequence of the laborious attitude of northern people. On the contrary, agreement with the second statement corresponds to inflating the sense of exclusion, dominance and exploitation that makes inequalities profoundly unfair.

To sum up

Based on the exploration of the collected questions of inequalities, we can draw some conclusions for WP4 survey, in order to frame territorial inequalities in a spatial justice perspective:

- *Inequalities should be measured both indirectly, by asking people to assess the services and opportunities they have access to in the place where they live (e.g. city/town of residence), and directly, by asking whether they perceive differences in the quality and access to services across territories.*
- *In line with the Spatial Justice's theoretical framework, measures of both indirect and direct perception of inequalities should look at: social value services - both in terms of satisfaction and judgement or access to - opportunities and capabilities like employment, and infrastructures.*
- *Survey measures should also consider people's participation to public life and the perception of the quality of the democratic system. Once again, people mostly tend to think about their closer experience even when asked about the country level. However, people's knowledge of the quality of democracy across territorial levels is likely to be country-specific, with the political system regional level (e.g. NUTS2) not always straightforward in all countries. Accordingly, a comparison between city and regional level on this kind of questions might reveal interesting patterns of variation in the participation to public life between the local and the regional level, whereas the introduction of questions about the perception of democracy at country and EU level might help to analyse to what extent people are able to differentiate their perception of democracy across levels or, rather, their experience at the closer level tends to influence attitudes at higher levels.*
- *Assessments of the quality and access to services and opportunities should be asked at the closest level to the respondent's actual experience. This might be the city or the area of residence. In fact, when prompted about higher levels, people tend to reflect the experience of their surrounding context, which they know better.*
- *People's perceptions of inequalities as unjust can be measured through questions about the causes of inequality, which operationalise the "sense of exclusion and dominance" and the idea of "inequality as product of policy choices" that underlie the concept of Spatial Justice.*

5. Territorial Cohesion and Solidarity in public opinion

Researchers have collected overall 610 survey questions on territorial cohesion and solidarity. Among them, 247 questions were found only once, while the others were repeated from 2 to 17 times; accordingly, by counting the repeated questions only once, there is an overall number of **345 unique survey questions on inequalities**.

In the second stage, this group of questions was coded by students, according to two variables:

- 1) **"Territorial"** variable discriminates those survey questions referring to solidarity measures between territories (e.g. between regions in country, or between countries in the EU) from those asking about preferences on solidarity at societal level (e.g. support to poor people). Questions measuring territorial inequalities were coded as "Yes" (or value 1), while they were coded as "No" (value 0) if otherwise. The questions on solidarity included in the territorial group represent the 60% of the collected items, with **200 unique survey questions** (which amount to 363 if considering also those repeated more than once).

- 2) Questions coded as Territorial, were further coded using the second variable, named “**Dimension**”, which can have four categories, which will be discussed in the following subsection: **1) Policy; (2) Knowledge; (3) Motivation (distinguished between: self-interest, normative, identity); (4) Deservingness.**

Table 5 Frequencies of collected survey question on solidarity, by Territorial dimension variable

Territorial	Frequency												Total
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	12	17	
No	105	34	18	28	30		7	8		1		16	247
Yes	143	38	27	52	30	42			9	10	12		363
Total	248	72	45	80	60	42	7	8	9	11	12	16	610

5.1 The concept of Territorial cohesion within a spatial justice framework

Although the concept of territorial cohesion is often considered as a contested one, it has been usually conceived as expression of **solidarity** between regions and states and associated to the **redistribution** of resources to disadvantaged and lagging behind territories. Besides such redistributive approach, however, the place-based approach (Barca 2009) defines territorial cohesion in the context of: a) searching for local development resources (Zauchat al. 2014), b) the position of territorial units in polycentric systems and in the context of environment (Medeiros 2016). Moreover, literature considers territorial cohesion either as a **policy objective** (i.e. the cohesion across territories within a political system) or as a **policy tool** in itself to reduce inequalities and disparities (see Deliverable D.1.1). Moreover, it is a **context-based concept**, which might assume different meanings across different territorial levels and for different actors.

The spatial justice approach, however, requires to rethink concepts like those of solidarity and territorial cohesion, which should be understood in terms of **redistributing resources and opportunities** in order to grant each territory an “**equal access**” and “**equal right to**” the **services, infrastructures, opportunities and political capacities** that configure a spatially just political unit (see section 3). This approach to redistribution implies to move away from conceiving of territorial cohesion mostly in terms of measures of **economic redistribution** and, rather, to focus on more encompassing development policies aiming at creating long-term opportunities and local empowerment. In this respect, the spatial justice framework challenges even the common understanding of structural funds, which are often considered more as investments than redistribution of resources and opportunities for a more encompassing development of a region (Jones et al. 2019).

Based on the above considerations, and despite the fuzziness of the concept, territorial cohesion can be related to:

Redistributive measures adopted in political or societal structures in which some members (donors) allocate resources or provide some relief to other members (recipient), in order to reduce disparities and narrow the socio-economic gap between units within the same political community.

These actions might be either mediated by a third actor which pools the community's resources or coordinate the efforts or the members, by following a **vertical approach** (Gerhards and Lengfeld 2019) or implemented according to a **horizontal and direct redistribution** between territorial unities.

Another important aspect concerns the **level** at which such redistribution should take place and the main actors and institutions responsible for their implementation. Although the concept of territorial cohesion has been largely developed at the European level, issues (and related policies) of redistribution can be developed also at the national level. Moreover, it is particularly relevant to understand whether these measures gain more support when implemented at national or at the European level.

Based on these premise, redistributive/solidarity measures can have the features summarised as in Box 3 below:

Box 3 Main components of redistributive/solidarity measures, according to a Spatial Justice perspective

- *Redistribution of resources and opportunities – and not just financial resources - across territories (horizontal) or mediated by a central actor (vertical)*
- *Territorial cohesion within the state*
- *Territorial cohesion with the EU*

5.2 From the concept to the survey measurement of Territorial cohesion

Based on these research questions, the “Dimension” variable allows us to differentiate among the following sub-groups of items, each of them addressing a specific dimension of the concept of territorial cohesion/solidarity:

- 1) **Policy:** questions looking at people's support for **policies** of territorial redistribution, and the institutions and actors that should adopt them. These questions address the following research questions about the “what” of solidarity: ***“Which policy measures for reducing these territorial inequalities do people support? Which actors, institutions do people think are responsible for ensuring equality?”***
- 2) **Knowledge:** questions about people's actual awareness of the current solidarity mechanisms that are adopted in a political system, regardless from their support to them. These questions basically aim at answering to questions like: ***“Are people aware of the existing solidarity measures?”***
- 3) **Motivation:** Another set of items looks more specifically at the main motivations behind support for redistributive measures. These questions are likely to provide insights on people's perception of such policies as “just” (**Value-based motivations**), or just as a matter of rational (**economic**) **self-interest** (reciprocity), or of **in-group considerations** (**Identity motivations**). With these questions it is possible to answer the question on the “Why” of solidarity: ***“Why should regions/countries in need be helped?”***
- 4) **Deservingness:** Finally, another way to measure the perception of redistribution as a matter of justice is to look at people's opinion about who should be entitled to receive help and under which conditions. In particular making solidarity as conditional to particular receivers' duties or status (e.g. in-group features or some responsible behaviour) drives away from a notion of justice. This addresses the question on ***“Who should be helped?”***

Policy

Overall, the Inventory collected **124 unique questions** (that is to say, by counting repeated questions only once) on support for redistributive measures. Examples of questions on territorial cohesion taken from the inventory are shown in Table 14, below:


Table 6 Questions measuring territorial cohesion, classified according the type/level of redistribution (overview)

Question	Type/level of redistribution	Source
<i>I would like you to tell me for each one if you personally consider it very important, important, of little importance or not important at all? Reduce the differences between the regions of our country by helping those regions less developed or in difficulties</i>	Resources (vertical/horizontal) Level: country	EB 31A
<i>Do you agree or not that a part of the taxes you are paying (..): be used for the development of the neediest regions of the European community even if they are not in our country?</i>	Economic (vertical/horizontal) Level: EU	EB13
<i>Do you agree or not that a part of the taxes you are paying (e.g. income tax, vat, etc): be used for the development of the most needy regions in (country)</i>	Economic (vertical/horizontal) Level: EU	EB13
<i>EU regional policy can invest in many different domains. From the following examples, which do you consider among the more important or less important ones for your city or region? Better transport facilities (rail, road, airports)</i>	Resources (vertical) Level: EU	Flash EB various years
<i>In Italy, some regions are richer than others. Some think that richer regions should help poorer ones, while others think poorer regions should rely on their own efforts. Which view comes closer to your own?</i>	Resources (horizontal) Level: Country	Laps – Unità d'Italia 2011
<i>As you might have heard, EU cohesion policy aims to reduce regional differences within the EU in things like economic development, and employment. While all members contribute and receive some funds, the wealthier EU countries generally contribute more and poorer EU regions receive more funding on average.'</i> <i>"In your opinion, the EU should continue this policy, where wealthier countries contribute more, and poorer EU regions receive more funding."</i> 1. Strongly agree, 2. Agree, 3. Disagree, 4. Strongly disagree, 5. don't know	Resources (vertical) Level: EU	PERCEIVE 2017
<i>Do you think your region benefits more, less or the same from EU funding than the rest of your country?</i> 1. More 2. Less 3. The same 77. Refused [INT INSTR: do not read out loud] 88. Don't know [INT INSTR: do not read out loud]	Economic (vertical) Level: EU	Cohesify

It should be noted that several survey questions collected in the Inventory deal with solidarity between member states within the EU, while the WP4 Survey focuses mostly on solidarity between regions both within countries and between EU regions.

The territorial level for solidarity measures is particularly relevant in research on territorial cohesion, as a recent experiment conducted in the EUEngage⁵ survey shows (Figure 2). When asking about support for measures of financial redistribution at different territorial levels, data reveal that the share of favourable answers was higher when the question referred to helping regions in the same state than other EU Member states, although with some interesting variations among countries. Moreover, data show that support for EU-wide solidarity is even lower than redistribution in favour of less developed countries of the world.

Figure 2 Support for territorial solidarity across different levels⁶, by country (% Agree- weighted) – EUEngage Survey 2017.



Note 1 Sample based on 11,141 respondents, with approximately 1,200 interviews per country.

⁵ EUENGAGE was a project funded by the EU under the H2020 Framework (GA 649281) and coordinated by the University of Siena (2015-2018).

⁶ The full text of the survey question is: "A recent authoritative report shows that, because of the economic crisis, **Treatment 1 – help to poorer regions**

... the gap between richer and poorer regions in [COUNTRY] has increased and inequalities have widened. As a consequence, real GDP per head has decreased in poorer areas such as ... (UK: Yorkshire, Midlands, Northern Ireland) (FRA: Corse, Nord Pas de Calais (now part of Hauts de France), Languedoc Roussillon (now part of Occitanie)) (GER: Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Saxony-Anhalt, Bremen, Saarland and Thuringia) (ITA: Mezzogiorno d'Italia) (SPAIN: Extremadura, Andalucia, Castille-La Mancha) (GRE: Anatoliki Makedonia, Thraki, Ipeiros, Dytiki Ellada) (CZ: North East (Moravia-Silesian region) (NETH.: Friesland, Groeningen and Drenthe) (POL.: Eastern area) (PORT. Norte).


Treatment 2 – help to poorer EU countries

the gap between richer and poorer countries in Europe has increased and inequalities have widened. As a consequence, real GDP per head has decreased in European countries such as Greece, Portugal, Italy, Spain.

Treatment 3 – help to poorer world countries

Shifting to questions related to the spatial justice approach to territorial cohesion, the Inventory contains only a few examples of items on support for redistributive measures other than financial transfers. One notable exception is the time series from Flash Eurobarometer, asking whether EU regional policy investments on a set of services (e.g. transport, or education, health, and infrastructure) are considered more or less important for respondents' own city or region. Data from the 2017 survey reveal that respondents tend to consider as important most of the proposed areas of intervention, with the exception of broadband internet access and immigration policy, although in the last two cases there are notable country differences. The little variation among the categories suggests that this kind of questions would inevitably result into high level of support, as they do not present contentious issues.

Figure 3 Importance of EU regional policy investments on areas of intervention - Flash Eurobarometer 452 (2017) (N=27,713)



Note 2 Survey question: "EU regional policy can invest in many different domains. From the following examples, which do you consider among the more important or less important ones for your city or region?" [AREA MENTIONED].

