imajINE Integrative Mechanisms for Addressing Spatial Justice and Territorial Inequalities in Europe

Integrative Mechanisms for Addressing Spatial Justice and Territorial Inequalities in Europe

D7.2 Summary Report on Comparative Framing Analysis of Regionalist Movements' Political Claims

Version 2.0

Authors: Anwen Elias and Núria Franco-Guillén (AU), Linda Basile (UNISI) and Edina Szöcsik (UNIBAS)

Grant Agreement No.:	726950
Programme call:	H2020-SC6-REV-INEQUAL-2016-2017
Type of action:	RIA – Research & Innovation Action
Project Start Date:	01-01-2017
Duration:	60 months
Deliverable Lead Beneficiary:	AU
Dissemination Level:	Public
Contact of responsible author:	Dr. Anwen Elias, Aberystwyth University, UK awe@aber.ac.uk, 0044 1970 621819

Dissemination level:

• PU = Public

• CO = Confidential, only for members of the consortium (including the Commission Services)

imajINE Integrative Mechanisms for Addressing Spatial Justice and Territorial Inequalities in Europe

Change control

VERSION	DATE	AUTHOR	ORGANISATION	DESCRIPTION / COMMENTS
1.0	16/4/20	Anwen Elias	AU	First full draft of D7.2
2.0	12/5/20	Anwen Elias	AU	Revisions from WP7 partners and internal IMAJINE review. Changes made: clarify relationship to other WPs; insert new figure 1 showing map of WP7 regions; clarify need for re-conceptualisation of territorial demands; add clarification of nature of documents collected in section 4; re-formatting of figures in section 5 to improve understanding; re-write figure headings in section 5 to clarify approach to data analysis; clarify key findings in summary and conclusion; add information to Appendix 3 on inter-coder reliability.

Table of Contents

Summary

This report examines how regionalist actors in 12 European regions perceive territorial disparities and (in)equalities, whether or not demands for territorial empowerment are justifiable on the grounds of socio-economic (in)justice, and the extent to which regionalist movements propose their own solutions for achieving a different (and better) regional future. It builds on Deliverable 7.1 (Elias *et al.*, 2018) where we define and identify the regions and regionalist actors included in the study, and locate our work in a broader territorial politics literature which has paid relatively little attention to the ways in which regionalist actors have justified their demands for territorial empowerment.

The report summarises the methodological approach adopted to explore these issues, namely the development of an original coding scheme that identifies the range of territorial demands that regionalist actors may make, and the different ways in which these might be justified (or framed). The coding scheme is used to qualitatively analyse the content of political documents produced by regionalist political parties and civil society organisations in the 12 case studies for the period 1990-2018.

Five key findings emerge from a comparative analysis of the resulting data:

1) In general, regionalist actors' **perceptions of territorial inequalities have focused on political and socio-economic realities,** with much less attention paid to cultural and environmental considerations.

2) In particular, **perceptions of political unfairness and socio-economic injustice have underpinned regionalist actors' demands for the empowerment of 'their' territory in order to create a fairer, more just set of territorial relationships**.

3) In practice, these **calls for territorial empowerment have assumed a range of forms**, with the nature and scope of territorial change claimed varying across cases and actors, as well as over time.

4) More specifically, regionalist actors have **shifted from pursuing 'moderate' strategies of territorial empowerment during the 2000s, to more 'radical' strategies in the last decade**; they are often, however, also highly pragmatic and pursue long- and short-term territorial goals simultaneously in order to change (and improve) their territorial reality.

5) What nevertheless unites regionalists is the belief that **'their' territory is the appropriate scale for addressing territorial inequalities and achieving a fairer, more just future for their citizens**.

These key findings indicate that regionalists' understandings of territorial relationships are broader than the socio-economic concerns invoked in policy and practitioner conceptualisations as identified in Deliverables 1.2 (Weckroth and Moisio, 2018a) and 1.4 (Weckroth *et al.*, 2018b). They also, however, reveal a clearer consensus than is found in this work on the most appropriate level for addressing territorial inequalities, unfairness and injustice. At the same time, our analysis of how regionalist actors frame their territorial demands exemplifies the way in which plural understandings of development, justice, well-being and the 'good life' develop and manifest themselves differently in various spatial contexts. As such, they suggest an approach to spatial justice that needs to be sensitive to, and anchored in, the experiences of specific actors in specific places of territorial disparities and (in)equalities.

Locating D7.2 within broader IMAJINE research

IMAJINE's WP1 provides the broader context for this report. In particular, the report responds to the argument advanced in Deliverable 1.1 that further work is required in order to better understand experienced and subjective realities in Europe (Weckroth *et al.*, 2018a: 31). It does so by analysing the understandings and perceptions of territorial (in)equality and spatial (in)justice amongst regionalist actors in 12 European sub-state territories. The reviews of academic and policy usages of the terms 'spatial justice' and 'territorial cohesion' in Deliverables 1.1 and 1.2 respectively (Weckroth *et al.*, 2018a; Weckroth and Moisio, 2018a) also inform the development of a coding scheme to capture the range of justifications advanced by regionalist actors in support of their demands for territorial empowerment. The comparative analysis of empirical findings refers back to, and directly engages with, these reports as well as Deliverable 1.4's analysis of policy-makers' conceptualisations of spatial justice and territorial cohesion (Weckroth *et al.*, 2018b). The report's conclusion gives a broader sense of the way in which Deliverable 7.2 builds on the work undertaken in WP1 by flagging the multi-dimensional perspectives on spatial relations articulated by regionalist actors (in contrast to the predominantly socio-economic approach in academic work and policy spheres), and the ways in which these priorities serve to map out a vision of a different (and better) regional future that can be achieved through territorial empowerment.

D7.2's emphasis on the highly differentiated ways in which regionalist actors perceive and propose solutions for territorial inequalities resonates with the **goal of WP6 to understand how policy-makers frame different policy challenges and solutions** (see Deliverable 6.1 - Cairney *et al.*, 2018: 21). Both WPs recognise, and aim to provide new insights into, the nebulous nature of territorial in-equalities and the way in which these are interpreted different by different actors in different places in very different ways, depending on their own beliefs and the contexts in which they operate. This work is potentially significant for the conceptualisation of a place-based approach to spatial justice as advocated by Jones *et al.* (2019) drawing on the work of WP1, and requires further reflection and elaboration as the IMAJINE work programme progresses.

In addition, D7.2's conceptualisation of regionalist actors' territorial demands and justifications of these, as well as its key empirical findings, will directly feed into the work to be undertaken in other WPs as follows:

- **WP4 Experimental Survey on Solidarity and Territorial Cohesion**: The questionnaire design will parallel D7.2's conceptualisation of demands for territorial empowerment, in order to evaluate whether and to what extent citizens support the core claims of regionalist actors in the sub-state territories included in WP7. For instance, some questions will address citizens' preferences for different types of decentralisation; others will ask about people's attitudes towards greater transfer of powers to subnational levels on a set of policies, selected among those emerging as most frequently mentioned by regionalist actors as areas where territorial empowerment is claimed. Finally, some questions will evaluate whether certain political, cultural or socio-economic justifications of territorial empowerment are also shared by citizens.

- **WP8 Re-imagining Regional Futures Through Participatory Scenario Building**: The findings of D7.2 will inform the policy scenarios prepared for WP8 for use with policy-makers and political actors. This will be done by informing the context for scenario development in different regional contexts in the

following ways: i) Confirming regionalist actors as a key stakeholder group in relation to goal-setting for territorial government; ii) revealing comprehensively the complex reasons why claims for greater self-government are made; iii) illustrating the different ways in which these claims are manifest; iv) establishing how these claims also constitute key emergent trends in understandings of territorial equality that are required to be acknowledged and taken account of in national and European Union (EU)- level policymaking (for example the observation of more radical perspectives among regionalist actors on solutions to conditions of territorial inequality); v) identifying the drivers of these changing trends (for example, negative reactions to the perceived unfair impacts of national-level austerity policies); vi) revealing how spatial justice at regional and sub-regional levels is experienced across cultural, political and social dimensions as well as economic, and aspired to in a desired future in terms of realising an acceptable quality of life.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

AU	Aberystwyth University
IGSO PAS	Institute of Geography and Spatial Organization, Polish Academy of Sciences
RUG	Rijksuniversiteit Groningen
TUD	Technische Universität Dresden
UNIBAS	Universität Basel
UNISI	Università degli Studi di Siena
UNISTI	University of Stirling
WP	Work Package

For acronyms of regionalist actors included in WP7, see Appendix 1.

Acknowledgements

1. Introduction

In its review of the usage of the concepts 'spatial justice' and 'territorial cohesion' in different academic literatures, Deliverable 1.1 makes the case that further work is required in order to better understand experienced and subjective realities of territorial inequalities in Europe (Weckroth *et al*., 2018: 31). In a further development of this argument, Jones *et al*. (2019: 110) emphasise the need to consider the extent to which a particular place, locality, region or state possess the rights, the capabilities or the capacity to be able to shape more just social and economic forms. From this perspective, the concept of spatial justice is compatible with "providing regions with the necessary capacity to shape their own socio-spatial futures" (ibid., 112) so that visions of long-term futures can be articulated that reflect the specific priorities that exist within their own territories and populations.

Work Package 7 contributes to this research agenda by examining perceptions of inequalities and injustice in sub-state territories. We focus on regionalist actors[1] (political parties and civil society organisations) in sub-state territories across Western Europe for whom such perceptions have been a central driver of political mobilisation. In particular, a sense in the periphery of many states of being 'different' from the 'centre' in some way (whether culturally, politically and/or economically) has underpinned a set of territorial grievances in many places (Rokkan and Urwin, 1983; Keating, 1988) based on the fundamental conviction that the region or nation is somehow losing out from the existing political union (Sorens, 2008: 310). In particular, we aim to understand the extent to which regionalist actors' perceptions of territorial inequalities have underpinned and informed their own solutions for achieving spatial justice and equality. Such solutions have focused on empowering 'their' territory to create a better, fairer society, often by enhancing its capacity to decide for itself how best to protect and/or advance its identity and/or interests. These territorial projects have often been taken to mean the pursuit of more regional autonomy or decentralisation[2], although we argue for a re-conceptualisation of regionalist actors' territorial demands that better reflects the full range of (more or less radical) ways in which they can seek to empower their territories to achieve a different future.

In order to explore the extent which regionalist actors' territorial demands are justifiable on account of economic, political and social justice, we undertake a comparative analysis of regionalist actors in 12 European regions (see Figure 1), with a focus on what territorial demands they advance and how these are justified. The criteria for the selection of cases and actors (political parties and civil society organisations) was presented in Deliverable 7.1 (Elias et al., 2018); this leads us to analyse 37 political parties (including electoral lists) and 19 civil society organisations (for an overview, see Appendix 1). Our aim in this report is to outline the approach taken to design and conduct a framing analysis, and to present the key findings in terms of how regionalist actors have sought to make sense of spatial

---

[1] Whilst the original IMAJINE proposal used 'autonomy movements' to refer to these actors, we outlined in Deliverable 7.1 (Elias *et al*., 2018: 6-8) the problems with such terminology and made the case for adopting the terms 'regionalist movements' and 'regionalist actors' instead. Both refer to same phenomenon, namely political actors that mobilise below and against the state, in order to demand the empowerment of 'their' territory (Massetti and Schakel, 2013: 801) in the name of a sub-state territorial community that is considered to be distinctive in some way.

[2] The original IMAJINE proposal used this terminology, reflecting that used by the call text itself. We consider the limitations of this conceptualisation of regionalist actors' territorial demands in Section 3.3 below.

disparities, and the extent to which these perceptions of 'their' territorial realities have informed calls for a fairer, more just, set of territorial relationships. The next section provides a review of academic work that has used a framing approach to examine the discourses of political actors, in order to better understand the conceptual and methodological choices that such an approach entails. Informed by this discussion, we present the definitions of "frame" and "frame analysis" employed in this project, before proceeding in the next sections to operationalise these concepts for the study of regionalist actors' framing strategies. Section 3 thus describes the development and application of an original coding scheme which enables us to map empirically i. the kinds of demands for territorial empowerment advanced by regionalist actors; and ii. the justifications advanced for why territorial empowerment is necessary. We argue that focussing our analysis on "frames as justifications" enables us to better understand how different political actors define a problem and articulate what they perceive to be at stake in relation to specific issues; it is thus an approach that is well suited to our goal of understanding different regionalist conceptualisations of territorial inequalities and spatial injustice. Section 4 then summarises the process followed in order to apply the coding scheme to the empirical study of regionalist actors' discourses in each of our cases.

The key findings of our empirical analysis are presented in section 5, where we set out the particular narrative(s) of spatial (in)justice and (in)equalities advanced by regionalist actors located in sub-state territories that they perceive to be "different" in some way. The Conclusion reflects on these in relation to the research goal presented above and considers the extent to which regionalist actors' arguments in favour of a more just set of territorial arrangements can contribute to tackling territorial inequalities in Europe.

Figure 1 Case study regions included in WP7
Note: The regions shown are based on regional tiers of government. An * indicates that the territorial groups that regionalist actors claim to represent are spread beyond these regional jurisdictions; for these cases, the region where most of the territorial population is concentrated is shown.

2. Frame Analysis in the Study of Political Actors: An Overview

Since the 1960s and 1970s, regionalist actors have become increasingly important political and electoral players in many pluri-national states. This has been mirrored by the growth in academic work focused on understanding and explaining regionalist mobilisation. A recurrent theme in much of this literature is the idea of regionalist movements as key "entrepreneurs" in mobilising territorial differences in political debate (Türsan, 1998: 6). In other words, whilst economic, political and cultural centre-periphery disparities inform and constrain regionalist mobilisation, regionalist actors play a key role in making sense of structural inequalities between centres and peripheries and translating these into arguments for territorial re-structuring or empowerment – their core political goal - in some way.

Recent scholarship has sought to better understand the agency of regionalist actors in drawing attention to, and contesting, territorial inequalities by examining the way in which they frame their territorial demands. Preliminary work has provided evidence of how such actors engage in issue framing as part of their strategic approach to contesting elections and advancing their policy goals (Huszka, 2014; Massetti and Schakel, 2015; Field and Hamann, 2015; Dalle Mulle, 2017; Brown Swan, 2017; Basile, 2019; Elias, 2019). Most of this work has focused on the framing strategies of regionalist political parties, and only recently have scholars (often coming from different disciplinary backgrounds) sought to broaden the scope of analysis. This has led to new work, for example on the framing strategies of pro-independence social movements in Catalonia and Scotland (Della Porta *et al*., 2017; Basta, 2018) and those emerging in media coverage of the 2014 independence referendum in Scotland (Dekavalla, 2016).