Another aspect related to the spatial justice approach concerns the perceived fairness of the redistribution across territories. In the Inventory, there are questions that explore the perceived benefits for respondent's own region of EU regional policy as compared to other regions in country, as in the example provided by the Cohesify survey⁷ (no data available for this item). The advantage of such question is that it measures both the perceived impact of EU regional policy and the perceived unbalances in treatment across regions, with the latter dimension being closely related to the concept of spatial injustice.

Knowledge

the gap between developed and less developed countries in the world has increased and inequalities have widened. As a consequence, real GDP per head decreased in less developed countries such as Somalia and Nigeria. [ASKED TO ALL] One measure that has been suggested to address this gap recommends that richer regions/EU countries/developed countries provide financial resources to poorer regions/EU countries/less developed countries. Do you agree or disagree with this measure?

⁷ *Do you think your region benefits more, less or the same from EU funding than the rest of your country?*

The 14 unique items on knowledge collected in the questionnaire mostly measure people's actual awareness about the current solidarity measures, either at national level (e.g. *"Does (OUR COUNTRY) have policies for developing its less favoured regions or not?"* EB36 (1991) and EB43.1bis (1995)) or at the EU level. The latter group of questions mainly focus on citizens' knowledge of the EU regional policy funds, the EU-funded projects respondents' area of residence and questions about the perceived impact or benefits from these funds.

As results from the PERCEIVE survey (Charron and Bahur 2018, p.14) reveal, knowledge of EU regional policy is somewhat limited at aggregate level (EU-average 48%), although there are relevant country variations. Indeed, there is little awareness in more developed countries such as the Netherlands (21%), UK (25% have heard of any of the EU funded project), Germany (29%), while these funds are pretty well known in Eastern countries like Slovakia (87%), Hungary (81%) and Poland (78%). These results are consistent with the Flash EB 452⁸ (2017), where majorities in Hungary (86%) and Poland (81%) have heard about one of the mentioned EU funds, while percentages drop to 26% in Belgium, 32% in France, and 38% in Germany.

Nonetheless, also in the light of a logic of parsimony, knowledge could be also captured by adding answer options to questions about the perceived benefits of EU regional policy for citizens' own region as compared to other regions (see above), by introducing answer options like: "[My region] did not benefit of these funds at all".

Motivations of support for redistribution

A third group of questions look more precisely at the "why" of solidarity, namely the reasons for supporting distributive measures. Scholars have pointed out an underlying tension between two goals of territorial cohesion: on the one hand, the achievement of a **balanced economic development** across territories; on the other hand, the **strengthening of competitiveness**, by enabling regions to exploit their potentials, although some scholars see these goals as complementary, rather than alternative (Deliverable D.1.1 and Jones et al. 2019).

At a first sight, renouncing to portions of wealth to share it with under-performing territories could look as a not rational choice for best-performing areas. Nonetheless, the redistributive policies might well have a utilitarian rationale, inspired by an "enlightened **self-interest**" that sees the help to disadvantaged areas as a potential source of investment, which will *grant positive returns* to the donor territory (Fernandes and Rubio 2012), while also improving the *overall competitiveness* of the whole political community (Jones et al. 2019). Moreover, addressing inequalities would contribute removing one potential source of social unrest and political instability (EPRS 2019), whose effects cannot be confined to the territories where they originate.

Besides any cost-benefits calculations, another distinct yet complementary logic behind the adoption of redistributive measures, relies onto a sense of belonging to a specific community among the actors that are part of it (Delanty 2008), a sense of membership (Grasso and Lahusen 2019, Lahusen and Grasso 2018) and of sharing a common fate, which, on its turn, relies upon a sense of **shared identity**. Indeed, the perception of, either actual, alleged or perceived common ties generate a strong sense of distinctiveness between "We" and "the Others," (Smith 1992) which then develops into the awareness

⁸ The full text of the question was: *"Have you heard about the following funds? -The European Regional Development Fund-The Cohesion Fund-Both-Neither-Has heard of at least one fund"*.

of the need to support all the components included in the “We-group”; or, in other words into a sense of solidarity.

Finally, redistribution and solidarity can be seen as a **value in itself**, based on the normative principle of the duty to help those people or territories in need.

The three basic motivations of self-interest, identity and values constitutes three categories of the variable “Dimension” used to code questions on territorial solidarity in the Inventory. Table 15, below, shows a few examples of these questions from the 90 unique items using the motivations code. Notably, most of these questions mostly refer to solidarity between EU member states.

Table 7 Questions measuring territorial cohesion, classified according the type of motivation (overview)

Question	Motivation	Source
<i>Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following statements on this topic. Setting aside a share of the public debt of all Member States to be held jointly... Would reinforce the financial stability of the Member States</i>	Self-interest	EB 76.11
<i>There are different opinions whether countries in the European Union should help each other. Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you totally agree, tend to agree, tend to disagree or totally disagree. EU countries in trouble should be helped... ... because every country could get into trouble someday.</i>	Self-interest	SOLIDUS 2016
<i>What is the main reason why you think that (COUNTRY) should not contribute to a common EU fund helping any other EU Member State facing potential severe economic and financial difficulties in times of crisis? Answers: 1. It is not in the economic interest of my (COUNTRY) to pay for the difficulties of other EU member states 2. Each member state should take care of its own troubles 3. Help from the EU would discourage a more responsible behaviour on the side of the country recipient of help</i>	Self-interest	ISSP 1990
<i>There are different opinions whether countries in the European Union should help each other. Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you totally agree, tend to agree, tend to disagree or totally disagree. EU countries in trouble should be helped... ... because ... because we all belong together</i>	Motivation-Identity	Solidus
<i>Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following statements on this topic. Setting aside a share of the public debt of all Member States to be held jointly... Would be necessary in the name of solidarity between Member States</i>	Motivation-normative	TransSOL 2017
<i>There are many reasons to state for or against financial help for EU countries in trouble. Which one of the following best reflects how you feel? - It is our moral duty to help other member states that are in need.</i>	Motivation-normative	Flash EB various years

Looking at the data on motivations for solidarity, the EB76.1 (2011) asked first whether people supported or not measures of financial solidarity; then, it asked people to motivate their agreement or disagreement, by choosing between two alternative statements. Results reveal that self-interest mo-

tivations tend to prevail among those people supporting measures of financial help (38%), as compared to those who disagree with financial solidarity (24%)⁹ (Table 8). As a methodological note on this formulation, however, one should observe that the two statements offered as answer options are not necessarily mutually exclusive, thus forcing the respondent to choose one of the two even if both conditions would apply to respondent's opinion.

Table 8 Motivations for solidarity at the EU level (%) – EB 76.1 (2011)

Agree financial help within EU (50%)		Disagree financial help within EU (50%)	
In the economic interest of (OUR COUNTRY)	38	<i>Not in the economic interest of (COUNTRY)</i>	24
In the name of European solidarity	59	<i>(COUNTRY) citizens should not have to pay for the economic problems of the other EU members</i>	68
Other (SPONTANEOUS)	2	<i>Other (SPONTANEOUS)</i>	9
N	12,652		12,528
Total	100		100

Based on this reasoning, the question from the PERCEIVE survey (Charron and Bahur 2018 –Table 9) addresses the potential bias inherent to the previous formulation, by presenting different motivations in a 10-point Likert scale (agree/disagree), rather than as contentious options in the same question. However, the options offered to those willing to contribute less to the EU regional policy are different from those offered to those willing to contribute the same/more, thus making a comparison between motivations among supporters and opponents of solidarity less straightforward. Notwithstanding this drawback, it is possible to observe, once again, that economic self-interest seems prevailing among those supporting EU solidarity, while humanitarian motivations seem to be less relevant. Likewise, the economic self-interest also drives people's refusal to support solidarity, as the idea of keeping the money where they originate seem the most popular argument for those unwilling to share resources with other regions in the EU.

Based on the previous findings, WP4 will incorporate questions asking about motivations for solidarity, by including items on economic self-interest, identity and normative motivation. Unlike the previous examples, however, the same items can be asked to all respondents, while bivariate analyses can allow for comparisons between those supporting solidarity and those not supporting it. Moreover, it

⁹ In flash EB 76.1 respondents were first asked "To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: *In times of crisis, it is desirable for (OUR COUNTRY) to give financial help to another EU Member State facing severe economic and financial difficulties*", with answers evenly divided between people agreeing (50%) and disagreeing (50%) with this statement. Then those who agree were asked: "What is the main reason why you think it is desirable that (OUR COUNTRY) gives financial help to another EU Member State facing severe economic and financial difficulties? 1 *It is in the economic interest of (OUR COUNTRY) to help another EU Member State*; 2. *In the name of European solidarity between Member States*", while those who disagreed were asked: "What is the main reason why you think it is not desirable that (OUR COUNTRY) gives financial help to another EU Member State facing severe economic and financial difficulties? 1 *It is not in the economic interest of (OUR COUNTRY) to help another EU Member State*; 2 *(NATIONALITY) citizens should not have to pay for the economic problems of the other EU Member State*". A similar approach of assigning different items on motivation according to answers on previous questions on solidarity was followed also by the PERCEIVE survey.

might be useful to introduce with an experimental treatment a difference between motivations for solidarity among country regions or EU regions, in order to observe whether the balance between self-interest or identity motivation is likely to vary whether the recipient regions are at the state or the EU level.

Table 9 Motivation for supporting EU regional policy – PERCEIVE survey (2017)

<i>Q21: In your opinion, compared with what it spends today, should (COUNTRY) contribute, more, about the same, or less to this EU policy? 1. More, 2. About the same, 3. Less</i>	<i>Q22: Follow up to Q21: Could you just tell me on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means “Not agree at all” and 10 means “totally agree”, as to why you would want (COUNTRY’s) contribution to be less/more/about the same?</i>	<i>Mean (0 strongly disagree-10 strongly agree)</i>
Should contribute less (16%)	The money (COUNTRY) pays would be better spent in (COUNTRY)	7.9
	The money will be largely wasted due to corruption	7.0
	The money only ends up helping wealthy EU regions in the end	6.0
	(COUNTRY) pays too much while other EU countries do not pay their fair share	6.8
	(COUNTRY) should instead be helping the worlds’ poorest people outside the EU	5.2
Should contribute more (24%)	It is in (COUNTRY’s) interest to invest in poorer regions	7.7
	It benefits everyone in the EU to invest in poorer regions	8.0
	(COUNTRY) has a humanitarian obligation to end poverty throughout the EU	7.6
Should contribute about the same (60%)	It is in (COUNTRY’s) interest to invest in poorer regions	7.3
	It benefits everyone in the EU to invest in poorer regions	7.5
	(COUNTRY) has a humanitarian obligation to end poverty throughout the EU	6.9

Deservingness

Finally, solidarity should also take into account the “whom” of help, namely those territories that people perceive as deserving help. Jones et al (2019) observe that a problematic aspect of territorial cohesion is that it paves the way to a narrative that describes the “under-performing” regions as problematic or lacking, by ascribing them a status of either inadequacy or victimhood (or both). This argument is closely related to the conditionality measures envisaged in EU cohesion policy (Brunazzo 2016), which demand receiving states to adopt effective structural reforms and to ensure full compliance with the EU legislation before receiving funds.

The Inventory collected overall 14 unique questions on “deservingness”, like those shown in Table 10. They mostly focus on the contraposition between actual need and capacity to use funds, which might be hindered by structural inadequacies like corruption or flaws in the administrative system. Moreover, these questions also explore people’s propensity to give funds also to better performing regions, since these investments could have also positive effects for the entire country.

Table 10 Questions measuring territorial cohesion, classified according the type of deservingness (overview)

Question	Type of deservingness	Source
<i>Considering that resources for aid to regions are limited, would it be more worthwhile to give it: 1 to the regions in the greatest need; 2 to regions that can make the best use of it</i>	<i>Need vs. Capacity to use funds</i>	<i>EB13</i>
<i>European regional policy supports economic development projects in all regions. In your opinion, should the EU continue to invest in all regions or concentrate exclusively on the poorer ones?</i>	<i>Need</i>	<i>(Flash EB 384)</i>
<i>There are many reasons to state for or against financial help for EU countries in trouble. Which one of the following best reflects how you feel? - Financial help should not be given to countries that have proven to handle money badly</i>	<i>Capacity to use funds/corruption</i>	<i>(TransSol XXX)</i>
<i>In all the other regions, European regional policy intervenes to help them to foster innovation, to create jobs and to work together. In your opinion, should the EU support all regions or concentrate exclusively on the poorer ones?</i>	<i>Need</i>	<i>(Flash EB 234, 2008)</i>

Results from the Flash EB 234 (2008), for instance, reveal that majorities in Spain (55%) tend to support help only to poorer regions (it is worthwhile noting that the survey was conducted at the beginning of the financial crisis). On the contrary, in the other countries more than half of respondents would prefer redistributing money among all regions, ranging from 52% in Romania to 65% in the UK.

Interestingly, a similar question asked in 2017 yields almost similar results but in the UK and, to a certain extent, Spain. The British case, in particular, stands out for the change in prioritizing support for investments in poorer regions, rather than all its regions (Table 11).

On the one hand, the different formulation of the survey question between the two waves might explain these differences, as the 2017 (Flash EB 452) did not include the priming information on *European regional policy supporting economic development projects in all regions* used in the 2008 formulation. Also, the answer options in 2017 mention the “investment”, while the 2008 formulation uses words as help and support, which might have affected answers. On the other hand, Brexit might explain a decreasing support for a broad help towards all regions, including the most developed ones like the UK, since British respondents would probably now feel not anymore involved by such redistribution.

Table 11 Regions deserving help, by country (selected countries - %) – Flash EB 234 (2008) and 452 (2017)

	2008				2017				
	The EU should help all its regions	The EU should only support the poorer regions	DK/NA	N	The EU should invest in all regions	The EU should only invest in the poorer regions	DK/NA	N	Total
ES	44	55	1	1006	49	49	2	1001	100
RO	52	45	3	1013	50	48	2	1000	100
NL	54	40	6	1002	52	42	6	1011	100
IT	59	38	3	1008	57	38	5	1000	100
PL	61	36	3	1001	61	34	5	1000	100
DE	62	35	3	1010	58	31	11	1000	100
FR	64	33	3	1009	57	39	4	1000	100
UK	65	31	4	1000	38	47	15	1001	100

Note 3 Survey question was: *[European regional policy supports economic development projects in all regions]. In your opinion, should the EU continue to invest in all regions or concentrate exclusively on the poorer ones?*

To sum up

The review of the collected survey questions on territorial cohesion and solidarity suggests a few useful insights for the design of the WP4 survey:

- *Questions on solidarity and territorial cohesion should take into account both the level at which these measures are adopted (national, EU, worldwide) and the approach (vertical, that is mediated by an institution, or horizontal, that is based on mutual support among units).*
- *The spatial justice perspective can be included by asking (1) questions about the preferred area of intervention for regional policy, besides financial help, and (2) the perceived fairness of redistributive measures. Previous surveys, however, show little variation in answers for the first kind of question, with generally very high level of support for non-financial solidarity policies.*
- *Previous research has also found a general low awareness of current EU solidarity measures, although with relevant variations between countries. Given the limited space available in the survey, one likely solution to include a knowledge dimension is to add the answer option “(my region) did not benefit at all of EU funds” to the survey question on the fairness of solidarity measure (“Do you think your region has benefitted more, less, about the same than other regions in country/EU?”).*
- *The notion of justice can be also well captured by the motivations for supporting solidarity, ranging from economic self-interest to identity, through normative based motivations.*
- *An experimental treatment can be also included to examine whether motivations differ when solidarity measures are aimed at helping regions in the same country or in other EU countries.*
- *Questions on deservingness will introduce a further element of analysis, aiming at assessing (1) whether the goal of territorial cohesion is just support to regions in need or a more encompassing approach to integrated development that includes also richer regions; (2) people’s support for conditionality measures aiming at reducing structural inadequacies in the receiving regions.*

6. Territorial autonomy

The Inventory includes 86 survey questions on territorial autonomy, which amount to 71 items by excluding those questions repeated more than once.

The content analyses conducted in the second stage allowed to classify questions according to two main variables, both drawn from the codebook used for the content analysis of regionalist parties' manifestos conducted in WP7 (IMAJINE's Deliverable D7.2):

- 1) **Territorial demand** classifies survey questions according to whether they mention a specific form of territorial organisation (**independence, federalism, modify, action**) or not (Not a territorial demand).
- 2) Questions coded as Territorial demands, were further coded using the second variable, named "**Motivation**", which recalls the frames used in WP7 content analysis to explain the justifications used by parties to explain their support for their territorial demands (**Political, Socioeconomic, Cultural**).

Table 12 Frequencies of collected survey question on Territorial autonomy, according to the two classification's variables

Frequencies	Territorial demand	Motivation
1	63	13
2	6	
3	9	
4	8	
Total	86	13

6.1 The concept of Territorial autonomy within a spatial justice framework

According to a spatial justice approach, the goal of reducing territorial inequalities also implies to look at territories as the main protagonist and responsible of their own development, rather a mere recipient of aids.

As outlined in Jones et al (2019), some approaches to territorial cohesion conceive it as a "window of opportunities" for the development of multilevel governance and the cooperation between different tiers of authority in spatial management. Besides to this, other approaches have underlined that "public policies ought to be context sensitive in a way that better takes into account the specific needs, characteristics, and potentials of places and regions" (Ibidem, p. 104). All these lines of argument are consistent with the idea that the concept of spatial justice calls for an alternative approach to the goal of reducing inequalities, one that does not limit itself to transfer resources to the regions in needs, but rather provides them with the necessary powers, competencies, and capacities to **make them active shapers of their own future**.

According to this perspective, there is not a "one-size-fits-all" policy to reduce spatial gaps; likewise, neediest regions are not required to catch up with the same levels of development of the more suc-

cessful regions (Ibidem, p. 106). Rather, **regions should be empowered** and enabled to take the responsibility of defining the **policy objectives and the development goals that are more appropriate to the distinctive features and peculiarities of the region**.

Regions' empowerment is precisely the topic of investigation of WP7, which analyses the discourses of regionalist actors demanding for greater autonomy from the central state for their own region. As the analyses carried out in Tasks 7.1 and 7.2 reveal, regionalist actors have, over time, articulated different types of demands of regional empowerment, ranging from full independence to demands for some action by the central government. Moreover, they have justified these demands with different arguments, by pointing out on the political, cultural, socio-economic or even environmental implications of territorial restructuring. WP7 has sought to disentangle the different narratives of regionalist actors by developing a codebook for the content analysis of regionalist parties' documents (Deliverable D7.2) that includes, among the others, coding variables aiming at capturing the different types of territorial demands and the arguments (defined as frames) used to justify them.

6.2 From the concept to the survey measurement of Territorial autonomy

In line with the work on regionalist actors carried out under WP7, the section on Territorial Autonomy in the WP4 survey aims, precisely, at exploring (1) public opinion's **support for different forms of regional autonomy** and (2) attitudes towards some of the **arguments that are often used by regionalist actors to justify their autonomist claims** (i.e. frames).

The two variables used in the Inventory's section on Territorial autonomy allow identifying survey questions according to these two main research goals.

Type of territorial demand

The first coding variable identifies those questions asking people's support for different types of territorial change. Coded questions can be classified according to the following categories:

- 1) **Independence:** Questions explicitly addressing the question of regions' full independence.
- 2) **Federalism:** questions concerning the creation of a federal state. They also include questions where, although not explicitly mentioned the federal system is indirectly indicated by describing the typical features of a federal system (e.g. state's full competencies on defence and security, with remaining policy areas being under federated territories' competence).
- 3) **Modify:** these questions are about the shift of competencies on some specific areas or simply the acknowledgement of greater self-government,
- 4) **Action:** questions concerning demands to the central state for specific resources or funding, but not policy competencies or powers.
- 5) **Not a territorial demand:** questions not explicitly addressing a territorial demand.

Questions on independence have been extensively asked in case-study surveys like those conducted by the CIS in Spain, due to the salience of the independentist question in that country. However, questions on independence have been included also in comparative studies like the ISSP in 1995 and 2003 (*"Which of these two statements comes closer to your own view?-It is essential that [Country] remains one [nation/state/country]-Parts of [Country] should be allowed to become fully separate [nations/states/countries] if they choose to"*). ISSP data from 1995, for instance, showed that majorities in Europe supported the unity of the state in most countries, although in the UK a noteworthy

30% advocated separation, with highest shares of separatists in Scotland (44%). Likewise, other countries revealed interesting variations among their regions: for instance, in Germany independence was mainly supported in Bayern (20%), while it comes with no surprise that in Italy 25% of separatist tendencies were recorded in Northern regions, as in those same years the Northern League was emerging in the Italian political scenario by claiming the secession of the North, thus questioning the unity of the nation in an unprecedented way (Basile 2015). The same question was asked in 2003, although in different countries but Poland, so that a time comparison is not possible. However, even in this case, it is interesting to notice that, although support for independence was nearly at 16% in Spain at aggregate level, support was much higher in specific Comundades Autonomas like the Pais Vasco (39%) and Catalunya (23%) (Table 13).

Table 13 Support for independence - % (ISSP 1995 and 2003)

	1995						2003		
	GER-West	GER-East	UK	ITA	NL	PL	Spain	Poland	France
Remains one state	84	92	70	84	95	85	84	85	88
Become separate	16	8	30	16	6	15	16	15	12
N	1,124	555	939	1,065	1,838	1,089	1,060	998	1,529
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100


Moving to questions on federalism, most of them can be found in case-study researches like the survey conducted in 2011 by the LAPS of the University of Siena, on an Italian sample of 803 individuals, where 43% of citizens expressed support for federalism, 35% were opposed and 22% were undecided¹⁰.

As for the questions on demands for some redistribution of competences between the state and regions (modify), most of them ask about the preferred level of intervention on a set of policy areas, or on the most important issue.

For instance, the INTUNE survey conducted in 2009 asked respondents whether certain political decisions should be taken at regional, national or European level. It should be noted that including the EU among the answers' options makes these questions mostly a measure of people's preferences for supranational integration in a context of multilevel governance than a measure of opinions about the centre-periphery cleavage. Nonetheless, as Figure 5 shows, data reveal interesting patterns of support for greater regional competences on Agricultural policy in Italy (39%) and Spain (32%); moreover, in Italy 38% of respondents wanted to take decisions on health at regional level, while 34% of British interviewees would opt for a subnational action on the fight against crime. As compared to the other countries, France, Germany and Poland, on the other hand, show lower levels of support for regional action. Interestingly, immigration was not considered as a regional-level issue in all countries.

¹⁰ In general, would you say you are in favour or against the introduction of federalism in Italy?

Figure 4 Level at which political decisions should be taken - % of Regional level (INTUNE 2009 –selected countries)



Note 4 In most European countries today, political decisions are made at three different levels of government: at the regional level, at the national level, and at the level of the European Union. In your opinion who should be responsible for each of the following policy areas? ... (Options: Regional; National; EU, None; Regional&National; National & European; All three, More than one)

Motivations

In some cases, the questions also include a specific justification of why a certain type of autonomy might be desirable or not. These dimensions are captured by the variable “**Motivation**”, which differentiates between:

- 1) **Political**: questions pointing to arguments of enhanced efficiency, greater political accountability and other political motivations for pursuing (or rejecting) regional autonomy.
- 2) **Socio-economic**: questions investigating the likely advantages (or disadvantages) of territorial autonomy for the region’s socio-economic development.
- 3) **Cultural**: questions related to the potential implication of autonomy for the protection of identity and linguistic, historical, and cultural distinctiveness of a region.
- 4) **Environmental**: questions concerning the implications of territorial autonomy for the environmental specificities and needs of a region.

Although the Inventory contains a few examples of these items, mostly drawn from case-study researches, they provide interesting analysis on how to frame the regionalist question in surveys.

For instance, the above-mentioned survey conducted by the Laps-University of Siena in Italy in 2011 revealed¹¹ that one-third of Italians were afraid that it would threaten the unity of the nation (33%)¹²,

¹¹ The following survey items were part of an experimental set of questions. The sample was divided into two halves, and each received a different introduction to the set of items. Sample A: “There are different opinions about the effects that the federal reform currently under discussion in Parliament can have on our country. Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. ...” Sample B: “There are different opinions about the effects that the federal reform currently under discussion in Parliament can have on the national unity. Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. ...” Because the experiment did not have a significant impact on answers, responses were merged.

¹² Item text: “The federal reform will threaten the national unity.”

and a majority (52%) thought it could increase local taxation¹³; likewise, only 38% thought it would enhance the efficiency of the healthcare system¹⁴.

To sum up:

- *Mirroring the work carried out under WP7 on regionalist parties and autonomist mobilisation, the WP4 survey will investigate citizens' preferences about territorial autonomy and their support for some of the main motivations that are commonly used to justify such mobilisation.*
- *In order to allow the greatest comparability, questions should take into account the differences among countries about the state's territorial organisation. This would imply a certain caution in considering examples drawn from case-study surveys, where most of these questions were retrieved from.*

7. Immigration and Emigration

Public opinion attitudes on immigration are among the most researched areas in the last decades, with several surveys potentially available for scrutiny (Migration Data Portal, 2020)¹⁵. For instance, the Eurobarometer provides for trends on immigration questions¹⁶, which include widely used and largely tested questions for this topic. Another valuable source for survey items is the database of the Transatlantic Trends Immigration (TTI), a stand-alone survey deriving from the Transatlantic Trends Survey, which, from 2008 to 2011 asked questions on immigration and integration issues¹⁷. The TTI represents one of the largest, comparative longitudinal studies on public opinion on these topics.