This literature provides the starting point for our study of regionalist actors' framing strategies, and we draw directly on it (and a broader territorial politics literature on regionalist mobilisation, see Deliverable 7.1: 9-10 for an overview) to inform the development of our coding scheme below. However, this work is also limited in important respects. Firstly, with some exceptions, the terminology of 'framing' has been used in a relatively loose way, with the different approaches developed to identify and analyse 'frames' only very superficially grounded in the broader (and substantial) literature on framing in different disciplines. Secondly, the literature is also guilty on the whole of the methodological weaknesses that Matthes (2009) observes in relation to media framing studies and which are characterised by a lack of transparency in relation to key aspects such as the operationalisation of framing definitions and reporting on the reliability of analyses.

In response, we adopt a more systematic approach to framing analysis that aims to provide a model of good practice for future work. We thus anchor our framing analysis in a review of a much larger literature spanning several disciplines, in order to better understand the conceptual, analytical and methodological choices that such an approach requires the researcher to make. We focus in particular on framing studies of political actors and draw on these to establish working definitions of "frames" and "frame analysis", as well as an approach for the identification of frames. These underpin the development of an original coding scheme to map the framing strategies of regionalist actors in section 3.

2.1 Defining "frames" and "frame analysis"

The notion of "frame" is widely attributed to Goffman's (1974) seminal work, where the term is understood as a "schema of interpretation" that provide meaning, determine what is relevant and irrelevant when considering actors, issues and events, and suggest appropriate behaviour (Vlingenthart and van Zoonen, 2011: 103). In other words, reality can be interpreted from multiple perspectives, and frames are a way of making sense of, and developing an idea or narrative about, that reality (Chong and Druckman, 2007: 104).

Frames are thus deliberate discursive constructions that give emphasis to different aspects of a topic/situation, and the specific ways in which different actors frame specific issues has been shown to have an important role in shaping how individuals understand, or see as relevant for making sense of, that topic /situation (Chong and Druckman, 2007: 104). For example, the way in which the media frames issues (by emphasising certain aspects of a topic) has been shown to shape citizens' understanding of and attitudes towards political, economic and social topics (De Vreese *et al*., 2011). Similarly, "politicians attempt to mobilize voters behind their policies by encouraging them to think about those policies along particular lines" and "this is accomplished by highlighting certain features of the policy, such as its likely effects or its relationship to important values" (Chong and Druckman, 2007: 106).

These examples point to a distinction made in the literature between "frames in communications" and "frames in thought" (see D'Angelo, 2012). Whilst the former relates to the words, images, phrases and presentation styles a speaker uses to relay information, the latter is concerned with an individual's understanding of a given situation. These two aspects of frames have inspired distinctive research agendas in the literature. On the one hand, scholars have focused on how different actors (e.g. media, political actors, institutions, social movements) construct or produce frames; the object of analysis is this thus the frame itself and how it is put together in a discourse. On the other hand, scholars interested in "frame effects" seek to understand how frames affect the attitudes and behaviours of their audiences (e.g. mass media audiences, public conversations and/or opinion). A third (more limited) literature has sought to merge these two perspectives by examining the dynamics of "framing contests" (Entman, 2003), and attempts to take into account both the multiple actors and audiences that influence whether and how frames resonate/impact (see also Vlingenthart and van Zoonen, 2011: 107).

In this project, our research interest aligns with the first of these lines of inquiry, since our primary aim is to understand the framing strategies of regionalist actors. The rest of this section will thus focus on work that has analysed "frames in communication". From this perspective, frame analysis can be understood as an approach whose purpose is "to identify and analyse how issues are embedded into selective, coherent context in a communication text, with the purpose of rendering these issues interpretable and meaningful" (David and Baden, 2017: 1). Studies that have undertaken some kind of 'frame analysis' can be found in a wide range of disciplines (communication and media studies, sociology, political science, psychology). However, in this work, "whilst there is a general agreement that frames are important structures for generating meaning, there is considerable variability in the specific conceptualization of frames…, driving diversity in methodological approaches to the analysis of frames" (ibid., 1). In the next section, we consider some of the key approaches that have emerged

in more detail, as the basis for developing a framework taken in this project for analysing the framing strategies of regionalist actors.

2.2 Doing frame analysis: conceptualisation and operationalisation

2.2.1 Conceptualisation of frames

A common distinction made in the framing literature is that between "issue-specific" and "generic" frames, based on the nature and content of the frame being investigated. According De Vreese (2005: 55), the former "are pertinent only to specific topics or events…other frames transcend thematic limitations and can be identified in relation to different topics, some even over time and in different cultural contexts". Whilst studies of the framing of specific issues are widespread in the literature (e.g. of nuclear power (Gamson and Modigliani, 1989), immigration (Helbling, 2014), the war on terror (Reese, 2010), or the break-up of Yugoslavia (Huszka, 2014), the latter are found to be particularly important in the framing of news stories where journalists have a key role in packaging complex information into meaningful narratives that will engage the public and facilitate understanding (David and Baden, 2017: 9).

A further distinction can be made between three distinctive conceptualisations of frames, based on the function of such frames in a discourse. A first approach dominant in mass communication studies is consistent with Gamson and Modigliani's definition of frames as "a central organising idea or storyline that provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events" (1989: 143). Scholars have thus often mapped the narrative and/or thematic features of a news discourse, either in relation to specific issues or in terms of generic frames that transcend thematic limitations and can be identified in relation to different topics, some even over time and in different cultural contexts (de Vreese, 2005: 54-55). Such frames emphasise how a story is told, in terms of the salience given to different aspects of a topic (e.g. human interest, economic consequences or conflict framings) (De Vreese, 2005: 53; Vliegenthart and Van Zoonen, 2011: 105).

A second approach is more aligned with Entman's argument that "to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation" (1993: 52). Work in this vein thus emphasises the internal structure of frames and looks for specific discursive components or "functions" (ibid.: 53) that are required to provide meaning to an issue. Such an approach is particularly prevalent in the literature on social movements, for example, where scholars have examined collective action frames that rely on three "core framing tasks" namely "diagnostic framing" (problem identification and attributions), "prognostic framing" (proposed solution or way forward) and "motivational framing" (mobilising individuals to action) (for an overview, see Benford and Snow, 2000). Whilst the resultant frames are often highly context-specific, there is also evidence that they can resonate across movements and contexts in the form of "master frames" (Snow and Benford, 1992; Benford, 2013). In one of the few instances where social movement scholars have examined attempts to mobilise on territorial issues, this approach to frame analysis has usefully been applied to shed light on the framing strategies of social movements around independence referendums in Catalonia and Scotland (Della Porta *et al.*, 2017). The authors thus note that "redistributive and democratic issues were emphasised over traditional ethnonationalist concerns" and that "frame bridging between independence and sovereignty, on the one hand, and

social claims such as social justice and the renewal of democracy, on the other, were important in both contexts" (ibid., 99).

A third approach has developed more recently in the political science literature, in work that has sought to address the general lack of attention to the role of political actors in framing processes. This has focused on what Statham and Trenz (2012: 128-9) call justification frames, which "aim to resonate with the public by adding political meaning" and try to win votes by politicising a particular stance on an issue. Such frames thus provide insight into how different actors define a particular problem, and direct attention to certain causes and consequences in order to convey what is at stake on a specific issue (Helbling, 2014: 23). In this respect, the analysis of framing is restricted to the first of the elements identified in Entman's definition of framing above, namely that of "problem definition": "By attending to this specific facet, we may better understand how political actors define a particular problem and find out which justifications are related to which positions" (Helbling *et al.*, 2010: 498).

Given its focus on the role of political actors in framing processes, and our specific interest in understanding how regionalist actors justify their territorial demands, our approach to frame analysis draws on the latter conceptualisation of frames (i.e. frames as justifications). It is also, therefore, an analysis that is issue-specific (i.e. frames related to regionalist actors' territorial positions), and where the aim is to identify the range of frames used by regionalist actors to justify their demands for a territorial re-structuring of political authority. Whilst the appeal of the latter is the potential for a high level of specificity and detail relevant to the issue under investigation, de Vreese (2005: 55) also flags up the risk that the high degree of issue-sensitivity makes analyses drawing on issue-specific frames difficult to generalize and compare. This is a particular concern given the comparative nature of our project (across different regions, and of different regionalist political parties and civil society organisations within regions). It is thus an aspect that we pay particular attention to in our approach to the identification of frames, which we now turn to consider.

2.2.2 Identification of frames

The key question here is how distinct frames can be identified in a communicative text in a systematic and rigorous manner (David and Baden, 2017: 4). There are two aspects to be considered here: the identification of an initial list of frames, and the specification of the process for identifying particular frames in the text. Each of these aspects is considered here in turn.

With regard to the identification of an initial list of frames to be analysed, three main approaches can be distinguished. An inductive approach starts from an analysis of the material, whether quantitative or qualitative, and aims to order observations into discrete frames (David and Baden, 2017: 4). Frames thus emerge from the material in the course of the analysis, and these constitute a complete inventory of arguments, reasoning devices, and framing mechanisms that have been evoked in the texts examined. Brown Swan (2017), for example, adopts such an approach in her study of the framing of self-government demands by Scottish and Flemish regionalist parties. A close reading of party documents leads to the identification of general themes, that are further classified into distinct frame "dimensions"; these are then "organised according to context, allowing for comparable frames to be identified but also for variation [between cases] to emerge" (ibid., 65). The advantage of an inductive approach is precisely its closeness to the material being analysed, and thus its sensitivity to context-specific nuances and complexities as the basis of an in-depth understanding of specific cases.

However, the development and validation of the framing scheme rests (often entirely) on the scrutiny and subjective interpretation of the researcher, and this process is often not systematic nor fully documented (David and Baden, 2017: 8). Studies taking an inductive approach have thus been criticised for being difficult to replicate beyond the specific case(s) being analysed (Hertog and McLeod, 2001). The high level of context specificity in inductive frame analyses also limits the possible transfer, validation, and generalization of the findings to other issues and debates.

In contrast, a deductive approach derives a list and operationalisation of frames from existing empirical or theoretical work, where these describe "expectable or possible frames, and aim to assess to what degree these occur in the material" (ibid.: 4). It is a particularly appropriate strategy when there is already a good knowledge basis about the concerns of a debate. In her study of the framing strategies of Italian political parties, for example, Basile (2019: 190) derives three broad groups of frames (functional, identity and structures of political opportunity) from the literature that has examined decentralising pressures in Western Europe in general and in Italy specifically. Deductive approaches, however, are "fallible where the knowledge used for deduction is uncertain, incomplete, or contested" and "vulnerable to over-looking new frames and may conflate differentiations in communication if these are not anticipated in the theoretical work (David and Baden, 2017: 8).

In contrast, hybrid approaches to frame analysis aim at limiting the disadvantages of both approaches to frame analysis by combining procedures for the generation of frame schemes. In other words, category systems of frame elements are developed following a combination of theoretical deduction and empirical induction by means of repeated pilot studies (David and Baden, 2017: 17). This is the approach we adopt in this study. We thus draw on the literature on territorial politics in general, and the limited number of specific studies that have examined the framing strategies of regionalist actors, to develop an initial list of frames and frame definitions. The resultant coding scheme is then piloted on documents from different actors in the study as a basis for further refinement. The next section considers this iterative process of coding scheme development in more detail.

3. Developing a Coding Scheme for Analysing the Framing Strategies of Regionalist Actors

3.1 Defining the 'issue': Regionalist actors' demands for territorial empowerment

Before proceeding in this section to identify and describe the coding scheme developed to analyse regionalist actors' territorial demands, it is necessary first to clarify the nature of the issue of interest to this project. Our starting point is the observation that, in recent decades, regionalist movements have mobilised below the state, in defence of distinctive territorial identities (e.g. based on ethnicity, language, culture, traditions) and interests (economic, cultural, political, social and/or symbolic in nature) (De Winter, 1998b; Hepburn, 2009b). The territory in question may (1) be institutionalised as a sub-state territorial entity or region within the state; (2) be a territory whose boundaries differ from the borders of an existing region; or (3) be a territory that is not institutionalised as sub-state territorial entity at all.

Regionalist mobilisation ultimately aims at the "empowerment" of the sub-state territory in some way, by protecting and advancing its distinctiveness. Recent scholarship has focused on understanding the specific ways in which regionalist actors seek to achieve this. This work has identified two distinctive strategies pursued in order to protect and advance territorial identities and interests.

Firstly, regionalist actors have sought to *challenge (and alter) the relationship between their territory and other territorial levels*. Given that regionalist mobilisation is underpinned by perceptions that the territory is somehow losing out from existing ways of doing politics (Sorens, 2008: 310), regionalist actors have thus demanded a change to the status quo in some way. Such a strategy seeks to enhance the territory's ability to protect and advance its identity and interests *in relation to other political levels*. In other words, it "can only be understood within a larger context of complex power relations" (Hepburn, 2010: 35). We consider the range of territorial goals regionalist actors pursue in more detail below (section 3.3), and these may entail the formal re-distribution of political authority to grant some kind of self-government, or better access to higher levels of decision-making (Massetti and Schakel, 2013; Keating, 1988); but they may also call for recognition of territorial distinctiveness, and/or new resources/policies to tackle specific territorial challenges (Hepburn, 2010: 28, 41-47). Moreover, whilst such territorial demands have mainly been directed at the state, regionalist actors have also sought opportunities beyond the state to pursue their territorial ambitions (Elias, 2009a; Jolly, 2015).

Secondly, regionalist actors have also sought to empower their territory through *exploiting the status quo*. Such a strategy implies working *within existing political structures to devise and implement political projects for the territory's well-being and in its exclusive interest*. For example, many regionalist parties have sought to enter regional government, because doing so provides an opportunity to implement their vision of the kind of society they would like for 'their' territory (Elias and Tronconi, 2011; Massetti and Schakel, 2013: 801; Mazzoleni and Mueller, 2016). Several have also sought to influence state-level decision-making either by entering coalition governments at this level or exchanging parliamentary support for minority central governments for territorial policy concessions (Elias and Tronconi, 2011), whilst most have also contested elections to the European Parliament as a means of securing a voice in the supranational arena (De Winter and Gómez Reino Cachafeiro, 2002). These strategies for territorial empowerment do not exhaust the options available to these actors; they may also seek to participate in political networks beyond the region, and/or build regional/international alliances with similar actors (Keating, 2001; Hepburn, 2010: 39).

Regionalist actors may pursue one or other of these strategies, and which one is given priority may depend on the context in which the actor operates. For example, until the late 1990s Plaid Cymru's (PC) goal was the creation of a Welsh parliament; once this had been achieved, the party's focus shifted onto how it would use the powers of the National Assembly for Wales to make public policy more aligned with the nation's needs (Elias, 2009b). Neither are these strategies mutually exclusive: the Scottish National Party (SNP) has sought to advance Scotland's interests through the Scottish Parliament at the same time as demanding Scotland's independence (Brown Swan, 2017; Elias, 2019).

In this project, however, we are only concerned with the first of these strategies. Our focus, therefore, is on **regionalist movements' demands to <u>change</u> the status quo, and specifically the territory's relations with higher territorial levels**. It is in relation to this specific issue that we aim to analyse and map the range of 'frames as justifications' used by regionalist actors. In order to do so, the coding scheme must first capture the range of regionalist actors' territorial demands, before the frames used

to justify these demands can be assessed in a second step. The next section details the development of our coding scheme to reflect both of these aspects.

3.2 Developing of the coding scheme: Overview of the process

A key concern for a study of framing strategies is to ensure the validity, reliability and replicability of the approach taken. These aspects of framing studies have often been criticised, not least because a frame is a quite abstract variable that is hard to identify and hard to code in content analysis (Van Gorp, 2007); as a result, the identification of frames often falls into a methodological black box (Tankard, 2001). This critique certainly applies to many of the studies of framing in territorial politics, where it is often unclear how frames are defined and/or extracted from the texts being analysed.

As indicated above, our approach here is a hybrid one that combines a deductive/inductive approach to the development of a coding scheme for analysing frames. The process of developing the coding scheme is summarised in Table 1 below. In a first step, we developed a list of frames from the literature on territorial politics that has examined regionalist mobilisation; this ensured that the coding scheme met a crucial prerequisite for a deductive approach to the derivation of frames, namely that the frames "suit the topic currently under investigation" (Matthes and Kohring, 2008: 262). Anchoring the frames in the subject literature also allowed us to specify the criteria for the identification of frames; each frame was thus defined in detail, with specific attention paid to establishing a clear differentiation between frames where necessary. These were set out in a coding manual (see Appendix 2) and made available to all coders contributing to the project.

A second inductive step sought to improve the construct and content validity of the coding scheme. In relation to the former, it is noted above that a key limitation of deductive approaches to framing is the limited capacity to detect new or alternative frames that have not already been captured in the literature in a topic. A pilot to testing the coding scheme on a sub-set of documents from our cases thus identified additional justifications of territorial empowerment not present in the academic literature. In relation to content validity, this was improved as a result of the pilot through checks on whether a frame's definition was representative of all aspects of the argument that it sought to capture; where this wasn't the case, frame definitions were revised as necessary.

The piloting of the coding scheme also served as a check on its reliability. As noted above, this is a particular concern for qualitative analyses of frames where researcher subjectivity may lead to different judgement about the existence/meaning of frames. But it is also a particular concern for this project given the high number of coders involved; we were thus specifically concerned with ensuring inter-coder reliability, or the extent to which different observers are consistent in their application of the coding scheme. This was promoted in two ways. Firstly, the process of piloting the coding scheme served to familiarise coders with the range and meanings of frames proposed; the training of coders in the application of the coding scheme was enhanced through one-to-one feedback on coding performances in the latter stages of the coding scheme's refinement. Secondly, all coders were required to pass an inter-coder reliability (ICR) test prior to commencing coding documents for their specific cases. Further detail about these tests (including the pass thresholds) are provided in Appendix 3; further checks on the reliability of coding subsequent to the finalisation of the coding scheme are outlined below.

In the rest of this section, we elaborate on the specific coding scheme developed as a result of the iterative process highlighted above. This involves conceptualising and operationalising regionalist actors' territorial demands and developing a list of frames to capture the range of justifications for these demands.

Table 1. Overview of process for developing the coding scheme

Phase	Time period	Tasks
DEDUCTIVE	November 2018 - February 2019	First version of coding scheme and coding manual derived from academic literature on regionalist mobilization.
INDUCTIVE	February-March 2019	Coding scheme introduced to and discussed with all coders; revision of coding scheme and manual based on feedback received.
	March - April 2019	Piloting of revised coding scheme by core team on selected documents from 4 cases; detailed review of each coder's coding decisions informed revisions of coding scheme and manual after every round.
	May – June 2019	Coding scheme applied by all coders using additional documents selected from our cases.
		Individual feedback to each coder after each round, focusing on coding inconsistencies affecting reliability. Detailed review of each coder's coding decisions informed revisions of coding scheme after every round.
		Final revision and simplification of the coding scheme and manual.
	July 2019	All coders required to pass an ICR test before they can begin to code documents for their case study (see Appendix 3).
		Most coders reached a sufficient level of inter-coder agreement in the third round of ICR test and start coding the documents for their cases. Where coders fail the ICR test, further feedback provided on areas of coding error/inconsistency and the test re-taken.

3.3 Coding territorial demands

3.3.1 Re-conceptualising regionalist actors' territorial demands

As noted in Deliverable 7.1, a defining feature of the regionalist family of actors is the common demand for some kind of self-government; this constitutes their core ideological dimension (De Winter, 1998b: 205; Massetti, 2009: 503; Alonso, 2012: 19; Massetti and Schakel, 2016: 60). However, it is commonly acknowledged that the specific type of self-government demands articulated by these actors varies greatly. Scholars of territorial politics have expended considerable effort in mapping and categorising these. Whilst a number of different classifications of territorial demands has emerged as a result (see Table 2), they have all tended to present goals on a spectrum reflecting degrees of self-government, ranging from more to less radical.

Table 2 Overview of scholarly categorisations of regionalist actors' territorial demands

Authors	Classification

Snyder (1982)	Independence / secession / separatism / devolution / semi-sovereignty / semi-autonomy / autonomy
Coakley (1993)	Secession / institutional recognition / cultural rights / equality of citizenship
De Winter (1998b)	Independence / irredentist / national-federalist / autonomist / protectionist
De Winter *et al*. (2006)	Irredentist / independence / confederal / national-federalist / decentralist / (asymmetric) autonomist / cultural protectionist
Massetti (2009)	Autonomists (assertive/moderate) / secessionist (extremist/strongly committed/ambiguous)
Dandoy (2010)	Secessionist / secentralist / protectionist
Lluch (2014)	Independentists / federalists / autonomists (with instrumental/teleological positions within each category)
Massetti and Schakel (2016)	Radical (separatist/ambiguous) / moderate (federalist/protectionist)

Applying such categorisations in practice is not, however, straightforward. Reflecting on such an exercise, De Winter *et al*. (2006: 251) find that attempts to classify regionalist actors to different categories of self-government are problematic since "some categories are overlapping and the distinction between different degrees of self-government – like sovereignty and autonomy – vary over time and space". And yet, the conceptualisation of territorial demands in terms of discrete categories has underpinned much of the scholarship on regionalist actors (and regionalist political parties in particular). Some of this work has charted the shifting territorial positions of regionalist parties over time (e.g. Elias, 2009b; Elias and Mees, 2017). Other studies have unpacked political parties' territorial positions and evidenced more complex strategies whereby different territorial goals are pursued simultaneously, and where long-term territorial aspirations are pursued alongside more instrumental/pragmatic demands to improve 'their' territory's autonomy (Hepburn, 2009b; Lluch, 2014; Mees, 2015; Dalle Mulle, 2016). Such categorisations also underpin quantitative work that has explored the link between regionalist parties' territorial positions and, *inter alia*, their left-right ideological profiles and their electoral success in decentralised political systems (Massetti and Schakel, 2015, 2016).

In line with this literature, our coding scheme aims to capture regionalist actors' territorial demands through a classification of territorial positions on a scale ranging from more to less radical positions. In a departure from extant work, however, we propose a re-conceptualisation of territorial demands on four grounds. Firstly, whilst the original IMAJINE call set out to explore the justifications of regionalist actors' demands for "regional autonomy or decentralisation", these goals arguably only reflect some of the ways in which the territory's relationship with higher levels of government can be changed. In other words, demands for territorial autonomy typically imply *modifying* the vertical allocation of power between centre and periphery (Mazzoleni and Mueller, 2016: 2, emphasis added) but territorial power-relations may also be changed in other ways, as suggested by Table 2.

This links to the second grounds for re-conceptualising territorial demands, namely the tendency noted above for the extant scholarly literature to mostly assumed that 'self-government' - understood as a shift of political authority from the state to the region (Alonso *et al*. 2013: 191) - exhausts the scope of territorial demands made by regionalist actors. But whilst this is undoubtedly central to what these actors are about, it is also the case that "nationalism and regionalism is not only concerned with constitutional change and greater self-government" (Hepburn, 2010: 485). Case study evidence points to other ways in which regionalist actors may mobilise in an attempt to protect and/or advance their territories identity and/or interests. For example, they may call for better representation in, or access to, state-level decision-making where this has an impact on their territory (Hepburn, 2009b: 484). Such shared rule demands imply more influence at the centre and are therefore conceptually distinct from self-rule demands for more autonomy (Dardanelli, 2019: 9). Hepburn (2010: 34) also raises the possibility that regionalist actors may be willing to trade-off political autonomy (and agree to re-centralisation in specific areas) for additional resources in a different area. There is thus a need to better capture the range of territorial strategies pursued by regionalist actors, and clarify the meaning and scope of different territorial positions in order to better distinguish between them in terms of what they imply for the territory's relations with higher levels of government.

Thirdly, not all territorial demands necessarily imply the change in the location of political authority within the political system that is intrinsic to the notion of increased self-government. This may be the case, for example, of some demands for cultural or political recognition of a territory's distinctiveness. De Winter's classification of territorial demands also includes 'protectionist' parties that lobby *within* the existing constitutional system for cultural recognition or economic resources (1998b: 204-205). Hough and Koß (2009: 581) argue that the East German Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus can be considered such a protectionist party in the 1990s, given that it sought to "protect and enhance the interests of eastern Germans without demanding a reconfiguration of state institutions". Similarly, the territorial project of the Lega dei Ticinesi in the Swiss canton of Ticino is defined not by demands for independence or greater constitutional autonomy, but by calls on the Swiss federal government to provide resources (e.g. subsidies) and protection against influxes from the outside, and to abolish all legislation damaging to the interests of Ticino (Mazzoleni, 2016: 161).

Fourthly, it is assumed in the literature discussed thus far that, because the centre-periphery ideological dimension is the core one for these actors, that they will always adopt a clear position on this dimension. Recent studies, however, have flagged up the possibility that political parties may deliberately choose to avoid adopting clear stances on some ideological dimensions. Whilst this is expected to apply mainly to issues that are of secondary importance to political parties (e.g. left-right issues for regionalist parties, see Elias *et al*., 2015: 844), there is nevertheless case study evidence to suggests that, in certain circumstances, regionalist actors may also adopt a "blurring strategy" – resulting in vague, contradictory or ambiguous positions (Rovny, 2013: 5-6) – in respect of their core territorial goals. Pérez-Nievas (2006: 35), for example, argues that the Basque Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV) has always been ambiguous about its ultimate goal, as a deliberate strategy for reconciling more and less radical territorial preferences within the party. Similarly, Massetti and Schakel (2016: 62) refer to "ambiguously secessionist" parties as ones that "put forward proposals which imply the questioning of state unity but are ambiguous in their stance, as they refrain from using clear catchwords such as 'independence', 'partition' or 'secession'".

In light of these observations, and in line with Hepburn (2009b: 482), we propose a re-conceptualisation of regionalist actors' territorial demands as ones that aim for their territory's empowerment in some way, where the pursuit of self-government is one but not the only way in which regionalist actors can seek to protect/advance their territory's identity and interests, and where such actors may be more or less clear about the kinds of territorial changes that they would like to see implemented. By clarifying the conceptual difference between broad types of territorial positions, and disaggregating different aspects within these, we propose a more fine-grained categorisation that arguably better captures the full scope and specificity of regionalist actors' efforts to change their territory's relations with higher levels of government. We now turn to the operationalisation of this understanding of regionalist actors' territorial demands in our coding scheme.

3.3.2 Demands for territorial empowerment: A coding scheme

As advanced in the previous section, we derive the basic structure of our coding system for territorial demands by distinguishing between three different categories of demands based on the nature of the change they imply to existing political systems:

i. territorial demands that imply a formal re-distribution of authority between different territorial levels (TDR codes)

We further distinguish here between:

- **demands for independence**[3] (withdrawal of existing constitutional framework);

- **demands for territorial re-structuring** (understood as a significant change in the way in which a state is organised territorially). Drawing on Dardanelli (2019: 282) we further differentiate here between *strong restructuring* (when changes in the way the state is vertically structured entail a transition from one type of territorial model to another, leading to a difference in kind (e.g. transition from unitary to decentralised or federal state), and *weak restructuring* (constituted by changes that do not entail a transition from one type of state to another, that is, changes of degree rather than kind). We capture this distinction in our coding scheme by distinguishing between:

- *demands for fundamental reform* (creation of a federal state, or creation or re-organisation of regional government);
- *demands for modification[4] of the extant political system* (via more self-rule, shared-rule or centralisation).

---

[3] Initially, a further coding distinction was made between 'independence' and 'independence ambiguous' positions, in line with the work of Massetti and Schakel (2016) cited above. However, in a pilot of the coding scheme this proved to be a difficult distinction to make empirically, with low reliability of coding across different coders. The two categories were thus merged, with the definition for the 'independence' code amended to include more ambiguous positions which nevertheless implied full statehood.

[4] A further distinction was made between executive/legislative and judicial dimensions of self and shared rule. However, a piloting of the coding scheme suggested that it was rarely possible to distinguish between these dimensions empirically, and where coders attempted to do so they often disagreed on the nature of the change implied. These codes were thus consolidated to distinguish between self/shared rule in the interests of simplifying the coding scheme and improving inter-coder reliability.

In order to capture the possibility that regionalist actors may not be clear about the specific nature of the territorial re-structuring they aspire to, the coding scheme also includes 'general' codes for each category.

ii. territorial demands for action that imply an empowerment of the territory within the existing constitutional/institutional legislative framework that governs the political relationship between different levels of government (TDA codes);

We further distinguish between:

- *demands for intervention* (action by another actor in the territory in some way);
- *demands for non-intervention* (for a political actor to refrain from intervening in the territory in some way).

iii. general territorial demands that imply some kind of change to the territorial status quo, but there is insufficient detail about the specific nature of the change implied (and therefore none of the above (TDR or TDA) codes can be applied).