Given the vast amount of material available, the Inventory includes just a few examples to be considered as templates for use in WP4 Survey. Overall, there are 208 survey questions in the database, **amounting to 192** by excluding the repeated items, with 159 of them retrieved from the TTI continuity codebook archived at the University of Siena.

7.1 The concept of Migration flows within a spatial justice framework

Spatial inequalities are closely related to mobility issues and migration flows. On the one hand, territorial inequalities trigger emigration, with people deciding to leave disadvantaged place to improve their quality of life. On the other hand, settlement places are heavily affected by incoming migrants, by raising issues of integration and mutual acceptance.

¹³ Item text: "The federal reform will increase local taxation."

¹⁴ Item text: "The federal reform will enhance the health system."

¹⁵ <https://migrationdataportal.org/themes/public-opinion-migration>

¹⁶ <https://www.gesis.org/eurobarometer-data-service/search-data-access/eb-trends-trend-files/list-of-trends/immigrants>
<https://www.gesis.org/eurobarometer-data-service/search-data-access/eb-trends-trend-files/list-of-trends/migration>

¹⁷ From 2011 until 2014, questions on immigration were reinserted into the Transatlantic Trends Survey.

Hence, the spatial justice approach, on the one hand examines migration flows by looking at both migrants' and residents' perceptions (i.e. actors), on the other hand it takes into account two spatial levels, namely the destination and origins places (i.e. places).

By combining both the actors and places dimension, there are four relevant research questions to be addressed by the WP4 Survey, as summarised in Table 14:

Table 14 Research questions on migration flows in WP4 survey, according to a spatial justice approach.

		Actors	
		Migrants	Residents
Places	Origin	(1) Why do people decide to migrate?	(2) What is the impact of emigration in the origin place?
	Destination	(3) Do migrants feel integrated in their destination place?	(4) What is the impact of immigration in destination place?

7.1 From the concept to the survey measurement of Migration flows

Collected questions in the Inventory have been classified according to the following dimensions: **Emigration**, covering research questions (1), (2) and (3), **Immigration Policy** and **Attitudes towards migrants**, covering research question (4). Most survey items belong to the last coding group, with emigration being somewhat residual, with 14 collected questions only. Moreover, it should be noted that the majority of the collected items mostly refer to migration in terms of flows from one country to another; however, as also outlined in IMAJINE's Deliverable D5.1, **internal migration** represents a significant component of migration flows in countries, with likely relevant spatial justice's implications. This literature gap encourages to include in WP4 a number of independent variables that can be used to control for the kind of immigration respondents have experience of (e.g. by asking whether they have grown up in a different region from that where they currently live, and whether they moved to other country's regions, or EU/non-EU countries for more than 6 months during their life).

The remainder of this section will discuss the measurement of the attitudes towards migration, based on the above-mentioned four research questions.

Emigration I: Why do people decide to migrate?


Examining people's motivation to migrate is likely to reveal underlying pattern of socio-spatial (economic) inequalities that trigger mobility both between regions and across countries. Most of collected items on emigration actually ask about people's migration history, while few of them contains specific questions on the motivations for moving. Moreover, besides questions about actual (retrospective) moves, many other questions in this group ask about the (prospective) willingness to migrate.

For instance, the EUENGAGE survey, based on a question drawn from TTI, embedded an experimental question on prospective migration, with the experimental treatment consisting in priming a random half of respondents with the introduction referring to the "economic crisis"¹⁸. In this way, a

¹⁸ [In view of the economic crisis], have you ever thought about moving away from your home country for a year or more, or even permanently? Yes, you've given it a lot of consideration; Yes, you've given some consideration;

single item measures both the willingness to move and the likelihood of the economic motivation, related to the financial crisis, as trigger for migration. Interestingly, the priming information significantly reduced the willingness to migrate (47% among those who received the treatment, against 52% among those who did not receive it), suggesting that the economic crisis is not considered among the main motivation to migrate. However, there are interesting differences at country level, as Figure 5 shows. Indeed, in Italy and Poland and, to a lesser extent, in Greece, there are almost no differences between the two groups, while in Germany, the Netherlands, UK and the Czech Republic those who are primed about the economic crisis are largely less likely to express some propensity to move.

Figure 5 Propensity to move away from home country - % of Yes (Euengage 2017, N=12,911)



Furthermore, the German Emigration and Remigration Panel Study (GERPS)¹⁹ provides interesting examples of survey questions containing more specific motivations to emigrate, which provide respondents with a balanced choice between professional, family, or related to personal lifestyle motivations. A Policy Brief published from this study, for instance, reveals that most Germans who decide to migrate are high-skilled and their decision is mainly driven by own professional reasons (58%) or partner's professional reasons (29%), with women more likely to move because of their partner's job (37%) than men (21%) (Bundesinstitut für Bevölkerungsforschung/Federal Institute for Population Research 2019).

Emigration II: What is the impact of emigration in the origin place?

Scholarly research on migration flows has mostly focused on immigration, while neglecting its counterpart of emigration (Kustov, 2020). As a consequence, there are few survey items available measuring residents' perception of the effects of emigration in the origin place. Among these, the Inventory collected one question on **preferences** for emigration from a Gallup study ("In your view, should emigration from this country be kept at its present level, increased, or decreased?"), while another question from TTS measures the **salience** of emigration issue ("Do you think that emigration in [COUNTRY]

Yes, you currently live abroad; Yes, you've previously lived abroad; No, you've never thought about it. Only half of the sample received the introductory statement "In view of the economic crisis".


¹⁹Bundesinstitut für Bevölkerungsforschung (2019)

<https://www.bib.bund.de/EN/Research/Surveys/GERPS/German-Emigration-and-Remigration-Panel-Study.html> - Many questions in this survey are based on another German study conducted in 2015 on refugees (https://www.diw.de/en/diw_01.c.538695.en/research_advice/iab_bamf_soep_survey_of_refugees_in_germany.html)

is a very serious problem, not a serious problem, or not a problem at all for [COUNTRY]?”). Interestingly, TTS asked the same question in 2013 and 2014, but in the 2014 version it added the following definition of emigration: *“that is the number of [NATIONALITY] who are leaving to live in other countries”*. By comparing aggregate answers from 2013 and 2014 wave in the same countries, Kustov (2020) shows that an explicit definition of emigration does not impact results, with negligible differences in answers to both survey questions, although with some country variation. This finding partially rejects the hypothesis that people tend to confuse immigration and emigration, especially in those countries where the two words are very similar. Nonetheless, this argument should be taken with caution, as the comparison is based on longitudinal non panel data. At the same time, this suggests that, especially in a survey where both immigration and emigration are mentioned, adding a definition might be helpful in minimising the measurement error or respondents’ confusion, especially in those languages where the two terms sound similar.

Data from TTS 2014 survey reveal that majorities in countries featuring high emigration flows, like Greece or Spain (IMAJINE’s Deliverable D5.1) actually tend to consider emigration a problem (Figure Figure 6). However, 84% of respondents consider it a problem also in Italy, where the emigration rate is comparatively lower (Ibidem); on the contrary, nearly 12% of Dutch respondents were worried by emigration, although recent trends show an increasing emigration rate from this country. Overall, these preliminary findings provide only partial evidence of a correlation between emigration rates and citizens’ preferences; however, further data and control variables are needed to test such hypothesis (e.g. by controlling data at regional level and by socio-demographics like past emigration experiences).

Figure 6 Emigration as a problem (% of Very serious problem – selected countries) – TTS 2014



No questions, on the other hand, have been found containing more encompassing measures of emigration attitudes mirroring those usually asked in immigration study (see below), asking about the main reasons for supporting or opposing emigration flows from country and the perceived impact (e.g. perceived “brain drain” effect of emigration, due to the impoverishment of the origin place of the most talented and skilled people). A notable exception, however, is reported in Kustov (2020), who administered an experiment on a sample of British citizens in 2018, in which two random halves of the sample were asked about support for emigration of, respectively, low-skilled and high skilled people: [SPLIT A]: *“Now, please consider British citizens without university degree who are leaving to live in other countries. Do you think low-skilled emigration from Britain ...”* / [SPLIT B]: *“Now, please consider British citizens with university degree who are leaving to live in other countries... Do you think high-skilled emigration from Britain ...”* [ALL]: *“...should be increased a lot, increased a little, left*

the same as it is now, decreased a little, or decreased a lot?". Findings in this research show a significant higher support for low-skilled rather than high-skilled emigration, regardless of respondents' own skills or group attitudes.

Emigration III: Do migrants feel integrated in their destination place?

The German Emigration and Remigration Panel Study (GERPS) represents one of the few available public opinion researches examining the consequences of mobility, by comparing Germans who migrated with the non-mobile population. The study also offers examples of survey questions about migrants' difficulty in settling in the destination place, on a 0 – 6 points scale ("Now, please think about the first weeks and months in the country where you live: How easy or difficult did you set foot?"), with majorities (55%) reporting positive experiences of integration.

Immigration: What is the impact of immigration in destination place?

According to a spatial justice approach, migration flows have an impact on destination places, as migration increases the population size in a context of limited resources (Kustov 2020) and triggers complex cultural dynamics between natives and newcomers. Such an impact can be measured through survey questions about people's **attitudes towards migrants**.

On this aspect, research has mostly focused on two main approaches (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014). On the one hand, the political economy approaches paid emphasis to the perceived competition for (economic, labour, welfare) resources between residents and newcomers (e.g. sociotropic effects). On the other hand, socio-psychological approaches have focused on the perception of the egotropic effects on the receiving country; these studies look, for instance, at the perceived cultural threats posed by newcomers, but also at the prejudices and generalised predispositions between in and out-group, which are likely to affect attitudes towards migrants.

EUENGAGE survey data (2017) on ten European countries (Table 15) allow an empirical comparison between the two approaches, by asking respondents' perception of the impact of immigration on Country and Nationality people. Indeed, data shows that welfare (71%) and security (70% and 59%) concerns seems to trigger anti - immigrants' attitudes more than cultural threats (59% and 56%), although the latter are supported by majorities among interviewees.


Table 15 Attitudes towards migrants: Economic and sociotropic effects (EUENGAGE 2017 - % N=11,141)

"Can you please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements about the general impact of immigration on [COUNTRY] and [NATIONALITY] people?" (Answer options: 1. Strongly agree, 2. Somewhat agree, 3. Somewhat disagree, 4. Strongly disagree).	
	%
Immigrants contribute more in taxes than they benefit from health and welfare services - % Strongly/somewhat disagree .	71
Immigrants increase the likelihood of a terrorist attack in (OUR COUNTRY) - % Strongly/somewhat agree .	70
Immigrants are a significant cause of crime in (OUR COUNTRY) - % Strongly/somewhat agree . The religious practices of immigrants are a threat to the (NATIONALITY) way of life and its traditions - % Strongly/somewhat agree .	59
The religious practices of immigrants are a threat to the (NATIONALITY) way of life and its traditions - % Strongly/somewhat agree .	59

An interesting survey question on attitudes towards immigrants and immigration, holding a more explicit spatial approach, is that one on the perceived success of migrants' integration in both the city/area where people leave and their own country, asked in the Special Eurobarometer 469 (2017). Notably, in all countries but Romania the integration is perceived as more successful in city/area of residence than in country, and especially in Germany, Spain, and France.

This finding suggests that, first, the territorial level indicated in the formulation of the survey question has an impact on answers and, second, that the perceived integration problems in public opinion might be more the product of media communication on migrants than of actual direct experiences of interaction with migrants.

Figure 7 Successful integration in country or city/area (% Very/Fairly successful – N=9125; Respondents per country: from 1016 in Spain to 1554 in Germany).




Besides attitudes towards migrants, migration flows also yield relevant policy implications. Indeed, as also suggested by the Political Economy approach, migration flows boost a competition for resources between residents and newcomers, in a context of limited resources. This leads to focus on **citizens' preferences about immigration policies** and, in particular, on migrants' access to national governments' redistributive policies. Indeed, many of the questions coded as "Immigration policy" in the section on Immigration & Emigration come from the Cohesion section, where they were tagged as non-territorially related.

These questions might focus on several aspects, such as the **preferred level** at which decisions on migration policy should be taken or support for **actual policies** of integration, hosting, or redistribution of resources to migrants.