The discussion thus far has focused on developing codes to capture more or less specific territorial demands, where there is a clear sense that some kind of change in the territorial status quo is being sought. A pilot of the coding scheme also revealed, however, significant occurrences of discourses containing a narrative clearly related to changing the territorial status quo in some way, but where no specific territorial demand was articulated, nor could the narrative be linked directly to one. Such discourses often serve the purpose of making a more general case for why a regionalist actor challenges the territorial status quo. In other words, these sections may provide a narrative about the support for, or legitimation to, a regionalist actor's territorial demands, e.g. by placing it in a broader context, or by discussing the territorial identity and/or interests that underpin the actor's territorial demands. Given that such a narrative is an important element of regionalist actors' framing strategies, the final element of the coding scheme relating to territorial demands was specified as follows:

iv. demands that are unspecified (presence of a territorial narrative but cannot be linked to a specific territorial demand).

3.3.3 The multi-level and policy scope of territorial empowerment

Whilst the coding scheme discussed thus far aims to capture the range of territorial positions adopted by regionalist actors, in a next step the coding scheme seeks to further specify the scope of demands for territorial empowerment in two respects: i. the extent to which these are conceived within a multi-level context; and ii. their policy scope. We do so for two reasons.

Firstly, early work that examined the territorial strategies of regionalist actors (and specifically regionalist parties) understood the object of such strategies to be the state. Urwin (1981: 232), for example, noted that "sub-state nationalist parties all make a "claim upon the state". Subsequent work has, however, demonstrated that these actors' territorial strategies have been re-conceptualised in the context of multi-level political systems. Regionalist mobilisation is thus motivated by the goal of enhancing the territory's ability to protect and advance its identity and interests *in relation to other political levels*, and "can only be understood within a larger context of complex power relations" (Hepburn, 2010: 35). Most significant has been the way in which regionalist actors have interpreted

the EU as a new structure of opportunity for advancing their territorial interests and achieving their territorial goals (De Winter and Gómez-Reino Cachafeiro, 2002; Schakel, 2009), with the latter often been re-imagined in a supranational framework along the lines of a 'Europe of the Regions' (Keating, 2006; Jolly, 2015). Even if many regionalist parties have become more sceptical of European integration in recent years, the EU continues to matter to these actors in so far as it offers opportunities for institutional representation and networking with like-minded partners (Mazzoleni and Mueller, 2016: 3) and is the source of political decision-making that has a direct impact in the territories that these actors claim to represent (Elias, 2009a).

But other territorial levels may also matter for regionalist actors. Whilst there are no equivalent institutional or political structures at the international level, regionalist actors may still look to the international arena for support for their territorial strategies. Elias (2009a: 114) notes, for example, that Corsican nationalist actors during the 1970s sought protection for human and minority rights via the legal frameworks provided by the United Nations (UN) and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO). Regionalist actors may also look below the state, and to other regions within or beyond their own state, for a framework for articulating their territorial demands. In this sense, "regionalist success can have important horizontal effects, that is, it can pull other regions in similar directions" (Mazzoleni and Mueller, 2016: 3). Such regional comparators were important, for example, in Catalan politics in the early 2010s when Convergència i Unió's (CiU) demands for "fiscal sovereignty" sought to emulate the Basque Country's high degree of tax autonomy as part of the so-called *concierto económico* (Elias and Mees, 2017: 143).

Secondly, scholars have increasingly recognised the important "competential dimension" (Alonso et al., 2013: 191) to territorial demands, where territorial contestation takes place in relation to a range of policy areas. The main focus has been on policy issues as related to debates about the delimitation of the competencies that fall under the jurisdiction of the state and the periphery, their nature (legislative versus executive, exclusive versus shared competencies), and about the constitutional status of this distribution of competencies (ibid.: 191; Hepburn, 2010). But policy-specificity is also expected to matter in relation to demands for action by higher levels of government (e.g. the state, but also the EU).

In order to capture the multi-level and policy scope of regionalist actors' territorial demands, our coding scheme thus considers the following aspects:

i. In relation to what level would the territory be empowered, if the territorial demand made were achieved? Phrased in this way, we focus on the *outcome* of the territorial demand articulated. In other words, of interest is the relationship between different levels of political interaction or policy-making, and how this would change if the regionalist actor's territorial demand (whatever this may be) would be implemented. Based on the discussion above, the coding scheme offers four options in response:

- **demands that result in empowerment in relation to the region, the state, the EU or the international level** (TL codes).

It is necessary here to note an important limitation of the coding scheme in relation to discussion elsewhere in IMAJINE outputs with regard to the territorial scales at which territorial inequality may be contested/addressed. In particular, Deliverable 1.4 (p13) notes the importance ascribed to a bottom-up approach to these issues by actors operating at the local level. The coding scheme outlined

here does not consider this level of government in relation to the territorial demands of regionalist actors. This does not mean that the empowerment of sub-regional levels of government was not considered by (or important for) regionalist actors, but these demands (on the few occasions that they were encountered) were presented as something that could be implemented by the regional government if/when it had the competency over the internal organisation of the territory.[5] We would thus consider this to be, in the first instance, a demand for the empowerment of the region in this specific area, which may then lead to a further internal devolution of authority within the regional territory.

ii. What policy area does a territorial demand relate to? Specifically, we are interested in instances where a territorial demand implies a change in the territorial status quo in relation to a specific policy area. As such, they are most likely to apply to demands involving some kind of redistribution of powers (TDR codes above) or political (in-)action (TDA codes above). Demands for independence or fundamental reforms, by their nature, imply change to the system as a whole and therefore are unlikely to be linked to specific policy areas. Because "every public policy has spatial dimensions (it has to apply somewhere), in principle any domain of political decision-making is a potential object of such explicit territorialisation" (Mazzoleni and Mueller, 2016: 8). The coding scheme thus provides a list of policy areas, taken from Basile (2019) and adapted as a result of the piloting of the coding scheme, as follows:

- **demands that are linked to a specific policy area** (choice of 21 policy areas) (PA codes).

3.3.4 Summary: coding scheme for regionalist actors' territorial demands

Whilst the original IMAJINE proposal sought to explore the ways in which regionalist actors sought to justify demands for more regional autonomy or decentralisation, we have argued here that such territorial goals only partially reflect the ways in which these actors have sought to change their territory's relations with higher levels of government. In order to better capture the full range of positions adopted by this political family in pursuit of a better, fairer set of territorial relations, we have proposed a re-conceptualisation of territorial demands; this takes into account both the range of demands made, as well as the multi-level and policy-specific focus of many regionalist actors' territorial strategies. The alternative classification set out above is summarised in Table 3 below, which indicates and defines the specific codes for territorial demands, levels of territorial empowerment and policy areas. These were also included in the full coding manual, along with examples of the application of the codes derived from the documents collected for the regionalist actors included in the project (see Appendix 2).

---

[5] We should also note here that several regionalist actors (and political parties in particular) addressed issues relating to the internal organisation of, and the distribution of political authority within, the regional territory in their documents, but as policies to be implemented by existing regional institutions. In this project we are only interested in territorial demands that imply a change in the territory's relations vis-à-vis higher levels of government; we therefore exclude from the analysis any demands for policy action that would work within extant regional structures.

Table 2. Summary of coding scheme: Territorial demands of regionalist actors

Category	Code	Definition
1. TYPE OF TERRITORIAL DEMANDS		
1.1 Demands for the territorial re-distribution of political authority (TDR codes)		
Independence	TDR_independence	This code should be used to capture demands for independence or secession, when irredentist claims are made (i.e. call for a territory to break away from one state to merge with another state), or for purposefully more ambiguous expressions which imply independent statehood (e.g. 'full sovereignty', 'own State').
Fundamental reform of political system	TDR_fund_ regionalise	Demands for the institutionalisation of a new layer of regional government (i.e. unitary -> regionalised state). Such institutionalisation can take various forms and may imply varying degrees of competences (ranging from regional councils with minimal administrative responsibilities, to regional executives or parliaments with high degrees of legislative, executive and/or judicial autonomy).
	TDR_fund_reborder	Demands for a redrawing of the borders of an already existing regional structure. In other words, although a regional structure already exists, the demand implies a fundamentally re-organising the territorial configuration of this structure. These demands may entail the merging of two or more regions, or establishing new regional units based on a different set of criteria. The re-drawing of regional boundaries may see a region preserve its original name, or assume a new one. This code can include demands that imply new borders within as well as beyond state borders.
	TDR_fund_federal	Demands for a reform leading to a federal political structure (i.e. unitary or regionalised state -> federal state). This encompasses any constitutional agreement that is based on a federal pact, be it of a federal or confederal nature. This code may only be used when an explicit demand for federalisation is made.
	TDR_fund_general	Demands for fundamental reform are expressed in general terms, but no specific detail is provided as to the exact form that this would take. Such demands may, for example, ask for fundamental changes to existing territorial structures at the state, the EU or international levels, or call for a radically different approach by other actors to managing the territory's needs and interests. However, what is absent is any specification of the nature of the changes that are called for. Where such information is present, the coder should look to apply the corresponding codes from the TDR or TDA coding options
Modification of political system	TDR_modify_selfrule	This code refers to demands that call for some kind of transfer of competences to the territory. Such a transfer could refer to i) executive (or administrative) decentralisation (where only policy implementation or execution is transferred); ii) legislative decentralisation (whereby the region can legislate over particular policy areas); or iii) judicial decentralisation (demands for the transfer of judicial powers to the territory). Self-rule demands may also be of a more general nature, and not specify whether this implies executive and/or legislative decentralisation.
	TDR_modify_ sharedrule	This code refers to demands that relate to the extent to which, or the way that, a territory participates in decision-making at higher territorial levels. Demands for shared rule will thus seek to establish or improve the link between the territory and decision-making at higher territorial levels. Such demands may refer to i) executive decision-making (e.g. via inter-governmental mechanisms that co-ordinate policies and actions across different territorial levels of government), ii) legislative decision-making (e.g. representation in higher-level

		legislative arenas), and iii) the judicial system (e.g. the territory's role in the operation of the judicial system at a higher territorial level). Demands may also be of a more general nature, in the sense that they imply more shared rule but no detail is provided about how exactly this might be achieved or implemented.
	TDR_modify_centralisation	Demands calling for the transfer of some policy competences to a higher territorial level. For example, regionalist actors may argue that the decentralisation of specific issues has been inefficient or no longer serves the territory's interest. Alternatively, regionalist actors may decide to agree to a reduction of the policy-making competences of the regional government in exchange for obtaining greater support by the state in the territory in other ways.
	TDR_modify_general	This code should be applied when a demand implies a modification of the political system in a general sense. For example, there may be no detail about whether this implies more self- or shared rule, and/or centralisation; or it may be that both self- and shared-rule are implied.
1.2 Demands for political (in-)action (TDA codes)		
	TDA_intervention	This code refers to demands for another actor to take action in the territory in some way. This may involve allocating resources (either financial or human resources), the implementation of a specific public policy, or regulation in the region (such as altering residency requirements in order to foster immigration in the region). It can also involve demands for recognition of the identity or interests of the territory in some way (e.g. that a territory is the homeland of a regional, ethnic or national group; the protection of the territory's language, specific traditions or customs; recognition of the principles or values of the territorial community more generally).
	TDA_nonintervention	This code refers to demands for a political actor to refrain from intervening in the territory. Such a demand may be framed in terms of loyalty to formal/informal provisions setting out the division of competences between different territorial levels, or refer to a conflict of competences.
1.3 General demands for a change in the territorial status quo		
	TDG_general	This code should be applied when an actor calls for some kind of change to the territorial status quo, but none of the above (TDR or TDA) codes can be applied. Such demands may call for some kind of change in the status quo of the territory's relations with other levels of government, but there is insufficient detail about the specific nature of the change implied. General territorial demands are too vaguely formulated to apply any other TD code.
1.4 Unspecified territorial demands		
	TD_unspecified	This code applies to quasi-sentences that contain frames that form part of an actor's general territorial narrative, but which cannot be clearly linked to a territorial demand. As such they do not themselves contain a specific territorial demand; rather, they serve to explain why a specified territorial demand is being made, what factors have prompted an actor to make such a demand, and what the consequences of it may be. Such arguments may also serve to place the specified demand in broader context, or outline the territorial identity and/or interests that underpin the demand.
2. LEVELS OF TERRITORIAL EMPOWERMENT		

In relation to the region	TL_region	This code should be applied when, if implemented, the demand would empower the territory in relation to other regional actors, governments and/or policy-making. For example, a regionalist actor may demand the same powers as another region has; as a result, its own territory would be empowered in relation to its regional counter-parts. The relationship affected may thus be that between regional actors, institutions, and/or policy-making within the state, or in other contexts beyond the state within which the territory is located.
In relation to the state	TL_state	This code should be applied when the implementation of a territorial demand would empower the territory in relation to actors, institutions, and/or policy-making at the level of the state.
In relation to the EU	TL_EU	This code should be applied when, if implemented, the demand would empower the region in relation to EU-level actors, institutions and/or policy-making.
In relation to the international level	TL_international	This code should be applied when, if implemented, the demand would empower the region within an international organisation or body.

3. TERRITORIAL DEMANDS LINKED TO POLICY AREAS		
Political system	PA_political	Constitutional and administrative structure of the political system, electoral laws etc.
Security	PA_security	Security issues such as the police, terrorism, civil protection, etc.
Justice	PA_justice	The justice sector, rule of law, corruption, civil and human rights, etc.
Foreign relations and defence	PA_foreign	Foreign and defence policy; international relations of different levels of government (including paradiplomacy activities of sub-state territories)
Europe	PA_europe	The European Union, processes of Europeanization (e.g. Helsinki process)
Economic policy	PA_economy	Economic policy other than fiscal and borrowing policy, including (but not limited to) trade, market regulations, economic growth impulse, macro and micro economic measures
Fiscal policy	PA_fiscal	Tax policy, central government funding of sub-state levels of government, inter-regional transfers, spending.
Borrowing policy	PA_borrowing	Borrowing policy (borrowing from state or other international institutions)
Labour/employment policy	PA_labour	The labour market, employment- and unemployment regulations
Agriculture and fisheries	PA_agriculture	The agricultural sector and fisheries
Energy	PA_energy	Energy politics, such as policy on infrastructural investments, subsidies etc.
Infrastructure and planning	PA_infrastructure	Infrastructure and planning, e.g. relating to transport or communication (including infrastructural and planning investments, the adoption of international standards, etc).