A very simple but effective question, encompassing people's preferences towards Immigration policy is that one asked in the PERCEIVE survey: "(COUNTRY) should have more restrictions on immigration than it does today". Data show that support for more restrictive policies is generally high, reaching a peak in the Netherlands (7 average), while the lowest score can be found in Poland (Figure 8).

Figure 8 Support for restrictive policies on immigration (average scores – PERCEIVE survey 2017).



This finding comes at odds with SOLIDUS' research, which found that 60% of respondents was in agreement with placing no restrictions on immigrants to come, work and live in country, although with relevant country differences. The different results, however, could be explained also by the different formulation of the question, which emphasised the aspect of immigrants coming to work. This inevitably rules out illegal migration, which, on the contrary, might be implicitly recalled in the PERCEIVE's formulation. Interestingly, however, SOLIDUS proposed an experimental treatment, by asking a question on access to health care also to illegal immigrants, before and after presenting a piece of scientific information. Reported results show that the initial share of respondents supporting this policy increased from 51% to 65% after presenting the information (Ramos et al. 2017).

To sum up

- *In line with the spatial justice approach, WP4 should include also questions about the spatial effects of inequalities on people's mobility. In particular, questions should look at the phenomena of immigration and emigration, by considering both the residents' and migrants' perspectives.*
- *It would be useful to integrate the question on emigration with a definition of emigration, in order to avoid respondents' confusion between immigration and emigration, especially in those languages where the used terms are similar.*
- *When asking about perceptions on migrants' integration, the city level seems the more appropriate to stimulate respondents' direct experiences.*
- *In order to take into account the differences between internal and external migration, WP4 should include at least some independent variable that allows to track people's movements within and across countries, in order to examine whether and to what extent the two kinds of (internal and external) immigration/emigration patterns are likely to differ with each other.*

Concluding Remarks

The present report described the Inventory of survey questions on Territorial Inequalities, Cohesion, Autonomy and Migration, used as baseline source for templates to be used for the design of the WP4 survey questionnaire and as a theoretical background for future analyses based on these survey data.

The report has also provided the theoretical grounds for the development of survey measures in WP4, based on the research carried out in WPs 1 through 7. In particular, the review of the collected

survey questions has provided the occasion to critically examine the challenges posed by the conceptualisation of the spatial justice for the operationalisation procedure, and to suggest likely solutions to address them. Therefore, each section concludes with a number of suggestions to be taken into account in the survey design process.

References

- Balcells, L., Fernández-Albertos, J. and Kuo A. (2015). Preferences for Inter-regional Redistribution, *Comparative Political Studies* 48(10), pp. 1318-1351.
- Barca, F. (2009) An Agenda for a Reformed Cohesion Policy: A place-based approach to meeting European Union challenges and expectations (Independent Report prepared at the request of Danuta Hübner, Commissioner for Regional Policy). Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/archive/policy/future/pdf/report_barca_v0306.pdf
- Basile, L. (2015). A dwarf among giants? Party competition between ethno-regionalist and state-wide parties on the territorial dimension: The case of Italy (1963–2013). *Party Politics*, 21(6), 887-899.
- Brunazzo, M. (2016). The history and evolution of Cohesion policy. In *Handbook on Cohesion Policy in the EU*. Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Bundesinstitut für Bevölkerungsforschung (Ed.) (2019): Gewinner der Globalisierung. Individuelle Konsequenzen von Auslandsaufenthalten und internationaler Mobilität. Policy Brief, Dezember 2019. <https://www.bib.bund.de/EN/Research/Migration/Projects/german-emigration-remigration-panel-study.html>
- Charron, N., and Bauhr, M. (2018). What do citizens think about redistribution and aid within the EU?. *QoG Working Paper Series*, 2018(2), 2.
- Davies, B. (1968). Social needs and resources in local services. London: Michael Joseph.
- Delanty, G. (2008) 'Fear of others: Social exclusion and the European crisis of solidarity', *Social Policy and Administration* 42(6): 676– 690. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9515.2008.00631.x
- Fernandes, S. and Rubio E. (2012) 'Solidarity Within the Eurozone: How Much, What for, for How Long?', *Jacques Delors Institute Policy Papers*, n. 51 (February 2012), retrieved from http://www.notre-europe.eu/media/solidarityemu_s.fernandes-e.rubio_ne_feb2012.pdf?pdf=ok
- Fowler, F. J., Jr. (1995). Applied social research methods series, Vol. 38. Improving survey questions: Design and evaluation. Sage Publications, Inc.
- Gerhards, J., Lengfeld, H., Ignácz, Z. S., Kley, F. K. and Priem, M. (2019). European Solidarity in Times of Crisis. Insights from a Thirteen-Country Survey. Abingdon/Oxon, New York/NY: Routledge.
- Grasso, Maria T., and Christian Lahusen. (2019). European Solidarity at a Crossroads? Citizens' Attitudes and Political Behaviors in Europe. *American Behavioral Scientist* <https://doi.org/10.1177/0002764218823846>.
- Hainmueller, J., & Hopkins, D. J. (2014). Public attitudes toward immigration. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 17.
- IMAJINE Deliverable D1.1 Conceptual review of the Scientific Literature.
- IMAJINE Deliverable D5.1 Synthesis report on migration flows.

IMAJINE Deliverable D7.2 Summary Report on Comparative Framing Analysis of Regionalist Movements' Political Claims.

IMAJINE Deliverables D7.1 Conceptual Framework and Contextualisation Case Study Report.

Jones, R., Moio, S., Weckroth, M., Woods, M., Luukkonen, J., Meyer, F., & Miggelbrink, J. (2019). Re-conceptualising Territorial Cohesion through the Prism of spatial justice: Critical perspectives on academic and policy discourses. In *Regional and Local Development in Times of Polarisation* (pp. 97-119). Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore.

Kustov, A. (2020). 'Bloom where you're planted': explaining public opposition to (e) migration. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 1-20.

Lahusen C. and Grasso, M. (2018) 'Solidarity in Europe: a comparative assessment and discussion', In Lahusen C, and Grasso M. (eds) *Solidarity in Europe*, Cham: Springer: 253–281.

Lawrence, E. D., and Sides, J. (2014). The consequences of political innumeracy. *Research & Politics*. <https://doi.org/10.1177/2053168014545414>

Lefebvre, H. 1970. *La Révolution Urbaine*. Paris: Gallimard.

Lengfeld, Holger and Florian K. Kley. 2017. 'Territorial Solidarity'. In Research report on transnational solidarity in the EU – Results from the Transnational European Solidarity Survey (TESS) - Deliverable 2.3 - Project SOLIDUS <http://solidush2020.eu/outcomes/>

Medeiros, E. (2016). Territorial Cohesion: An EU concept, *European Journal of Spatial Development*, 60.

Rauhut Daniel (2018) A Rawls-Sen Approach to Spatial Injustice vol.4 no.3 *Social Science Spectrum*, pp. 109-122.

Raul Ramos, R.Jordi Suriñach J.and Marta Soler M. (2017) Scientifically Informed Solidarity in Research report on transnational solidarity in the EU - Results from the Transnational European Solidarity Survey (TESS)

Smith A. (1992). *Le origini etniche delle nazioni*. Bologna: Il Mulino.

Sniderman, P. M., Peri, P., de Figueiredo Jr, R. J., & Piazza, T. (2000). *The outsider: Prejudice and politics in Italy*. Princeton University Press.

Soja, E. (2009). The city and spatial justice. *Justice Spatiale - Spatial Justice*, n° 01, September 2009.

Soja, E. (2010). *Seeking spatial justice*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Widuto, A. (2019) Regional inequalities in the EU European Parliamentary Research Service [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI\(2019\)637951](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI(2019)637951)

Zaucha, J., Komornicki T., Böhme K., Świątek D., Żuber P. (2014) Territorial Keys for Bringing Closer the Territorial Agenda of the EU and Europe 2020, *European Planning Studies*, vol. 22(2) pp. 246-267

Appendix

A1. Inventory – Codebook

Variables common to all sections

Question ID: Unique identifier for each question.

1. INEQ_XX
2. COES_XX
3. AUTO_XX
4. IMM_XX

Question text: Full text of the survey question as it appears in the codebook.

Frequencies:* Number of times in which the same question has been found.

VALUE XX

**Questions were counted as identical when the question text was the same in different studies or with just a few, irrelevant, changes in the formulation of the question (e.g. version 1 asks: “Please tell me whether do you agree” and version 2: “Do you agree or disagree ...”). When the questions were similar but with some substantial change in the phrasing of the question, they have been considered as similar and a relevant code has been applied in the third stage to identify these cases (See below).*

Similarities: Presence of similar questions in the Inventory.

1. Yes
2. No

Section: Section to which the question has been assigned, among the four IMAJINE’s core topic.

3. Inequalities
4. Solidarity
5. Territorial autonomy
6. Immigration/Emigration

Label:(If available): label applied to the variable in the dataset.

TEXT

Variable name: (If available): name used to identify the variable in the dataset.**

** In some cases, it is not possible from the codebooks to differentiate whether the code used to identify a question is the label or the variable name.

TEXT

Study name: Name of the study.

TEXT (See also List of sources in Appendix A3)

Year: Year of the study.

YYYY

Scope: Scope of the survey

1. Cross-country
2. Case-study.

Variables specific to each section

Section 1. INEQUALITIES

Territorial: Questions dealing with territorial aspects.

1. Yes
2. No

Dimension: Territorial inequality's dimension measured by the survey question.

1. Direct
2. Indirect
3. Justice
4. Cause

Section 2. COHESION

Territorial: Questions dealing with territorial aspects.

1. Yes
2. No

Dimension: Territorial inequality's dimension measured by the survey question.

1. Policy
2. Knowledge
3. Motivation – self-interest
4. Motivation – identity
5. Motivation – normative
6. Deservingness

Section 3. AUTONOMY

Territorial Demand: Type of territorial demand asked in survey question.

1. Independence
2. Federalism
3. Modify
4. Action
5. Not a territorial demand

Motivation: Justification asked to justify support/opposition to territorial autonomy.

1. Political
2. Socioeconomic
3. Cultural

Section 4. IMMIGRATION/EMIGRATION

Dimension: Mobility's dimension measured by the survey question.

1. Emigration
2. Immigration policy
3. Attitudes towards migrants

A2. Keywords used for search in ZACAT engine

(<https://zacat.gesis.org/webview/>)

Dimension	Keyword
Inequalities	Rich*
	Poor*
	Income
	Inequalit*
	Equalit*
Solidarity	Disadvant*
	resourc*
	redistribut*
	solidarity
	help*
Territorial Autonomy	Autonom*
	Region*
	Federal*
	Territorial
Migration	birth
	migra*
	immigra*
	foreign*

A3. List of sources used for the Inventory

Comparative and Trend surveys

1. EB – Eurobarometer: Standard and Special EB (Cross-country - Europe)

Commission of the European Communities (2012): Eurobarometer 2 (Oct-Nov 1974). GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA0986 Data file Version 1.0.1, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10854>

Commission of the European Communities (2012): Eurobarometer 3 (May 1975). GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA0987 Data file Version 1.0.1, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10855>

Commission of the European Communities (2012): Eurobarometer 4 (Oct-Nov 1975). GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA0988 Data file Version 1.0.1, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10856>

Commission of the European Communities (2012): Eurobarometer 5 (May-Jun 1976). GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA0989 Data file Version 1.0.1, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10857>

Commission of the European Communities (2012): Eurobarometer 6 (Nov 1976). GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA0990 Data file Version 1.0.1, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10859>

Commission of the European Communities (2012): Eurobarometer 8 (Oct-Nov 1977). GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA0992 Data file Version 1.0.1, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10862>

Commission of the European Communities (2012): Eurobarometer 10 (Oct-Nov 1978). GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA0994 Data file Version 1.0.1, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10864>

Commission of the European Communities (2012): Eurobarometer 10A (Oct-Nov 1978). GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA0995 Data file Version 1.0.1, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10865>

Commission of the European Communities (2012): Eurobarometer 11 (Apr 1979). GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA1036 Data file Version 1.0.1, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10866>

Commission of the European Communities (2012): Eurobarometer 13 (Apr 1980). Faits et Opinions, Paris. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA1038 Data file Version 1.0.1, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10868>

Commission of the European Communities (2012): Eurobarometer 15 (Apr 1981). Faits et Opinions, Paris. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA1206 Data file Version 1.1.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10870>

Commission of the European Communities (2012): Eurobarometer 16 (Oct-Nov 1981). Faits et Opinions, Paris. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA1207 Data file Version 1.0.1, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10871>

Commission of the European Communities (2012): Eurobarometer 17 (Mar-Apr 1982). Faits et Opinions, Paris. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA1208 Data file Version 1.0.1, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10872>