Social policy	PA_social	Social welfare and social protection e.g. social insurances (disability, pensions) etc.; policies tackling inequalities (e.g. gender, class); policies relating to poverty, housing etc.
Health	PA_health	Public health; including health insurance, research, technological development, infrastructural investments in the field
Education and research	PA_education	Education and research; e.g. the public school system, financing of higher education, financing of research, etc.
Sport and leisure	PA_sport	Professional and amateur sports, leisure activities; regulation and investment relating to sports and leisure; organisation of and participation in sporting events.
Media	PA_media	Newspapers, radio, television and social media (related to news) regulations and investments.
Migration	PA_migration	Immigration (including integration), emigration and refugee and asylum seeker issues; e.g. residency status regulations, emergency aid and infrastructure for refugees, etc.
Tourism	PA_tourism	Tourism; e.g. investment in tourism infrastructure and services
Culture	PA_culture	Cultural policy, language promotion (literature), heritage, museums, performative arts, traditional and cultural festivals.
Environment	PA_environment	Environmental protection; e.g. sustainability, pollution, city- and rural planning

3.4 Coding frames as justifications

Recent work has argued that regionalist mobilisation in pluri-national states is underpinned by "a general sense of neglect, the idea of being different and having divergent interests from the rest of the country" (Dalle Mulle, 2017: 154). Our coding scheme aims to capture whether, and the extent to which, these sentiments exhaust the range of justifications advanced by regionalist actors to justify their territorial demands. As outlined above, an initial list of frames was developed based on a review of the literature on regionalist mobilisation. This work has focused almost exclusively on regionalist parties (to the exclusion of civil society organisations, with the exception of Della Porta *et al*. (2017) and Basta (2018)) and has largely been based on in-depth case studies of one/a few case studies. It is nevertheless a useful starting point for understanding the diverse components of regionalist movements' 'issue packages' (Alonso *et al*., 2017). In a second step, the coding scheme was piloted on a sample of documents in order to refine the range and definition of frames; we outline some key changes made below. This resulted in a coding scheme composed of 35 frames, organised in four thematic groups (cultural/socio-economic/political/environmental frames); these are summarised in Table 4 below.

3.4.1 General categories of frames

As suggested above, a key feature of regionalist mobilisation is a sense of distinctiveness vis-à-vis the rest of the state, whether in terms of identity or interests. In their seminal study of the origins and evolution of territorial politics in Western Europe, Rokkan and Urwin (1983) argued that such distinctiveness is observable along three dimensions: culture, economics and politics. This tri-fold conceptualisation of the centre-periphery cleavage has proved enduring in subsequent scholarly work, with different studies focusing on one or more of these aspects in relation to regionalist mobilisation (e.g. Keating, 1988; Massetti, 2009; Fitjar, 2009; Alonso, 2012). These categories thus provide us with a general structure for our list of frames, which will be grouped according to **cultural, socio-economic and political frames**. In addition, we add a fourth category of **environmental frames**, given that several studies have observed territorial claims being supported by the assertion that it would allow for better stewardship of the environment. We elaborate on specific frames within these general categories as follows.

3.4.2 Cultural frames

Several scholars have viewed the possession of a distinctive cultural identity (e.g. based on ethnicity, language, culture, traditions) to be a key element underpinning the emergence of regionalist movements (Parks and Elcock, 2000; Müller-Rommel, 1998; Alonso *et al*., 2013). Much of the early work on this phenomenon also assumed that territorial demands would be framed in terms of a distinctive territorial identity. For example, Rokkan and Urwin (1983: 66) argue that whilst economic, cultural and political grievances may underpin regional mobilisation, "no territorial identity...can be defined solely in terms of a distinctive economy"; rather, "there must be something upon which territorial mobilization can be built, and that something is a form of cultural identity that possesses, both subjectively and objectively, distinctive and potent stigmata and artefacts". A similar assertion is made in the first attempts by scholars of territorial politics to study this party family comparatively and systematically. The labelling of these actors as "ethno-regionalist" sought to capture their role as

"ethnic entrepreneurs" whose territorial demands were underpinned by the desire to defend and secure recognition of their cultural identity (De Winter and Tursan, 1998; Müller-Rommel, 1998: 19).

Other analyses of framing strategies in relation to territorial actors have proposed a single frame to capture the identity/culture dimension of arguments for/against territorial re-structuring: 'identity' (Basile, 2019: 201), 'cultural distinctiveness/similarity' (Field and Haman, 2015: 905), 'ethnic security' (Huszka, 2014: 6). Whilst the frames differ in specific definitions and the emphasis given to different aspects of identity/culture, by encompassing these in a single frame the resultant analyses are unable to examine how identity/culture arguments play out differently in different places. There is plenty of empirical evidence that points to such variation in practice. For example, national identity in Scotland is rarely defined in terms of the more cultural aspects associated with it in much of the literature discussed above (Dalle Mulle, 2016: 7, 9). Likewise, whilst a narrative of historical distinctiveness has featured in the rhetoric of regionalist actors in many places (Della Porta *et al.*, 2017: 117; Dalle Mulle, 2017: 69), it is not an important theme for the Lega Nord (LN) given that its professed homeland of 'Padania' is an invented national community (Giordano, 2000). Elsewhere, the focus has been on arguments to do with cultural and/or linguistic maintenance, understood as ones where the claim for greater autonomy is supported by the assertion that it would facilitate the recognition and maintenance of the territory's distinct language and culture. This line of argument is one that has often been advanced by members of the nationalist movement in Quebec, who have claimed that 'sovereignty' would allow the political flexibility that would make it easier to ensure a future for the French language, along with the province's Francophone culture (McRoberts, 1988; Levine, 1990). A concern with cultural and linguistic issues has also been a prominent consideration in the arguments for autonomy advanced by other regionalist movements for example those in Catalonia (Dowling, 2009; McRoberts, 2001), the Basque Country (Mees, 2003), Flanders (De Winter, 1998a), South Tyrol (Pallaver, 2006: 166) and Wales (Wyn Jones, 2007).

In order to capture the full range of identity/culture arguments as articulated in different contexts, our coding scheme disaggregates these into specific codes. The identity code thus aims to capture all references to the sense of being a distinct territorial community of identification, which may be defined as a 'nation' or 'people' (real or imagined), and which encompasses different understandings of such a community (e.g. ethnic vs. civic). Codes for cultural and linguistic distinctiveness encompass the cultural/linguistic maintenance arguments summarised above, whilst a further set of codes recognise the importance of distinctiveness in other respects in some places (religious, historical and customs). Two additional codes were added following the piloting of the coding scheme on our cases: cultural invasion (frames that refer to attempts to culturally assimilate, invade or colonise the territory), and cultural/identity crisis (frames that makes explicit reference to a crisis of identity and/or culture in some way).

3.4.3 Socio-economic frames

As noted at the outset of this section, underpinning regionalist mobilisation is a sense of distinctiveness in relation to the rest of the state, which includes economic distinctiveness. In his analysis of regionalist party discourses in Northern Italy and Flanders, for example, Dalle Mulle (2017: 68, 95) finds evidence of such economic distinctiveness being cited as part of the case for territorial re-organisation (with specific reference being made to the different economic structures of Northern vs. Southern Italy, and Flanders vs. Wallonia respectively). The economic distinctiveness code thus aims to capture arguments

that refer in some way to the social and/or economic specificity of the region (e.g. as something that is not sufficiently taken into account, or as something to be protected/valued/promoted).

More commonly used arguments identified in the literature are related to economic growth in some way, in the sense that claims for territorial empowerment are supported by the assertion that it will facilitate better economic development and therefore lead to a region that is more prosperous. In Scotland, for example, devolution and (more recently) independence have been framed as possessing a significant economic dividend (Lynch 2002; Elias, 2019). An economic case in support of territorial empowerment has also been a feature of the arguments advanced by several other regionalist movements in locations such as Catalonia, Bavaria, Flanders, Wallonia and Northern Italy (Massetti, 2009; Van Houten, 2007; Elias and Mees, 2017). Indeed, in such cases, like in Scotland, we have seen claims for greater political control in areas such as industrial policy, regulatory policy, regional development policy, fiscal policy and even immigration policy all being underpinned by arguments about how it would advance the territory's economic prospects (Van Houten, 2007; Massetti 2009; Hepburn 2009a, Franco-Guillén, 2016). Work that has examined the factors shaping individuals' support for independence (Curtice, 2013; Muñoz and Tormos, 2014; Serrano, 2013) or secessionist parties (Sorens, 2008) has also pointed to the importance of arguments about the economic viability of a region. The socio-economic prosperity code thus encompasses arguments that refer to the region's overall prosperity in some way (e.g. as something which has been jeopardised within the territorial status quo, or can be ensured or improved as a result of territorial reform).

More recent work has also drawn attention to the increasing importance of socio-economic arguments that argue for a fairer, or more just, treatment of the territory in two respects: i. in relation to other territories, and ii. in terms of developing a fairer and more just society within the territory itself. The first of these is concerned with the redistribution of resources between territories (e.g. within the state, or within the EU). These are thus arguments about "territorial solidarity" and relate to the issue of socio-economic disparities between poorer or richer areas of a polity (Basile, 2015: 894-5). Given the alignment in this respect with the notion of "territorial cohesion" in the EU policy context until the mid 2010s (see Deliverable 1.1 (Weckroth *et al.*, 2018: 18) and Deliverable 1.2 (Weckroth and Moioso, 2018a: 9); see also Jones *et al.*, 2019), a territorial cohesion code thus aims to capture arguments that alludes in some way to the distribution of resources between different territories, and/or where the fiscal relationship between the territory and others is mentioned. Dalle Mulle (2017) notes, for example, that the issue of uneven economic development and inter-regional fiscal transfers within Italy and Belgium is a key grievance underpinning discourses of "economic victimisation" in the relatively richer regions of Northern Italy and Flanders respectively. But arguments about territorial cohesion are also to be found in relatively poorer regions. In Wales, for example, PC has long argued for a fairer funding formula for Wales in order to tackle economic under-development (Wyn Jones and Scully, 2011: 61). As noted above, arguments about territorial cohesion and solidarity have also been articulated at a supranational scale and have informed various European policies aimed at tackling territorial inequalities between different states and regions (Jones *et al.*, 2019: 99-106).

The other set of arguments has to do with developing of a fairer and more just society within the territory itself; such a focus is consistent with the more recent shift in EU cohesion policies, as noted in Deliverable 1.2. Some scholars have thus claimed that territorial empowerment would allow for the maintenance and the development of a distinctive (more progressive) approach to social justice, and hence contribute to the development of a fairer and more just society (Béland and Lecours, 2010;

McEwen 2002). Such arguments are consistent with the shift in emphasis in EU cohesion policies since the mid 2010s, with a greater emphasis on solidarity between individuals rather than regions (Deliverable 1.2 by Weckroth and Moioso (2018a: 14)), albeit in this case with the region advanced as the territorial level at which such solidarity can best be achieved. The code social justice thus encompasses arguments that refer to the possibility of creating a more just society in some way, usually by appealing to values such as fairness, equality and individual solidarity. In practice, the literature suggests that the exact form taken by such arguments may vary considerably in their focus and detail although there is no doubt about the importance of such arguments in different places. For example, nationalists in Quebec have regularly sought to argue that independence is necessary in order to protect aspects of the province's generous social policy provisons (Béland and Lecours, 2010: 8). Similarly, the SNP has long made the case that only with independence can Scotland become a fairer and more just society (Della Porta *et al.*, 2017: 106; Elias, 2019); a similar argument has been advanced by the Catalan Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC) over the years (Elias, 2015). Such arguments have also featured in relation to the issue of immigration, with Hepburn (2009a) demonstrating that in Scotland and Catalonia, claims for greater autonomy in the field immigration policy have argued that this could allow for the development of a more welcoming and compassionate approach to immigration that would stand in contrast to the approach favoured by the state.

In some places, regionalist actors have also drawn on socio-economic developments beyond their territories in order to justify their territorial demands. On the one hand, and often inspired by post-colonial struggles of the 1950s and 1960s, actors have conceived of their territories as 'internal colonies' of the state, and their goal is to liberate the territory from 'alien domination' and 'exploitation'. Such arguments have been advanced in economically under-developed peripheries (Maíz, 2003; Elias, 2009a) but also in relatively rich ones (Nairn, 2003; Dalle Mulle, 2017). Whilst the code 'cultural invasion' above seeks to capture the cultural aspects of such a colonial relationship, socio-economic colonialism is aimed at frames that refer to its socio-economic manifestations (e.g. references to economically exploit, plunder, colonialise the territory and/or the people who live there). On the other hand, Keating (2001) notes that whilst developments in globalisation may pose a threat to the economic viability of sub-state territories, some regionalist actors have seen these as opportunities for sub-state territories to prosper beyond state borders. Dalle Mulle (2017: 2, 66) finds precisely such arguments being used by the Flemish Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (N-VA) in order to demonstrate the economic viability of an independent Flemish state. Of course, globalisation does not only have an economic dimension; changes in the international order have also provided opportunities for stateless nations to project their identities within a wider political space and imagine alternative political models which can better accommodate territorial distinctiveness (Keating, 2001). The globalisation code seeks to capture these arguments; we locate it here within the 'economic' category of frames since our pilot suggested that these predominate in our cases, but it is defined in a sufficiently broad way to encompass all references to globalisation (e.g. the increasing inter-connectedness and/or interdependence of the world's economies, cultures, societies and/or governments).

A further code aims to explore the impact of the economic crisis on regionalist actors' territorial demands. That such an impact can be expected is suggested by Keating's observation that territorial challenges to the state are a response from the periphery to shifting economic, cultural and political circumstances that can alter regionalist movements' calculations about whether they win or lose from particular constitutional arrangements (Keating, 1988). Béland and Lecours (2019), for example, argue

that austerity policy has had an impact on regionalist mobilisation in Catalonia and Scotland, where it has underpinned discourses of blame assignation. The economic crisis code is thus aimed at arguments that make a specific reference to the economic crisis in some way (e.g. by linking territorial demands to the causes and consequences of economic crisis).

A final code was added as a result of the piloting of the coding scheme, which revealed arguments about sustainable development to be increasingly used by regionalist actors in several of our cases. The sustainable development code thus focuses on arguments broadly understood as being concerned with satisfying society's economic, social and environmental needs in terms of well-being in the short, medium and – above all – long term (see Deliverable 1.3 Glossary of Key Terms - Weckroth and Moioso, 2018b). In other words, they are arguments that look to balance current political demands with wider and future impacts on the territory's ability to sustain itself.

3.4.4 Political frames

Whilst we make the case above for codes that capture arguments relating to the cultural and socio-economic distinctiveness of a territory, the coding scheme complements these with a code for political distinctiveness. These captures arguments that refer to political markers of difference that are claimed to characterise a territorial group or community, whether this be in terms of political values, principles, ideas or a specific approach to tackling a political issue or problem. For example, a recent study of the Scottish referendum campaign notes that pro-independence parties clearly positioned themselves within, and mobilised popular support on the basis of, a "strong tradition of social democratic values in Scotland" (Della Porta *et al.*, 2017: 105-6).