Commission of the European Communities (2012): Eurobarometer 18 (Oct 1982). Faits et Opinions, Paris. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA1209 Data file Version 1.0.1, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10873>

Commission of the European Communities (2012): Eurobarometer 19 (Mar-Apr 1983). Faits et Opinions, Paris. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA1318 Data file Version 1.0.1, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10874>

Commission of the European Communities (2012): Eurobarometer 20 (Oct 1983). Faits et Opinions, Paris. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA1319 Data file Version 1.0.1, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10876>

Commission of the European Communities (2012): Eurobarometer 21 (Apr 1984). Faits et Opinions, Paris. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA1320 Data file Version 1.0.1, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10878>

Commission of the European Communities (2012): Eurobarometer 22 (Oct 1984). Faits et Opinions, Paris. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA1321 Data file Version 1.0.1, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10879>

Commission of the European Communities (2012): Eurobarometer 24 (Oct 1985). Faits et Opinions, Paris. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA1542 Data file Version 1.0.1, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10881>

Commission of the European Communities (2012): Eurobarometer 26 (Nov 1986). Faits et Opinions, Paris. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA1544 Data file Version 1.0.1, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10883>

Commission of the European Communities (2012): Eurobarometer 28 (Nov 1987). Faits et Opinions, Paris. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA1713 Data file Version 1.1.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10885>

Commission of the European Communities (2012): Eurobarometer 30 (Oct-Nov 1988). Faits et Opinions, Paris. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA1715 Data file Version 1.0.1, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10887>

Commission of the European Communities (2012): Eurobarometer 31A (Jun-Jul 1989). Faits et Opinions, Paris. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA1751 Data file Version 1.0.1, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10889>

Commission of the European Communities (2012): Eurobarometer 35.0 (Mar 1991). INRA, Brussels. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA2031 Data file Version 1.1.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10895>

Commission of the European Communities (2012): Eurobarometer 36 (Oct-Nov 1991). INRA, Brussels. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA2081 Data file Version 1.1.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10848>

Commission of the European Communities (2012): Eurobarometer 37.1 (Apr-May 1992). INRA, Brussels. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA2241 Data file Version 1.0.1, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10901>

European Commission (2012): Eurobarometer 40 (Oct-Nov 1993). INRA, Brussels. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA2459 Data file Version 1.1.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10908>

European Commission (2012): Eurobarometer 41.1 (Jun-Jul 1994). INRA, Brussels. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA2491 Data file Version 1.1.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10910>

European Commission (2012): Eurobarometer 44.1 (Nov-Dec 1995). INRA, Brussels. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA2690 Data file Version 1.0.1, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10917>

European Commission (2012): Eurobarometer 44.2bis (Jan-Mar 1996). INRA, Brussels. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA2828 Data file Version 1.0.1, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10919>

European Commission (2012): Eurobarometer 44.3 (Feb-Apr 1996). INRA, Brussels. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA2829 Data file Version 1.0.1, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10920>

European Commission (2012): Eurobarometer 44.3OVR (Feb-Apr 1996). INRA, Brussels. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA2830 Data file Version 1.0.1, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10921>

European Commission (2012): Eurobarometer 45.1 (Apr-May 1996). INRA, Brussels. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA2831 Data file Version 1.0.1, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10922>

European Commission (2012): Eurobarometer 46.0 (Oct-Nov 1996). INRA, Brussels. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA2898 Data file Version 1.0.1, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10923>

European Commission (2012): Eurobarometer 47.1 (Mar-Apr 1997). INRA, Brussels. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA2936 Data file Version 1.0.1, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10926>

European Commission (2012): Eurobarometer 47.2 (Apr-Jun 1997). INRA, Brussels. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA2937 Data file Version 1.0.1, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10927>

European Commission (2012): Eurobarometer 48.0 (Oct-Nov 1997). INRA, Brussels. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA2959 Data file Version 1.0.1, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10929>

European Commission (2012): Eurobarometer 49 (Apr-May 1998). INRA, Brussels. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA3052 Data file Version 1.1.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10930>

European Commission (2012): Eurobarometer 50.0 (Oct-Nov 1998). INRA, Brussels. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA3085 Data file Version 1.1.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10845>

European Commission (2012): Eurobarometer 50.1 (Nov-Dec 1998). INRA, Brussels. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA3086 Data file Version 1.0.1, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10828>

European Commission (2012): Eurobarometer 51.0 (Mar-May 1999). INRA, Brussels. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA3171 Data file Version 1.0.1, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10931>

European Commission (2012): Eurobarometer 52.0 (Oct-Nov 1999). INRA, Brussels. GESIS data archive, Cologne. ZA3204 data file version 1.0.1, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10933>

European Commission (2012): Eurobarometer 52.1 (Nov-Dec 1999). INRA, Brussels; NSD, Bergen. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA3205 Data file Version 2.0.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.11377>

European Commission (2012): Eurobarometer 54.2 (Jan-Feb 2001). European Opinion Research Group (EORG), Brussels. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA3388 Data file Version 1.1.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10938>

European Commission (2012): Eurobarometer 55.0 (Mar-Apr 2001). European Opinion Research Group (EORG), Brussels. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA3506 Data file Version 1.0.1, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10940>

European Commission (2012): Eurobarometer 55.1 (Apr-May 2001). European Opinion Research Group (EORG), Brussels. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA3507 Data file Version 1.0.1, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10941>

European Commission (2012): Eurobarometer 55.2 (May-Jun 2001). European Opinion Research Group (EORG), Brussels. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA3509 Data file Version 1.0.1, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10943>

European Commission (2012): Eurobarometer 56.1 (Sept-Oct 2001). European Opinion Research Group (EORG), Brussels; NSD, Bergen. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA3626 Data file Version 2.0.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.11378>

European Commission (2012): Eurobarometer 56.2 (Oct-Nov 2001). European Opinion Research Group (EORG), Brussels. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA3627 Data file Version 1.0.1, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10946>

European Commission (2012): Eurobarometer 56.3 (Jan-Feb 2002). European Opinion Research Group (EORG), Brussels. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA3635 Data file Version 1.0.1, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10947>

European Commission (2012): Eurobarometer 57.1 (Mar-May 2002). European Opinion Research Group (EORG), Brussels. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA3639 Data file Version 1.0.1, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10949>

European Commission (2012): Eurobarometer 58.0 (Sep-Oct 2002). European Opinion Research Group (EORG), Brussels. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA3692 Data file Version 1.0.1, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10952>

European Commission (2012): Eurobarometer 59.1 (Mar-Apr 2003). European Opinion Research Group (EORG), Brussels. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA3904 Data file Version 1.0.1, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10955>

European Commission (2012): Eurobarometer 59.2 (May-Jun 2003). European Opinion Research Group (EORG), Brussels. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA3905 Data file Version 1.0.1, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10956>

European Commission (2012): Eurobarometer 60.1 (Oct-Nov 2003). European Opinion Research Group (EORG), Brussels. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA3938 Data file Version 1.0.1, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10958>

European Commission (2012): Eurobarometer 61 (Feb-Mar 2004). European Opinion Research Group (EORG), Brussels. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA4056 Data file Version 1.0.1, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10961>

European Commission (2012): Eurobarometer 62.1 (Oct-Dec 2004). TNS OPINION & SOCIAL, Brussels [Producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA4230 Data file Version 1.1.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10963>

European Commission (2012): Eurobarometer 63.1 (Jan-Feb 2005). TNS OPINION & SOCIAL, Brussels [Producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA4233 Data file Version 1.1.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10965>

European Commission (2012): Eurobarometer 64.2 (Oct-Nov 2005). TNS OPINION & SOCIAL, Brussels [Producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA4414 Data file Version 1.1.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10970>

European Commission (2012): Eurobarometer 64.3 (Nov-Dec 2005). TNS OPINION & SOCIAL, Brussels [Producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA4415 Data file Version 1.0.1, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10971>

European Commission (2012): Eurobarometer 65.3 (May-Jun 2006). TNS OPINION & SOCIAL, Brussels [Producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA4507 Data file Version 1.1.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10975>

European Commission (2012): Eurobarometer 66.1 (Sep-Oct 2006). TNS OPINION & SOCIAL, Brussels [producer]. GESIS data archive, Cologne. ZA4526 data file version 1.0.1, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10980>

European Commission (2012): Eurobarometer 66.3 (Nov-Dec 2006). TNS OPINION & SOCIAL, Brussels [producer]. GESIS data archive, Cologne. ZA4528 data file version 2.0.1, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10982>

European Commission (2012): Eurobarometer 67.1 (Feb-Mar 2007). TNS OPINION & SOCIAL, Brussels [producer]. GESIS data archive, Cologne. ZA4529 data file version 3.0.1, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10983>

European Commission (2012): Eurobarometer 68.1 (Sep-Nov 2007). TNS OPINION & SOCIAL, Brussels [producer]. GESIS data archive, Cologne. ZA4565 data file version 4.0.1, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10988>

European Commission (2012): Eurobarometer 70.1 (Oct-Nov 2008). TNS OPINION & SOCIAL, Brussels [producer]. GESIS data archive, Cologne. ZA4819 data file version 3.0.2, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10989>

European Commission (2012): Eurobarometer 71.2 (May-Jun 2009). TNS OPINION & SOCIAL, Brussels [Producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA4972 Data file Version 3.0.2, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10990>

European Commission (2012): Eurobarometer 71.2 (May-Jun 2009). TNS OPINION & SOCIAL, Brussels [Producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA4972 Data file Version 3.0.2, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10990>

European Commission (2012): Eurobarometer 71.3 (Jun-Jul 2009). TNS OPINION & SOCIAL, Brussels [Producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA4973 Data file Version 3.0.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.11135>

European Commission (2012): Eurobarometer 72.4 (Oct-Nov 2009). TNS OPINION & SOCIAL, Brussels [Producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA4994 Data file Version 3.0.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.11141>

European Commission (2012): Eurobarometer 73.4 (May 2010). TNS OPINION & SOCIAL, Brussels [Producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA5234 Data file Version 2.0.1, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.11479>

European Commission (2012): Eurobarometer 73.5 (Jun 2010). TNS OPINION & SOCIAL, Brussels [Producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA5235 Data file Version 4.0.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.11432>

European Commission (2013): Eurobarometer 43.1bis (May-Jun 1995). INRA, Brussels. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA2639 Data file Version 1.1.1, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.11776>

European Commission (2013): Eurobarometer 69.2 (Mar-May 2008). TNS OPINION & SOCIAL, Brussels [producer]. GESIS data archive, Cologne. ZA4744 data file version 5.0.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.11755>

European Commission (2013): Eurobarometer 71.1 (Jan-Feb 2009). TNS OPINION & SOCIAL, Brussels [Producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA4971 Data file Version 4.0.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.11756>

European Commission (2013): Eurobarometer 74.1 (AUG-SEP 2010). TNS OPINION & SOCIAL, Brussels [Producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA5237 Data file Version 4.2.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.11625>

European Commission (2013): Eurobarometer 74.2 (2010). TNS OPINION & SOCIAL, Brussels [Producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA5449 Data file Version 2.2.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.11626>

European Commission (2013): Eurobarometer 74.3 (2010). TNS OPINION & SOCIAL, Brussels [Producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA5450 Data file Version 5.2.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.11627>

European Commission (2014): Eurobarometer 75.2 (2011). TNS OPINION & SOCIAL, Brussels [Producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA5480 Data file Version 4.0.1, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.11853>

European Commission (2014): Eurobarometer 75.4 (2011). TNS OPINION & SOCIAL, Brussels [Producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA5564 Data file Version 3.0.1, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.11851>

European Commission (2014): Eurobarometer 77.2 (2012). TNS OPINION & SOCIAL, Brussels [Producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA5598 Data file Version 4.0.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.12032>

European Commission (2015): Eurobarometer 76.4 (2011). TNS OPINION & SOCIAL, Brussels [Producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA5596 Data file Version 3.0.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.12181>

European Commission (2015): Eurobarometer 77.3 (2012). TNS OPINION & SOCIAL, Brussels [Producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA5612 Data file Version 2.0.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.12050>

European Commission and European Parliament, Brussels (2012): Eurobarometer 73.1 (Jan-Feb 2010). TNS OPINION & SOCIAL, Brussels [Producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA5000 Data file Version 4.0.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.11428>

European Commission and European Parliament, Brussels (2014): Eurobarometer 76.1 (2011). TNS OPINION & SOCIAL, Brussels [Producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA5565 Data file Version 4.0.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.11847>

European Commission and European Parliament, Brussels (2014): Eurobarometer 76.3 (2011). TNS Opinion&Social [producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA5567 Data file Version 2.0.1, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.12007>