But rhetoric in support for territorial change may also be driven by the sense that the region's identity/interests are not well served within existing constitutional/institutional frameworks. Indeed, in his study of the re-emergence of nationalism in Europe at the end of the twentieth century, Brubaker (1996: 79) notes that most nationalist movements express variations of a core lament that "the identity and interests of a putative nation are not properly expressed or realised in political institutions, practices or policies". This dissatisfaction with the territorial status quo is a common theme in studies of regionalist actors' grievances, although the specific form that these arguments take reflects the specificities of different cases. A key driver of regionalist mobilisation in Friesland, for example, was the lack of recognition of, or protection and support for, the Friesian language within the Dutch state (Hemminga, 2006: 141). Likewise, a key frustration for moderate Corsican nationalist during the 1960s and 1970s was the impossibility of accessing representative institutions in the absence of an elected regional government and the domination of state-level politics by local clans (Elias, 2009a: 117). More recently, dissatisfaction with the territorial *status quo* has led regionalist actors to shift (and often radicalise) their territorial demands in many places (Elias, 2009b; Hepburn, 2009c; Scantamburlo and Pallaver, 2014; Elias and Mees, 2017; Dalle Mulle, 2017; Maíz and Ares, 2018). The dissatisfaction code thus captures arguments expressing the various set of grievances concerning the territorial status quo, especially in terms of the territory's extant relations with other levels of government (e.g. state, EU).

Furthermore, Della Porta and Diani (2006: 76) note in relation to social movements that "a crucial step in the social construction of a problem consists in the identification of those responsible for the situation in which the aggrieved population finds itself". There is plentiful evidence that political parties also engage in such blaming strategies (e.g. Weaver, 2018), and regionalist actors are not exception.

Case studies have noted blame being attributed *inter alia* to the central government, state-wide parties and/or their regional branches, the EU, other regionalist actors and/or other groups within the state's territory (Giordano, 2000; Dalle Mulle, 2017: 37, 64, 78; Maíz and Ares, 2018: 187; Basile, 2019: 206-7). These arguments are captured by the blame code, where there is a clear attribution of responsibility to someone/something (e.g. political institutions, actors, policies or approaches) for a particular situation/outcome (either affecting the territory specifically or in a more general sense).

Other works that have examined the framing strategies of territorial actors have also identified the prominence of arguments relating to democracy (Huszka, 2014: 6; Basile, 2019: 191; Della Porta *et al*., 2017) or 'citizen rights and representation' (Field and Hamann, 2015: 906). The exact conceptualisation of the frame varies across these studies, and include a consideration of the general quality of the democratic process, the participation and/or representation of citizens and/or regions in decision-making, the accountability of decision-making and/or political actors, and taking decisions as close as possible to citizens. Operationalising these arguments into discrete codes in our coding scheme was a challenge. An initial draft differentiated between *democracy* and *participation* codes, but the pilot phase showed this to be problematic in practice as i. coders struggled to differentiate consistently between these; and ii. the 'democracy' frame contained arguments which were felt to be substantively different) (e.g. quality of the democratic system and the fundamental rights of citizens). As a result, the final coding scheme contains the following codes: a quality of democracy[6] code for all arguments relating in some way to the nature and quality of the democratic system, institutions and/or government (which may be inadequate or under threat, or could be improved to enhance the democratic quality of the political system); and a code for civil and human rights to be applied when a territorial demand is justified in relation to the fundamental rights of citizens in some way.

Our coding scheme also distinguishes between arguments about the quality of democracy in general, and arguments that specifically focus on the democratic right of nations to decide for themselves how they are governed. This is because of the particular salience in recent years of such arguments in places such as Catalonia and Scotland, where such a democratic right to self-determination has been asserted on the basis of national sovereignty, and claims that this is a means to achieving better welfare and governance for the national population (Della Porta *et al*., 2017: 101; Dalle Mulle and Serrano, 2018). The sovereignty code thus captures arguments that explicitly refer to the territory's right to decide for itself how it is governed (e.g. by using terminology such as 'sovereignty', 'self-determination' or asserting a 'right to decide' or take control of its own affairs).

---

[6] We include in this code elements that the other studies referred to above exclude. For example, Basile (2019: 206) distinguishes between 'democracy' and 'subsidiarity' frames, with the latter capturing arguments for a further decentralisation of decision-making within the EU context. In our coding scheme, we include 'subsidiarity' arguments under the 'quality of democracy' code as we understand it to relate to improving the quality of decision-making by bringing it closer to citizens (see D1.3's Glossary of Key Terms, Weckroth and Moisio, 2018b: 5). Furthermore, Field and Hamann (2015: 906) have a separate code for 'legal-constitutional compliance' to capture regionalist parties' arguments about compliance with or violation of existing legal or constitutional provisions. Our pilot of the coding scheme suggested that such arguments usually implied acting in a way consistent with extant constitutional/legislative provisions (and therefore respecting and working within democratically agreed frameworks); such arguments are thus also encompassed within the 'democracy' code in our coding scheme.

A further two codes – Europe and comparison – are informed by what we note above, in relation to the coding of regionalist actors' territorial demands, about the tendency for such actors to look (and draw on experiences from) further afield when articulating their territorial positions and strategies. The first thus aims to capture arguments that link a territorial demand to Europe in some way. This may be in the positive sense that the EU or developments in European integration is supportive of regionalist actors' territorial ambitions, as was widely considered by regionalist actors in the 1990s; or in the negative sense that supranational policies/institutions/actors are damaging to or undermining territorial identities and/or interest, a critique that has become more salient amongst these actors in recent years (De Winter and Gómez-Reino Cachafeiro, 2002; Elias, 2009a; Jolly, 2015). The second, in turn, recognises that regionalist actors often compare their own fortunes to those of other actors, e.g. other regions (as the example above illustrates) or states. For example, the SNP has consistently looked to the success of other small states such as Iceland, Ireland and Norway (Della Porta *et al*., 2017: 105), whilst Dalle Mulle (2017: 153) notes the tendency for pro-independence parties to look to examples of 'peaceful' separations in attempt to reassure their populations that secession need not be difficult or violent.

Basile's (2015: 895, 2019: 191-196) study of the strategies used by political actors to frame the issue of decentralisation in Italy also finds evidence of the use of arguments about efficiency, and especially by the Lega Nord in its strong and sustained critique of the inefficiency of the Italian central state (see also Giordano, 2000: 446). Similar arguments have been found in other cases, with the Catalan ERC denouncing the "appalling inefficiency" of the Spanish administration and the Flemish N-VA proclaiming more self-government to be the only way forward for more efficient governance (Dalle Mulle, 2017: 36, 64). The efficiency code is thus used for arguments referring to efficiency in some way, whether this be in terms of the speed of decision-making, the simplicity/complexity of political processes and/or services, or the implications of the territorial re-structuring for the efficacy with which decisions are made and/or policies/services operate. We also take a further code from Basile's work, namely political unity. This capture arguments about the unity of the central state (e.g. as something to be preserved, or as outdated and/or fictitious); found to be salient in the Italian case, such arguments were also identified in other cases during the piloting of the coding scheme. The latter is informed by what we note above, in relation to coding regionalist actors' territorial demands.

A final set of political frames were derived from the piloting phase, and thus reflect arguments salient in our cases but not recognised in the extant territorial politics literature. A political colonialism code aims to capture arguments referring to attempts to politically assimilate, suppress, invade and/or colonise a territory; in this sense, it seeks to complement the cultural/socio-economic dimensions of the colonial relationship captured in the cultural invasions and socio-economic colonialism codes described above. A political crisis code is applied when regionalist actors make explicit reference to some kind of political crisis (as distinct from an identity/cultural, economic, or environmental crisis, see above/below). In contrast, the peace and conflict code captures arguments making a reference to peace and/or security, either specifically in the context of political conflict and conflict resolution (an important feature of the Corsican case and in relation to political violence by radical nationalist groups) or more generally in the sense of co-existence or co-habitation between peoples/nations. Finally, the policy code was added due to the high occurrence of arguments setting out the specific policy changes that could be achieved as a result of territorial empowerment (e.g. a change in housing or transport

policy, with actors often setting out in detail the exact nature of the policy change that they would implement).

3.4.5 Environmental frames

Some of the frames here are included in order to provide consistency with the cultural, socio-economic and political frames summarised above. This is the case, for example, for the codes environmental distinctiveness, environmental crisis, and environmental colonialism. These thus capture the specific environmental dimensions to arguments invoking, respectively, distinctiveness/ crisis/ colonialism. As noted above, however, there is also evidence in the literature of environmental arguments constituting a distinctive set of justifications for regionalist actors' demands for territorial empowerment. In comparison with the other categories discussed above, this line of argument is not one that has occupied a particularly prominent position in the literature to date. However, over recent years, several pieces of research have highlighted the environmental dimension that has begun to feature in the arguments advanced by various regionalist actors. For example, Elias (2009) has drawn attention to the 'eco-nationalism' that has emerged as a feature of the party platform presented by Plaid Cymru in Wales, echoing similar findings by Gómez-Reino (2006: 184) in relation to the Galician Bloque Nacionalista Galego (BNG). In addition, Hepburn (2010: 180) has highlighted how claims for greater autonomy for Sardinia by parties such as the Partito Sardo d'Azione (PSdAz) and the Indipendèntzia Repùbrica de Sardigna (iRS) have been linked to arguments regarding how the influence of Rome has allowed the destruction of forests, the pillaging of mineral resources and the spread of pollution through the dumping of nuclear waste. We thus include an environmental sustainability code to capture arguments concerned with the protection and maintenance of environmental resources for future generations (e.g. as something which has been or is jeopardised by the territorial status quo, or which can be achieved as a result of territorial empowerment).

3.4.6 Other frames

We also included a code for other frames in the coding scheme, in order to capture arguments that may not fit neatly into the list of frames outlined above. Having such a category was crucial in the process of developing the coding scheme since it allowed us to identify justifications that may have been neglected in the extant literature, or which did not fit easily with the frame definitions as they had been hitherto defined. This led us to add and/or clarify codes where necessary, and specifically where the frequency of a particular argument in a case or across cases indicated that it should be captured in the coding scheme either as a distinct frame, or as part of an existing frame. This category also proved important for capturing arguments that lacked sufficient detail for categorisation in any of the specific frame codes (e.g. "more devolution will allow us to better meet the needs of Wales", where it is not clear whether those needs are cultural/socio-economic/political/environmental in nature. We reflect on the content of "other" frames in the comparative discussion of the case study data below.

Table 3. Summary of coding scheme: Frames

Frame	Code	Definition
1. CULTURAL FRAMES		
Identity	FRA_cult_identity	Arguments that refer to a distinctive territorial identity, understood as a general feeling of belonging to the territory and/or the people who live there. In other words, there is a claim that a group consciousness of being different exists, and that this provides a common basis of identification. Reference to distinct interests or values that define the group's identity may be made. In some cases, arguments may be framed in terms of a 'national' identity, and/or refer to a distinct 'people' or a 'community of destiny'. Such an identity may also be based on a heartland (real or imagined). The full acknowledgement of the "nation" and its values should be considered as a political value to be pursued by parties.
Cultural distinctiveness	FRA_cult_ culturedist	Claims that refer to cultural difference in some way, either through general references to 'culture' and/or cultural values/practices, or through more specific references to aspects of culture (e.g. the arts, literature and creative production, performative arts, heritage etc).
Linguistic distinctiveness	FRA_cult_language	Arguments that refer to linguistic diversity and bi/multilingualism. The status of the language within the territory may differ (minority vs. majority), as will the exact way in which linguistic distinctiveness is used as an argument (e.g. arguments to bolster the use of a minority language, to protect the status of a language, or to ensure bilingualism or multilingualism).
Religious distinctiveness	FRA_cult_religion	Claims may cite religious difference as an argument in support of a territorial demand. For example, arguments may relate to the need to protect or promote this aspect of the territory's distinctiveness.
Historical distinctiveness	FRA_cult_history	Arguments here should make some reference to the territory's historical past in some way. Such arguments may refer to a history of autonomy and/or independent statehood, or of being governed by other powers that the state which the territory is currently part of. Such references may seek to legitimise current territorial demands. Alternatively, where past autonomy/independence has been lost, it may be reclaimed. Regionalist actors may also make reference to key historical events, which in some way have impacted on the territory and its present-day situation.
Customs distinctiveness	FRA_cult_customs	References to the territory's customs and traditions. There is a broad range of aspects that may be referred to here, including specific symbols and traditions. Arguments framed in more abstract terms relating to a particular 'way of life' within the territory should also be included here.
Cultural invasion	FRA_cult_invasion	Arguments about the state's attempts to culturally assimilate, invade, colonise, the territory and/or the people who live there.
Cultural/identity crisis	FRA_cult_crisis	To be applied when there is explicit reference to a crisis of identity and/or culture in some way. The use of the word 'crisis' implies some kind of negative situation which has either occurred abruptly or with little/no warning, or in the sense of 'a testing time' or 'emergency event'; crises may also be linked to unstable/dangerous situations affecting an individual, group, community or an entire society. Arguments may link territorial demands to the causes and consequences of cultural/identity crises, including existing responses to its effects.
2. SOCIO-ECONOMIC FRAMES		
Economic distinctiveness	FRA_soc_distinct	Arguments that refer to the social and/or economic specificity of the region. These may claim that current arrangements do not take sufficiently into account this distinctiveness, that greater autonomy would allow for the recognition of this distinctiveness, or that this is something that should be valued, protected and/or respected. Arguments may refer to particular socio-economic features of the territory that distinguish it from other contexts; this may

29

		include dependence on or significance of certain key economic sectors, levels of poverty or deprivation, economic performance, economic output or performance.
Socio-economic prosperity	FRA_soc_prosperity	Arguments that refer to the possibility of improving the region's overall socio-economic prosperity. Such arguments may refer to the territory's economic performance/growth (e.g. GDP); standards of living in a territory (e.g. wage levels); standards of employment or levels of employment in the territory; levels of educational attainment or health in the territory.
Territorial cohesion and solidarity	FRA_soc_terrcohesion	This code might be applied when the actor establishes a link between a territorial demand and the socio-economic differences and similarities between different territories (e.g. across the state, or across the EU). This can be positive (e.g. with greater say in the redistribution of resources, territorial cohesion will be guaranteed) or negative (claiming that resources should be left where they are produced). Arguments alluding to the fiscal relationship between the territory and other actors (e.g. other sub-state territories, or in relation to higher levels of government) should also be included here.
Social justice	FRA_soc_justice	This code seeks to capture arguments that refer to the possibility of creating a more just society, usually by appealing to values such as fairness, equality, and individual solidarity (for solidarity between territories (rather than individuals), see the category FRA_soc_cohesion below). Such arguments may refer to (but are not limited to) the gap between rich and poor within the territory; levels of welfare provision; the general approach to taxation; opportunities to access education and/or health care; difference in policy approaches in the field of immigration.
Socio-economic colonialism	FRA_soc_colonialism	Arguments that refer to the state's attempts to economically exploit, plunder, colonise, the territory and/or the people who live there. Such arguments may feature especially as part of a discourse of 'internal colonialism', often understood in terms of the uneven territorial effects of economic development, and where a territory has been economically exploited by other actors, often, but not exclusively, the state.
Globalisation	FRA_soc_globalise	To be applied when a territorial demand is connected to globalisation in some way, understood as the increasing inter-connectedness and/or interdependence of the world's economies, cultures, societies, and/or governments. Although this code is included under the 'socio-economic' thematic cluster, it should also be used for arguments that make reference to alternative aspects of globalisation (including political, cultural and environmental).
Economic crisis	FRA_soc_crisis	This code should be applied when there is explicit reference to an economic crisis in some way. The use of the word 'crisis' implies some kind of negative situation which has either occurred abruptly or with little/no warning, or in the sense of 'a testing time' or 'emergency event'; crises may also be linked to unstable/dangerous situations affecting an individual, group, community or an entire society. Arguments may link territorial demands to the causes and consequences of economic crises, including existing responses to its effects.
Sustainable development	FRA_soc_sustainable	Arguments explicitly framed in terms of sustainable development. This is broadly understood as a concern with meeting the territory's present needs, without compromising its ability to meet its needs in the future; in other words, it is an approach that looks to balance current political demands with wider and future impacts on the territory's ability to sustain itself. Arguments are broader that just environmental sustainability (see FRA_env_sustainable); they are also about ensuring peace and prosperity for people and the planet, now and in the future.
3. POLITICAL FRAMES		
Political distinctiveness	FRA_pol_distinct	Arguments making reference to the political markers of difference that characterise a territorial group or community. These may constitute distinctive ideological values (e.g. left- vs. right, egalitarianism, republicanism etc.), principles, ideas, or a specific approach to tackling a political issue/problem. Such markers of distinctiveness may be something to be recognized, valued, respected, or advanced.

Dissatisfaction with the territorial status quo	FRA_pol_ dissatisfaction	This code aims to capture statements that express dissatisfaction with the territorial status quo, and specifically the extant nature of the territory's relations with other levels of government. Such arguments may refer to existing relationships with governments, actors and/or institutions in so far as they currently impact on the territory's ability to protect and advance its interests. Arguments coded here may also refer to (and evaluate) previous attempts at reforming the territorial status quo, or policies pursued by other levels of government that have impacted the territory in some way.
Attribution of blame	FRA_pol_blame	Statements where blame is attributed to someone/something for a particular situation/outcome. This may include other political actors (including parties and governments), political institutions, policies or approaches. Such arguments may include attributing blame for the current situation of the territory in some way, or in a more general sense (e.g. blame on political elites as part of a populist discourse of us vs. them).
Quality of democracy	FRA_pol_quality	Arguments relating to the nature and quality of the democratic system, institutions, and the government. These may be inadequate or under threat, or could be improved to enhance the democratic qualities of the political system. Arguments may relate to the nature, maintenance and/or strengths/deficiencies of democracy; the accountability and transparency of the political system; political rights, such as equality before the law, due process, participation in civil society and politics such as freedom of association, right to assemble, to petition, to vote; the nature and quality of representation of citizens and/or the territory within the political system (including participation and voice in decision-making).
Civil and human rights	FRA_pol_rights	This code must be applied when the territorial demand is considered as a means to protect the fundamental rights of citizens. These may include those rights protecting individuals' integrity, life, safety, and the protection from discrimination on the bases of individuals' traits. In addition, rights of freedom of speech, religion, press, assembly, and movement may be cited, either as something that has been eroded or under threat, or something to be valued and/or protected.
Sovereignty	FRA_pol_ sovereignty	Arguments about self-determination and sovereignty as principles to be defended, reaffirmed and promoted. Includes the assertion of a right to self-determination (i.e. to decide for themselves on how their territory is governed); in many places, this argument has been phrased as the 'right to decide' or the right to 'take control' over their own affairs. The territory may also be described as having initially possessed sovereignty, which has been taken over by the central state. Arguments may also make reference to a 'national interest' which must be recognised and legitimised in decision-making.
Europe	FRA_pol_Europe	This code must be applied when a territorial demand is connected to Europe (or the idea of Europe), or the European Union project in some way, and where these references serve to legitimise and provide support for a territorial demand. Arguments are likely to vary significantly in nature, from specific references to EU actors or policies, to broader references to European values, principles or characteristics. It may also be the case that references to the history of the EU/Europe are brought forward to legitimise a demand.
Comparison	FRA_pol_ comparison	This code should be applied whenever the actor establishes an analogy, example or comparison with other territorial contexts. Such arguments may refer explicitly to examples within or beyond the state where the territory is located, or they may talk in a more general way (without referring to specific examples) about other cases and/or contexts. Such arguments may refer to the situation of another territory (e.g. its success or failure) to illustrate the past/present situation of the territory, and/or what could be achieved in the future. Comparisons may refer to political, socioeconomic, cultural or environmental performance.
Efficiency	FRA_pol_efficiency	This code should be used for statements which refer to efficiency in some way. This can include the speed and efficacy of decision-making, the simplicity/complexity of political processes and/or services, and the implications of the existing division of competencies for the way in which decisions/policies/services operate.

Central state unity	FRA_pol_unity	The unity of a central state (e.g. Italy, or UK, or Spain) is at the core of this frame. It might be considered either as a value or as an outdated, fictitious principle. Some regionalist actors pursue territorial change, claiming that this would not put question the state's unity. Other actors may perceive the state's unity to be a fiction or an outdated value, so they aim at challenging this principle.
Political colonialism	FRA_pol_ colonialism	This code should be applied to frames that refer to the state's attempts to politically assimilate, suppress, invade, colonise, the territory and/or the people who live there.
Political crisis	FRA_pol_crisis	This code should be applied when there is explicit reference to a political crisis in some way. The use of the word 'crisis' implies some kind of negative situation which has either occurred abruptly or with little/no warning, or in the sense of 'a testing time' or 'emergency event'; crises may also be linked to unstable/dangerous situations affecting an individual, group, community or an entire society. Arguments may link territorial demands to the causes and consequences of political crisis, which may refer to territorial politics specifically, or in a more general way (e.g. crisis of the political system, processes and/or institutions).
Peace and security	FRA_pol_peace	This code must be applied when the territorial demand refers in some way to peace and/or security: i. arguments may be made in the context of political conflict and conflict resolution; these are likely to appear in cases where political unrest or violence is present, and will link this to a demand for a change in the territorial status quo in some way; ii. arguments may refer to peace/conflict in a broader sense of co-existence between citizens and/or groups; cohabitation between people/communities may be threatened in some way, or be something to value/protect/ensure and/or or a desire to protect/ensure. May also allude to reconciliation between different groups.
Policy	FRA_pol_policy	This code should be applied when a territorial demand is considered to be a means to achieve something in relation to a specific policy field. In other words, the outcome of a demand would enable some kind of change in a particular area of decision-making to be implemented.
4. ENVIRONMENTAL FRAMES		
Environmental distinctiveness	FRA_env_distinct	This code aims to capture arguments that make reference to the particular features of the territory's environment. This may include references to its landscape, topography, climate or wildlife. Arguments may call for the preservation or promotion of these distinctive features, or argue that these have been threatened in some way by the action of others in the territory.
Environmental crisis	FRA_env_crisis	To be applied when there is explicit reference to an environmental crisis in some way. This may be as a crisis resulting from a natural disaster or human activity. The use of the word 'crisis' implies some kind of negative situation which has either occurred abruptly or with little/no warning, or in the sense of 'a testing time' or 'emergency event'; crises may also be linked to unstable/dangerous situations affecting/threatening the natural environment (and which may have implications for an individual, group, community or an entire society). May link territorial demands to the causes and consequences of environmental crises, including existing responses to its effects.
Environmental colonialism	FRA_env_ colonialism	This code should be applied to frames that refer to the state's attempts to environmentally plunder, invade, colonise, the territory.
Environmental sustainability	FRA_env_ sustainability	Captures arguments that are concerned with the protection and maintenance of environmental resources for future generations. Arguments here will refer to different ways in which to tackle unsustainable environmental practices, and/or promote policies and practices that protect and preserve the environment. May include protecting environmental diversity, preventing damage to the natural environment (e.g. pollution, infra-structure or industrial developments), tackling climate change, and reducing the use of plastics.

5. OTHER FRAMES		
Frames - other	FRA_other	This code aims to capture arguments that do not fit with the codes provided for the four thematic clusters above.

4. Coding Regionalist Actors' Discourses: A Qualitative Content Analysis

We use the coding scheme described above to undertake a qualitative content analysis of regionalist actors' political discourses. This is a method for systematically describing the meaning of qualitative data by assigning successive parts of the material to the categories of a coding scheme (Schreier, 2014: 170). The coding manual provided a detailed overview of the process for undertaking such an analysis, and served as a tool for training, and evaluating the coding performance of, coders. It also serves to enable the replicability of the coding process by other research teams in future (e.g. to analyse other regionalist actors not included in this study, or non-regionalist actors who have adopted a position on the territorial issue dimension). In this section, we summarise the key stages of this process whereby documents and texts were identified for analysis, the reliability of coding across coders and cases was evaluated, and the data was analysed on a case-by-case basis. The resultant data set will be made available as open access data upon completion of the IMAJINE project, in accordance with the guidelines set out in the Data Management Plan (Deliverable 10.2).

4.1 Identification of material for analysis

In order to identify the material to be analysed in this respect, we follow Krippendorff (2004) by distinguishing between "sampling" and "coding" data units, understood as the documents to be included in our analysis vs. the textual units within these to which coders apply the coding categories defined in the coding scheme.

4.1.1 Sampling units: criteria for document collection

The coding scheme was applied to a range of documents where regionalist actors formulated and justified their territorial demands. In practice, the range of available documents varied considerably across regionalist actors, requiring us to establish parameters for document selection that would ensure a sufficient commonality across actors and cases to enable comparative analysis. At the very least, the selection of documents for each regionalist actor needed to allow for a longitudinal analysis of the time period 1990-2018, and include the most informative documents related to the major events and milestones of the regionalist movement's mobilization.

Following a scoping exercise where the nature and availability of documentation for each regionalist actor was reviewed, the following criteria were established to provide a minimum sample of documents to be collected for each actor:

For regionalist parties:

- All election manifestos for regional, state-wide and European elections between the time period 1990-2018. In case of missing manifestos, a substitute document should be identified (e.g. a conference report from the same year, or a general party programme issued close to the elections, or valid for the relevant electoral period).

- In addition, important time-points other than elections were identified – e.g. key milestones in territorial politics, and/or important periods of regionalist mobilization – during the period 1990 and

2018 (e.g. a referendum or constitutional reform on a territorial issue, a (draft) law or the publication of an autonomy statute). A sample of the most relevant programmatic documents for each milestone was collected (e.g. policy position papers, political statements, legislative proposals, press releases, and other relevant documents.) in order to have a sample of documents that illustrates (and as far as possible, exhausts) the variation of territorial demands and arguments brought forward for all key periods of regionalist mobilisation.

For regionalist civil society organisations:

- Events, milestones and major periods of regionalist mobilisation that have been important to civil society organisations between 1990 and 2018 were identified (e.g. a referendum, a constitutional reform, a (draft) law or the publication of an autonomy statute). A sample of the most relevant programmatic documents for each of these mobilization was collected (e.g. policy position papers, political statements, legislative proposals, press releases, and other relevant documents.); as for regionalist parties, the aim is to have a sample of documents that illustrates (and as far as possible, exhausts) the variation of territorial demands and arguments brought forward for all periods of regionalist mobilisation.

In addition to this minimum sample of documents, coders were able to select and include in the analysis other programmatic documents that focused on, or were linked to, regionalist actors' territorial demands (e.g. summaries of party congresses, policy position papers or statements, and/or legislative proposals). A summary of the documents collected for each case is provided in Table 5 below. The number of documents collected and analysed varies between regions, and for specific actors within regions; this is an inevitable consequence of the very different nature of the regionalist actors included in the study (e.g. how long they have existed, the type and frequency of documents produced). Nevertheless, for each case there is sufficient material to be able to identify each actor's territorial demands and the key features of its framing strategy over the time period of interest, which is our primary aim in this report. In order to prepare the identified documents for analysis, they were converted into Word or text files, and imported into MaxQDA, a software specifically developed to support qualitative content analysis.

Table 4. Summary of document samples.

Case	Actor	Summary of documents analysed
Aosta Valley	UV	A total of 17 manifestoes were coded, from regional, state and European elections (1990-2018).
	UVP	2 election manifestoes coded (2013 and 2018 regional elections).
	SA	6 election manifestoes coded (2003-2018 – regional and state elections).
	ALPE	2 election manifestoes coded (2013 and 2018 regional elections).
	Mouv'	Manifesto for 2018 regional election coded.
Bavaria	BP	Sample made up of 56 documents were retrieved and analysed for the BP. Of these 56, 22 were general or election-specific manifestos; 18 were policy statements (leaflets or articles in the BP's journal "Freies Bayern" (engl: Free Bavaria); the remaining 16 documents were press releases, policy papers on specific issues, legislative proposals and other documents.