European Commission and European Parliament, Brussels (2015): Eurobarometer 77.4 (2012). TNS OPINION & SOCIAL, Brussels [Producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA5613 Data file Version 3.0.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.12049>

European Commission and European Parliament, Brussels (2015): Eurobarometer 78.2 (2012). TNS opinion, Brussels [producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA5686 Data file Version 3.0.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.12367>

European Commission, Brussels (2015): Eurobarometer 78.1 (2012). TNS opinion, Brussels [producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA5685 Data file Version 2.0.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.12061>

European Commission, Brussels (2017): Eurobarometer 79.3 (2013). TNS opinion, Brussels [producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA5689 Data file Version 2.0.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.12718>

European Commission, Brussels (2017): Eurobarometer 79.4 (2013). TNS opinion, Brussels [producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA5852 Data file Version 4.0.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.12730>

European Commission, Brussels (2017): Eurobarometer 80.1 (2013). TNS opinion, Brussels [producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA5876 Data file Version 2.0.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.12768>

European Commission, Brussels (2017): Eurobarometer 81.1 (2014). TNS opinion, Brussels [producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA5878 Data file Version 2.0.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.12832>

European Commission, Brussels (2017): Eurobarometer 81.2 (March 2014). TNS opinion, Brussels [producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA5913 Data file Version 2.0.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.12884>

European Commission and European Parliament, Brussels (2018): Eurobarometer 84.1 (2015). TNS opinion [producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA6596 Data file Version 3.0.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.13191>

European Commission and European Parliament, Brussels (2020): Eurobarometer 86.1 (2016). TNS opinion, Brussels [producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA6697 Data file Version 2.0.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.13542>

European Commission and European Parliament, Brussels (2017): Eurobarometer 87.1 (2017). TNS opinion, Brussels [producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA6861 Data file Version 1.2.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.12922>

European Commission and European Parliament, Brussels (2018): Eurobarometer 88.1 (2017). TNS opinion, Brussels [producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA6925 Data file Version 1.0.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.12959>

European Commission and European Parliament, Brussels (2019): Eurobarometer 90.1 (2018). Kantar Public [producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA7484 Data file Version 1.0.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.13211>

European Commission, Brussels (2019): Eurobarometer 90.3 (2018). Kantar Public [producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA7489 Data file Version 1.0.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.13254>

European Commission and European Parliament, Brussels (2019): Eurobarometer 91.1 (2019). Kantar Public [producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA7561 Data file Version 1.0.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.13317>

European Commission, Brussels (2017): Eurobarometer 86.3 (2016). TNS opinion, Brussels [producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA6791 Data file Version 2.0.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.12812>

European Commission, Brussels (2017): Eurobarometer 87.3 (2017). TNS opinion, Brussels [producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA6863 Data file Version 1.0.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.12847>

European Commission, Brussels (2018): Eurobarometer 81.4 (2014). TNS opinion, Brussels [producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA5928 Data file Version 3.0.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.12956>

European Commission, Brussels (2018): Eurobarometer 82.3 (2014). TNS opinion, Brussels [producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA5932 Data file Version 3.0.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.13021>

European Commission, Brussels (2018): Eurobarometer 83.2 (2015). TNS opinion [producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA5965 Data file Version 2.0.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.13085>

European Commission, Brussels (2018): Eurobarometer 83.3 (2015). TNS opinion, Brussels [producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA5998 Data file Version 2.0.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.13133>

European Commission, Brussels (2019): Eurobarometer 84.3 (2015). TNS opinion, Brussels [producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA6643 Data file Version 4.0.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.13249>

European Commission, Brussels (2020): Eurobarometer 85.2 (2016). TNS opinion, Brussels [producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA6694 Data file Version 2.0.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.13438>

European Commission, Brussels (2020): Eurobarometer 86.2 (2016). TNS opinion, Brussels [producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA6788 Data file Version 1.5.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.13467>

European Commission, Brussels (2018): Eurobarometer 88.2 (2017) - Integration of immigrants in the European Union and Corruption. TNS opinion, Brussels [producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA6927 Data file Version 1.0.0, (Special EB 469) <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.13005>

European Commission, Brussels (2019): Eurobarometer 88.4 (2017). TNS opinion, Brussels [producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA6939 Data file Version 2.0.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.13288>

European Commission, Brussels (2019): Eurobarometer 90.2 (2018). Kantar Public [producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA7488 Data file Version 1.0.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.13289>

European Commission, Brussels (2019): Eurobarometer 91.2 (2019). Kantar Public [producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA7562 Data file Version 1.0.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.13318>

2. Flash Eurobarometer (Cross-country - Europe)

European Commission, Brussels (2015) Flash Eurobarometer 156: The quality of life in 31 European cities (2004). TNS Sofres – EOS Gallup [producer]
https://data.europa.eu/euodp/it/data/dataset/S1235_156

Papacostas, Antonis, & Soufflot de Magny, Renaud (2007). Flash Eurobarometer 189a (EU communication and the citizens - General Public Survey). *GESIS Datenarchiv, Köln. ZA4453 Datenfile Version 1.0.0*, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.4453>.

Soufflot de Magny, Renaud (2007). Flash Eurobarometer 189b (EU communication and the citizens - Decision Makers). *GESIS Datenarchiv, Köln. ZA4454 Datenfile Version 1.0.0*, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.4454>.

European Commission (2007): Flash Eurobarometer 202 (Young Europeans). The GALLUP Organisation, Brussels. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA4542 Data file Version 1.0.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.4542>

European Commission (2007): Flash Eurobarometer 206a (Attitudes on issues related to EU Energy Policy). GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA4546 Data file Version 1.0.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.4546>

European Commission (2009): Flash Eurobarometer 216 (Public attitudes and perceptions in the euro area). The GALLUP Organisation, Brussels. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA4979 Data file Version 1.0.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.4979>

European Commission, Brussels (2015) Flash Eurobarometer 227: Expectations of European citizens regarding the social reality in 20 years (2008). The Gallup Organization Hungary [producer]
https://data.europa.eu/euodp/it/data/dataset/S683_227

European Commission (2008): Flash Eurobarometer 234 (Citizens' Awareness and Perceptions of EU Regional Policy). The GALLUP Organisation, Brussels. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA4739 Data file Version 1.0.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.4739>

European Commission, Brussels (2015) Flash Eurobarometer 261 (1/2009)"Flash Eurobarometer on water. 1st Archive release GESIS Study ID: ZA4890. The Gallup Organization Hungary [producer]
https://data.europa.eu/euodp/it/data/dataset/S743_261

European Commission, Brussels (2015) Flash Eurobarometer 276 (ZA5213) Social Impact of the Crisis - Wave 1 (2009) - 1st Archive release (v1.0.0)
https://data.europa.eu/euodp/it/data/dataset/S801_276

European Commission, Brussels (2015) Flash Eurobarometer 277: Perception survey on quality of life in European cities (2009) https://data.europa.eu/euodp/en/data/dataset/S764_277_A_B_C_D

European Commission (2011): Flash Eurobarometer 279 (Public Attitudes and Perceptions in the Euro Area, wave 8). The GALLUP Organisation, Brussels. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA5438 Data file Version 1.0.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10227>

European Commission, Brussels (2015) Flash Eurobarometer 286: Monitoring the social impact of the crisis : public perceptions in the European Union.
https://data.europa.eu/euodp/it/data/dataset/S852_286

European Commission, Brussels (2015) Flash Eurobarometer 288: Monitoring the social impact of the crisis: public perceptions in the European Union - Wave 3
https://data.europa.eu/euodp/it/data/dataset/S850_288

European Commission, Brussels (2015) Flash Eurobarometer 289: Monitoring the social impact of the crisis: public perceptions in the European Union - Wave 4
https://data.europa.eu/euodp/it/data/dataset/S851_289

European Commission (2011): Flash Eurobarometer 298 (Citizens' Awareness and Perceptions of EU Regional Policy, wave 2). The GALLUP Organisation, Brussels. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA5445 Data file Version 1.0.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10222>

European Commission, Brussels (2015) Flash Eurobarometer 311: Monitoring the social impact of the crisis: public perceptions in the European Union - Wave 5
https://data.europa.eu/euodp/it/data/dataset/S948_311

European Commission, BrusselsDG CommunicationCOMM A1 'Research and Speechwriting' (2013): Flash Eurobarometer 338 (Monitoring the Social Impact of the Crisis: Public Perceptions in the European Union, wave 6). GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA5773 Data file Version 1.0.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.11582>

European Commission, Brussels (2014): Flash Eurobarometer 356 (Public Opinion in the European Union Regions). TNS Political&Social [producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA5791 Data file Version 1.0.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.11876>

European Commission, Brussels (2014): Flash Eurobarometer 384 (Citizens' Awareness and Perceptions of EU Regional Policy, wave 3). TNS Political & Social [producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA5898 Data file Version 1.0.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.11955>

European Commission (2013): Flash Eurobarometer 360 (Attitudes of Europeans Towards Air Quality). TNS Political & Social [producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA5795 Data file Version 1.0.1, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.11580>

European Commission (2015): Flash Eurobarometer 362: Flash Eurobarometer survey on the euro (2012) https://data.europa.eu/euodp/it/data/dataset/S1038_362/resource/dc90f60c-6e35-4d4a-8e83-c290f86fd62b

European Commission, Brussels (2017): Flash Eurobarometer 366 (Quality of Life in European Cities). TNS Political&Social [producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA5885 Data file Version 1.1.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.12910>

European Commission, Brussels (2014): Flash Eurobarometer 385 (Justice in the EU). TNS Political & Social [producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA5899 Data file Version 1.0.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.11954>

European Commission, Brussels (2014): Flash Eurobarometer 386 (The Euro Area, 2013). TNS Political & Social [producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA5901 Data file Version 1.0.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.11941>

European Commission, Brussels (2014): Flash Eurobarometer 398 (Working Conditions). TNS Political & Social [producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA5909 Data file Version 1.0.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.11949>

European Commission, Brussels (2015): Flash Eurobarometer 405 (The Euro Area, October 2014). TNS Political & Social [producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA5946 Data file Version 1.0.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.12199>

European Commission, Brussels (2016): Flash Eurobarometer 419 (Quality of Life in European Cities 2015). TNS Political & Social [producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA6641 Data file Version 1.0.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.12516>

European Commission, Brussels (2016): Flash Eurobarometer 427 (Public Opinion in the EU Regions). TNS Political & Social [producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA6649 Data file Version 1.2.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.12597>

European Commission, Brussels (2015): Flash Eurobarometer 423 (Citizens' Awareness and Perceptions of EU Regional Policy, wave 4). TNS Political & Social [producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA6587 Data file Version 1.0.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.12371>

European Commission, Brussels (2017): Flash Eurobarometer 452 (Citizens' Awareness and Perceptions of EU Regional Policy, wave 5). TNS opinion, Brussels [producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA6858 Data file Version 1.0.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.12822>

European Commission, Brussels (2017): Flash Eurobarometer 458 (The Euro Area, October 2017). TNS opinion, Brussels [producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA6919 Data file Version 1.0.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.12936>

European Commission, Brussels (2018): Flash Eurobarometer 455: European Youth (2017) https://data.europa.eu/euodp/en/data/dataset/S2163_455_ENG

European Commission, Brussels DG Communication COMM.A.3 'Media monitoring and Eurobarometer' (2020). Flash Eurobarometer 472 (Public Opinion in the EU Regions). *GESIS Datenarchiv, Köln. ZA6966 Datenfile Version 1.0.0*, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.13526>.

European Commission, Brussels (2019): Flash Eurobarometer 478 (How do we build a stronger, more united Europe? The views of young people). Kantar Belgium, Brussels [producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA7555 Data file Version 1.0.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.13290>

3. EES - European Elections Studies (Cross-country - Europe)

Eijk, C. van der, Franklin, M., Schoenbach, K., Schmitt, H., Semetko, H., with: Brug, W. van der, Holmberg, S., Mannheimer, R., Marsh, M., Thomassen, J., Wessels, B., International Research Group "European Election Studies", IPSOS, Hamburg, Germany (primary investigator) (): European Election Study – 1999. DANS.<http://dx.doi.org/10.17026/dans-z9j-vy6m>

Schmitt, Hermann; Hobolt, Sara B.; Popa, Sebastian A.; Teperoglou, Eftichia; European Parliament, Directorate-General for Communication, Public Monitoring Unit (2016): European Parliament Election Study 2014, Voter Study, First Post-Election Survey. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA5160 Data file Version 4.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.12628

Eijk, C. van der, Franklin, M., Schoenbach, K., Schmitt, H., Semetko, H., with: Brug, W. van der, Holmberg, S., Mannheimer, R., Marsh, M., Thomassen, J., Wessels, B., International Research Group "European Election Studies", IPSOS, Hamburg, Germany (primary investigator) (): European Election Study – 1999. DANS.<http://dx.doi.org/10.17026/dans-z9j-vy6m>

Schmitt, Hermann; Bartolini, Stefano; Brug, Wouter van der; Eijk, Cees van der; Franklin, Mark; Fuchs, Dieter; Toka, Gabor; Marsh, Michael; Thomassen, Jacques (2009): European Election Study 2004 (2nd edition). GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA4566 Data file Version 2.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.10086

Egmond, Marcel van; Brug, Wouter van der; Hobolt, Sara; Franklin, Mark; Sapir, Eliyahu V. (2013): European Parliament Election Study 2009, Voter Study. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA5055 Data file Version 1.1.0, doi:10.4232/1.11760

4. ESS- European Social Survey (Cross-country - Europe)

ESS Round 9: European Social Survey Round 9 Data (2018). Data file edition 2.0. NSD - Norwegian Centre for Research Data, Norway – Data Archive and distributor of ESS data for ESS ERIC. doi:10.21338/NSD-ESS9-2018.

5. EVS – European Values Study (Cross-country - Europe)

EVS (2011): EVS - European Values Study 1981 - Integrated Dataset. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA4438 Data file Version 3.0.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10791>

EVS (2011): EVS - European Values Study 1990 - Integrated Dataset. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA4460 Data file Version 3.0.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10790>

EVS (2011): EVS - European Values Study 1999 - Integrated Dataset. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA3811 Data file Version 3.0.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.10789>

EVS (2016): European Values Study 2008: Integrated Dataset (EVS 2008) - Restricted Use File. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA4799 Data file Version 1.0.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.12483>

EVS (2020): European Values Study 2017: Integrated Dataset (EVS 2017). GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA7500 Data file Version 3.0.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.13511>

6. ISSP - . International Social Survey Program (Cross-country - World)

Kelley, Jonathan, Bean, Clive, Evans, Mariah DR, Haller, Max, Höllinger, Max, Mohler, Peter P., Braun, Michael, . . (1989). International Social Survey Program: Social Inequality I - ISSP 1987. GESIS data archive, Cologne. ZA1680 data file version 1.0.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.1680>.

ISSP Research Group (1992): International Social Survey Programme: Role of Government II - ISSP 1990. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA1950 Data file Version 1.0.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.1950>

Kelley, Jonathan, Bean, Clive, Evans, Mariah, Haller, Max, Hoellinger, Franz, Dimova, Lilia, Stoyanov, Alexander, . . (1994). International Social Survey Program: Social Inequality II - ISSP 1992. GESIS data archive, Cologne. ZA2310 data file version 1.0.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.2310>.

Kelley, Jonathan, Evans, Mariah, Haller, Max, Hoellinger, Franz, Dimova, Lilia, Tilkidjiev, Nikolay, Kostecky, Tomáš, . . (1998). International Social Survey Programme: National Identity I - ISSP 1995. GESIS Datenarchiv, Köln. ZA2880 Datenfile Version 1.0.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.2880>.

Kelley, Jonathan, Evans, Mariah, Dimova, Lilia, Papageorgiou, Bambos, Lemel, Yannick, Mohler, Peter Ph., Harkness, Janet, . . (1999). International Social Survey Program: Role of Government III - ISSP 1996. GESIS data archive, Cologne. ZA2900 data file version 1.0.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.2900>.

Kelley, Jonathan, Evans, Mariah, Zagórski, Krzysztof, Haller, Max, Hadler, Markus, Dimova, Lilia, Carleton University Survey Center, Canada, . . (2002). International Social Survey Program: Social Inequality III - ISSP 1999. GESIS data archive, Cologne. ZA3430 data file version 1.0.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.3430>.

Kelley, Jonathan, Sikora, Joanna, Evans, Mariah, Haller, Max, Hadler, Markus, Ressler, Regine, Scalon, Maria C., . . (2003). International Social Survey Program: Social Relations and Support Systems - ISSP 2001. GESIS data archive, Cologne. ZA3680 data file version 1.0.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.3680>.

Gibson, Rachel K., Haller, Max, Hadler, Markus, Hoellinger, Franz, Dimova, Lilia, Pyman, Heather, Pammett, Jon H., . . (2012). International Social Survey Program: National Identity II - ISSP 2003. GESIS data archive, Cologne. ZA3910 data file version 2.1.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.11449>.

Wilson, Shaun, Gibson, Rachel, Hadler, Markus, Hoellinger, Franz, Ressler, Regina, Haller, Max, Scalon, Maria Celi, . . (2012). International Social Survey Program: Citizenship - ISSP 2004. GESIS data archive, Cologne. ZA3950 data file version 1.3.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.11372>.

Philips, Timothy, Mitchell, Deborah, Pammett, Jon H., Jerolimov, Dinka M., Jokic, Boris, Mateju, Petr, Linek, Lukas, . . (2008). International Social Survey Program: Role of Government IV - ISSP 2006. GESIS data archive, Cologne. ZA4700 data file version 1.0.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.4700>.

Höllinger, Franz, Haller, Max, Evans, Ann, Carton, Ann, Segovia, Carolina, Institute for Social Research, Zagreb, Croatia, Papageorgiou, Bambos, . . (2018). International Social Survey Program: Religion III -

ISSP 2008. GESIS data archive, Cologne. ZA4950 data file version 2.3.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.13161>.

Ganzeboom, Harry BG (2015). International Social Survey Program: Social Inequality IV - ISSP 2009 (Netherlands). GESIS data archive, Cologne. ZA5995 data file version 1.0.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.12338>.

Plecitá, Klára, Lund Clement, Sanne, Andersen, Johannes, Shamshiri-Petersen, Ditte, Andersen, Jørgen G., Andersen, Morten H., Lolle, Henrik, . . (2015). International Social Survey Program: National Identity III - ISSP 2013. GESIS data archive, Cologne. ZA5950 data file version 2.0.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.12312>.

FORS swiss foundation for research in social sciences, c / o University of Lausanne, Switzerland, Gonzales T., Ricardo, Lyons, Pat, Wolf, Christof, Lund Clement, Sanne, Andersen, Johannes, Shamshiri-Petersen, Ditte, . . (2016). International Social Survey Program: Citizenship II - ISSP 2014. GESIS data archive, Cologne. ZA6670 data file version 2.0.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.12590>.

FORS, c / o University of Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland, Gonzales T., Ricardo, Mansfeldova, Zdenka, Wolf, Christof, Lund Clement, Sanne, Andersen, Johannes, Shamshiri-Petersen, Ditte, . . (2018). International Social Survey Program: Role of Government V - ISSP 2016. GESIS data archive, Cologne. ZA6900 data file version 2.0.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.13052>.

Muckenhuber, Johanna, Hadler, Markus, Höllinger, Franz, Dimova, Lilia, Steinmetz, Stephanie, Sapin, Marlène, Joye, Dominique, . . (2020). International Social Survey Program: Religion IV - ISSP 2018. GESIS data archive, Cologne. ZA7570 data file version 2.0.0, <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.13543>.

7. TTI - Transatlantic Trends on Immigration (Cross-country – World)

Ziebarth, Astrid, Bernstein, Hamutal, Nyiri, Zsolt, Isernia, Pierangelo, Diehl, Claudia, and Martin, Susan. Transatlantic Trends: Immigration, (2011. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2013-02-04. <https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR34423.v1>

Wunderlich, Tanja, Ziebarth, Astrid, Gustin, Delancey, Nyiri, Zsolt, Isernia, Pierangelo, Diehl, Claudia, and Martin, Susan. Transatlantic Trends: Immigration, 2010. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2012-05-16. <https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR33022.v1>

Wunderlich, Tanja, Ziebarth, Astrid, Gustin, Delancey, Isernia, Pierangelo, Diehl, Claudia, and Martin, Susan. Transatlantic Trends: Immigration, 2009. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2011-09-01. <https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR31801.v1>

Wunderlich, Tanja, Ziebarth, Astrid, Gustin, Delancey, Isernia, Pierangelo, Diehl, Claudia, and Martin, Susan. Transatlantic Trends: Immigration, 2008. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2011-08-16. <https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR26502.v1>

Surveys from EU-funded projects

8. COHESIFY (Cross country – Europe)

Borz, G. Brandenburg, H. and Mendez, C. (2017) The COHESIFY citizen survey dataset, Version 2017, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow. <http://www.cohesify.eu/data/>

9. EUENGAGE (Cross country – Europe)

EUENGAGE Survey (2016-2017) – Project funded under the H2020 programme (GA 649281)

10. INTUNE (Cross country – Europe)

Cotta, Maurizio, Isernia, Pierangelo, and Bellucci, Paolo. IntUne Mass Survey Wave 1, 2007. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2013-04-11. <https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR34421.v1>

11. PERCEIVE (Cross country – Europe)

Charron, N. (2017). PERCEIVE: project database - all original and secondary data files from UGOT [Data set]. Zenodo. <http://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3332792>

Charron, N., V. Lapuente & P. Annoni (2019). 2017 EQI Data. 'Measuring Quality of Government in EU Regions Across Space and Time.' Papers in Regional Science. DOI: 10.1111/pirs.12437. (QoG-Eqi)

Charron, N., Dijkstra, L., & Lapuente, V. (2015). 2013 EQI Data. Mapping the regional divide in Europe: A measure for assessing quality of government in 206 European regions. Social Indicators Research, 122(2), 315-346. (QoG-Eqi)

Charron, Nicholas, Lewis Dijkstra & Victor Lapuente (2014). 2013 EQI Data. Regional Governance Matters: Quality of Government within European Union Member States, Regional Studies, 48 (1): 68-90. DOI:10.1080/00343404.2013.770141 (QoG-Eqi)

12. REScEU (Cross country – Europe)

REScEU Research Group (2019) 'The REScEU 2019 Mass Survey Codebook', Edited by Francesco Visconti and Alessandro Pellegata (<https://www.resceu.eu/publications/working-papers/the-resceu-2019-mass-survey-codebook.html>)

13. SOLIDUS

SOLIDUS (2016) Research report on transnational solidarity in the EU - Results from the Transnational European Solidarity Survey (TESS) Deliverable 2.3.

14. TransSol (Cross country – Europe)

TransSol (2016) Population Survey Questionnaire Milestone MS4 TransSOL: European paths to transnational solidarity at times of crisis: Conditions, forms, role models and policy responses.

Other projects (miscellaneous)

15. CIS – Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (Case study – Spain)

Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas – CIS (1994) "Estereotipos Regionales", N. 2123, Noviembre 1994 http://www.cis.es/cis/opencm/ES/2_bancodatos/estudios/ver.jsp?estudio=1114

Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas – CIS (1996) "Conciencia nacional y regional", N. 2228, Noviembre 1996 http://www.cis.es/cis/opencm/ES/2_bancodatos/estudios/ver.jsp?estudio=1218&cuestionario=1365

Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas - CIS (2009) "Modelos Espaciales de Preferencia Política, N. 2799, Abril 2009 http://www.cis.es/cis/opencm/ES/2_bancodatos/estudios/ver.jsp?estudio=10062&cuestionario=11676&muestra=17645

16. DISPOC- University of Siena – GfK (Case study – Italy)

Indagine DISPOC- University of Siena – GfK (2019)

17. EQLS - European Quality of Life Survey (Cross-country - Europe)

Eurofound (2016), “European Quality of Life Survey” – EQLS (2016)

<https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/surveys/european-quality-of-life-surveys/european-quality-of-life-survey-2016>

18. GERPS German Emigration and Repatriation Study (Case study – Germany)

Erlinghagen, Marcel; Schneider, Norbert (2020): German Emigration and Remigration Panel Study (GERPS) 2018. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA7583 Data file Version 1.0.0,

<https://doi.org/10.4232/1.13479>

19. Italian Prejudice Survey (Case study – Italy)

Schizzerotto, Antonio, Peri, Pierangelo, Sniderman, Paul M., and Piazza, Thomas. Italian Prejudice Survey (1994. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], (2016-08-22. <https://doi.org/10.3886/E100010V6>

20. ITANES - Italian National Election Studies (Case study – Italy)

ITANES 2001. “Questionario Post-elezioni” Doxa [Producer] <http://www.itanes.org/dati/>

21. LAPS Surveys (Case study – Italy)

(LAPS) Laboratorio Analisi Politiche e Sociali – University of Siena (2011) “Unità d’Italia”.

(LAPS) Laboratorio Analisi Politiche e Sociali – University of Siena – Toluna (2016) “Referendum Costituzionale Dicembre 2016”.