Catalonia	Political parties (CiU, CDC, JxC, JxS, ERC, CUP)	Sample of 146 documents for three political parties, two electoral lists, four civil society organisation and two referendum campaign. These included 44 electoral manifestos corresponding to the three levels (regional, general, European) from 1990 to 2018 for the political parties and electoral lists.
	Civil society organisations (EJS, DGM, PDD, OC, ANC, SUMATE)	In addition to these manifestos, and also for the civil society organisations, 46 political statements, 15 press releases, one policy paper and 10 various documents such as leaflets and campaign fliers were collected.
Corsica	Moderate/ radical nationalists	The fragmentation of the Corsican nationalist movement has significantly impacted on the existence of available material. Some documents were retrieved from the current parties' web pages, and/or Web Archive; party magazines provided additional material (manifesto summaries, press releases and policy positions). This resulted in a sample composed of political statements (31), electoral manifestos (19), press releases (9), leaflets and campaign documents (10) and policy papers (4).
Friesland	FNP	9 manifestos for elections to the provincial government of Friesland (1990-2018). 15 additional documents composed of statements published in regional newspapers and policy papers.
Galicia	BNG	19 electoral manifestos (6 for regional elections, 8 for general elections, and 5 for European elections) for period 1990-2018. The only document that could not be obtained was the manifesto for the 2001 Galician election.
	ANOVA	3 political statements (approved at the party's national assembly in 2012, 2015 and 2018 respectively), and electoral manifestos from its electoral alliances (AGE and ENM). The latter account for 4 manifestos (2 regional, 1 general and 1 European election).
Kashubia	KPZ and KJ	7 documents were analysed for KPZ (for the period 1992-2016) and 3 for KJ (for the period 2011-2016). These are mostly programme documents adopted at the General Delegates' Meetings of both organizations. They are called congressional resolutions, ideological declarations, ideological resolutions or programme declarations. In addition, there is also a statement of one of the branches of the KPZ.
Northern Italy	LN	A total of 14 documents were analysed. 13 of these were manifestoes for regional, state and European elections; a further article was included from the party's newspaper as a proxy for a 2008 manifesto which could not be obtained.
Sardinia	PSdAz	Sample of documents included 9 manifestos (1996-2018), and a further 3 written jointly with SNI (2001 and 2004). A further 10 documents were analysed representing the 1990-2018 period (including political statements and a legislative proposal relating to Sardinian autonomy); these provided material to cover the full time period considered by the analysis, especially for years for which election manifestos were not available.
	SNI	5 election manifestos analysed (1996-2013), and a further 3 written jointly with SNI (see above); these were supplemented by two further political statements (from 2009 and 2011 respectively).

	iRS	4 election manifestos analysed (2004-2009); later election materials could not be accessed.
Scotland	SNP SF, YS, RIC, SIC, WFI	Sample of 171 documents one political party, three civil society organisation and two referendum campaigns. These included 17 electoral manifestos corresponding to the three levels (regional, general, European) from 1990 to 2018 for the SNP. Besides manifestos and also for the civil society organisations, 24 political statements, 37 press releases, 83 policy papers and 10 various documents such as leaflets and campaign fliers were analysed.
Wales	PC	17 election manifestoes for regional, state-wide and European elections (1990-2018).
	YSG, CY, YC	For civil society organisations in Wales, document collection was strongly influenced by the type of documents available, which were limited (especially YC given its recent creation). Sample made up of short promotional material, newspapers created by the organisation or speeches by political leaders. These amount to a total of 9 documents in the sample (YSG – 4, CY – 4, YC - 1).

4.1.2 Coding units: criteria for selecting and coding text

Within these documents, relevant sections of text for coding were identified through a two-stage process. In the first instance, coders were required to read through the documents to identify text sections containing a narrative related to regionalist actors' desire to challenging (and alter) the relationship between their territory and other territorial levels in some way. This criteria for text selection aligns with our conceptualisation of regionalist actors' territorial demands outlined above, whereby their aim is to enhance the territory's ability to protect and advance its identity and interests in relation to other (higher) political levels.

Within these relevant sections of text, in a second stage coders were required to identify relevant sentences (or parts of them) for coding. Following other work (Werner, Lacewell and Volkens, 2015: 6; Basile, 2019) the exact units to be coded are quasi-sentences; these are sentences (or parts of them) that contain exactly one statement or argument. The general rule in these works is that natural sentences must be split into quasi-sentences when they contain more than one statement or argument. In the context of our project, this means that a quasi-sentence must only contain one of each of the elements that we aim to capture with our coding scheme (territorial demands, levels of empowerment, policy area, frame); a natural sentence that contains more than one of each of the elements must therefore be split into quasi-sentences, which are then coded in turn. The coding manual provides detailed guidelines on and examples of the process of identifying and coding quasi-sentences (see Appendix b, sections 6 and 7).

4.2 Evaluating the reliability of the coding process

The coding manual was used to familiarise all coders with the steps outlined above, and provided the benchmark against which the reliability of coding was evaluated. It is noted above that each coder was required to pass an ICR test before being able to proceed to start coding documents for their specific case studies. Once achieved, the reliability of coding was monitored on an on-going basis in two ways (specific details about the design and logic of the reliability rests can be found in Appendix 3):

i) Monthly coding webinars (total of 7) provided an opportunity for each coder to present coding queries and/or doubts arising from their specific cases, for general discussion by all coders working on the project. All queries and agreed solutions were documented in a shared-access spreadsheet, and served as a reference point for all coders.

ii) For each case study, inter- and intra-coder reliability tests were undertaken on an on-going basis throughout the coding process, with areas of disagreement were reviewed and (if necessary) codings revised.

4.3 Guidelines for data analysis

Once all the coding of the selected documents and relevant text parts had been completed, a common framework for data analysis was provided to all coders. This formed the basis for a report on the framing strategies of regionalist actors produced for each case study. It included guidelines on the content and structure of each case study report, and an indication of the kind of data analysis required and how the data could be represented visually. This was accompanied by step-by-step instructions on undertaking and presenting the data analysis in MaxQDA and in Excel (the latter being used when the analytical functions of MaxQDA posed limitations in relation to the nature and scope of analysis that was required). The case study reports form the basis for the comparative overview of regionalist actors' framing strategies in the next section and are available to read on the IMAJINE website.

5. Mapping the Territorial Demands and Framing Strategies of Regionalist Actors

In this section, we turn to examine the data emerging from the application of our coding scheme to the territorial narratives of regionalist actors in our cases. We first provide a general overview of the range of demands for territorial empowerment advanced by these actors, in order to illustrate the range of ways in which they have sought to change the territory's relations with higher levels of government. This analysis serves to anchor the discussion that follows, where we consider in detail the different ways in which these territorial demands have been justified by regionalist actors.

5.1 Overview of regionalist actors' demands for territorial empowerment

Regionalist actors in our case studies have sought to empower their territories in relation to higher levels of government in a range of ways (Figure 2). Most demands for territorial reform have been for a modification of the extant political system in some way (37% of all demands made), with calls for increased self-rule for the territory predominating, followed by those for more shared rule; there were only a handful of demands for the re-centralisation of competencies (0.05% of all territorial demands). Calls for action by higher levels of government account for 26% of all territorial demands (with calls for intervention dominating this category); this is a significant finding given that, as we note above, this is a dimension of territorial empowerment that is rarely considered in the extant literature on regionalist mobilisation in pluri-national states. It is followed by demands for independence, accounting for 22% of all demands made. Demands for fundamental reform of the existing political system make up 12% of all demands made by regionalist actors, with these encompassing calls for the creation of regional government, a shift to a federal state, and less specific demands for some kind of far-reaching change

in the political status quo. Only 4% of all territorial demands are considered to be 'general', in the sense that they imply some kind of territorial change but lack any detail about its specific nature.

Figure 2 Overview of territorial demands, 1990-2018 (% of all segments coded with specific territorial demands, all cases and actors)

But our data also suggests important shifts in the kind of territorial demands made over time (see Figure 3).[7] Two trends are particularly significant in this respect. On the one hand, modification and action demands (which imply shifting the balance of power or working within the existing political system) have fluctuated over the three decades considered in the study. These together make up 48% of all territorial demands in the 1990s, but they increase in importance in the 2000s (to 79% of all demands) only to fall back again in the 2010s (58% of all demands). On the other hand, demands for independence and fundamental reform (which imply more far-reaching territorial re-structuring) show the opposite tendency: together, these accounted for 47% of all territorial demands in the 1990s, declining to 18% in the 2000s, only to increase again in the 2010s to account for 38% of all territorial demands. Our data thus suggests that the pressure on the stability and integrity of pluri-national states in Western Europe has waxed and waned over time, with more radical solutions for a fairer, more just territorial settlement being pursued in more recent years.

---

[7] Here, and in subsequent figures where we show changes in the data over time, we split the data by decade to follow the structure of the case study reports, many of which structured their analysis in a broadly similar way in order to reflect key phases of regionalist mobilisation in different places.

Figure 3 Evolution of territorial demands over time (% of all segments coded with specific territorial demands, all cases and actors)

Further variation in the kinds of territorial demands advanced by regionalist actors is evident when our data is disaggregated by case (see Figure 4). Considered from this perspective, we get a clear sense of the different focus of regionalist mobilisation in different places, although this masks further variation within cases over time. For example, regionalist actors in Scotland and (to a lesser extent) Bavaria have mainly focused on achieving independence for their territories, although in both places secessionist demands have become less important over time (with demands for self-rule in particular gaining more traction in the 2010s). In contrast, in places like Catalonia, Sardinia, Galicia and Wales, whilst independence demands have been less salient overall, they have become more prominent in the last decade (with the most significant shift in the Catalan case, where these accounted for 49% of all territorial demands in the 2010s, compared to only 6% in the 1990s). There are also cases where independence demands have been entirely absent (Friesland, Aosta Valley and Kashubia) or marginal (Northern Italy) overall (in the latter case, these featured in the discourse of the LN in the 1990s, but disappeared completely in the 2000s).

Figure 4 Territorial demands per case, 1990-2018 (% of all segments coded with specific territorial demands, all cases and actors)

Demands for fundamental reform of the existing political system have also been more important in some places than others. In Wales, for example, these account for 36% of all territorial demands overall, but they are concentrated almost exclusively in the 1990s when regionalist actors were pushing for the creation of a new regional level of government; this demand was achieved in 1999 and prompted a shift in focus onto expanding the self-rule capacity of the National Assembly for Wales in the 2000s (with this demand featuring alongside growing calls for Wales's independence in the 2010s). A similar trend is evident in the Kashubian case. Here, whilst demands for fundamental reform made up 11% of all territorial demands made, in practice these were exclusively articulated in the 1990s in the form of calls for regional self-government for the Kashubian people; decentralisation reforms at the end of the 1990s prompted regionalist actors to shift attention onto the protection and promotion of Kashubian cultural and linguistic diversity on the one hand, and (with the creation of a new civil society organisation – Kaszëbskô Jednota (KJ) - in 2011) demands for the further empowerment of the regional level on the other hand.

These examples point to the growing importance of modification demands over time in places like Wales and Kashubia; it is a trend also in evidence in Friesland, Bavaria and Scotland. It is only in Sardinia that we find evidence of such demands declining decade on decade; other cases show a less linear trend, with these increasing in importance in Galicia, Catalonia, Wales and Northern Italy during the 2000s, but falling back in the 2010s. However, the general finding noted above – that modification demands are overwhelmingly demands for more self-government – holds across all our cases.

Finally, demands for action also vary across our cases, even though this category is dominated by calls for intervention by higher levels of government in all places. They account for the majority of territorial demands advanced overall in Aosta Valley, Corsica, Galicia, Kashubia and Sardinia, and it is only in Scotland and (to a lesser extent) Bavaria that these are marginal to regionalist actors' territorial discourses (representing 2% and 12% of all territorial demands respectively). But here again the data in Figure 4 masks important variation within cases, as the emphasis on getting other levels of government to act to protect the territory's identity and/or interests shifts over time. This increases over the three

decades examined in Corsica, Sardinia, Wales, Bavaria and Scotland (in the latter two cases, from very low starting points), and only becomes less important in two places (Galicia and Kashubia). As with modification demands, we also find cases where the use of action demands fluctuates over the time period examined (Aosta Valley, Catalonia, Kashubia, Northern Italy and Friesland).

The data considered thus far evidences the shifts in the nature of territorial demands across cases, actors and over time. But a common theme emerging from several of the cases is the way in which regionalist actors pursue multiple territorial goals at the same time, often complementing long-term goals (often involving more radical territorial change such as independence or fundamental reform) with attempts to advance the territory's identity and/or interests in the shorter-term (for example through calls to modify or for action within the extant political system). Regionalist actors, and especially political parties that have a longer experience of representing the territory at different levels, are thus often found to be highly pragmatic, recognising in their territorial narratives what can and cannot be realistically achieved in a given institutional and/or political context. The PSdAz exemplifies such a strategic approach, with the party pursuing the goal of 'independentist federalism' alongside a project of 'pragmatic autonomism' focused on enhancing Sardinian self-rule and increasing the policy intervention of (primarily) the Italian central government in specific areas of importance to the island. Such an approach points to the flexibility of many regionalist parties in their pursuit of a fairer, or more just, set of territorial relationships.

Our coding scheme sought to capture further information about the scope of regionalist actors' territorial actors in two respects. Firstly, and in recognition of the fact that regionalist actors have often sought to advance their territorial ambitions in political contexts that are multi-level, our data provides insight into the territorial levels in relation to which regionalist actors have sought to protect and/or advance their identities and/or interests. The findings are unambiguous in this respect. Claims for territorial change have overwhelmingly been articulated in relation to the state, and this has become increasingly the case over time (from 74% of all territorial demands advanced in the 1990s, to 87% in the 2010s). The only other level in relation to which regionalist actors have sought territorial empowerment in any meaningful way is the supranational one, although it has declined in relative importance over time (from 23% of all territorial demands in the 1990s, to 11% in the 2010s). In contrast, regionalist actors have paid very little attention to empowering their territory in relation to the international or other regional contexts (accounting for 3% and 1% respectively of all territorial demands made for the period 1990-2018). These general findings show little variation when the data is disaggregated by case.

A more detailed comparison of the nature of the territorial demands articulated in relation to the state vs. EU levels also suggests, however, that the kind of territorial empowerment sought has varied (Figure 5). Some general trends in the data are worth noting in this respect. For example, demands articulated in relation to the state have predominantly been ones for a modification of its political system through the decentralisation of political authority to the regional level; these have been less important overall in relation to the EU, where the emphasis rather has been on demands for action (and specifically policy intervention). In contrast, whilst demands for fundamental reform represented an important component of all demands made in relation to the state in the 1990s, these have declined in subsequent decades but have remained a feature of territorial demands articulated in relation to the EU. In contrast, demands for independence have been articulated primarily in relation to the state, which is

unsurprising as it is at this level that decisions about the secession of parts of the territory are ultimately decided.


Figure 5 Evolution of territorial demands according to level of empowerment over time (% of all segments coded with specific territorial demands, all cases and actors)

Secondly, and in order to better understand the so-called "competential dimension" (Alonso et al., 2013: 191) of regionalist actors' territorial demands, our data allows us to identify the different policy areas in relation to which territorial empowerment has been sought. An initial observation here is that actors' claims are overwhelmingly linked to two types of demands: those for a modification of the extant political system, and those for action in the territory by higher levels of government. Taken together, these account for 94% of all instances when a territorial demand has been linked to a specific policy area for the time period examined. In terms of the scope of these policy linkages, regionalist actors have targeted (to different extents) all of the policy areas included in our coding scheme. The least important include borrowing, sport and tourism policies (less than 1% of all policy linkages made overall). Understanding the priority areas for regionalist actors is more complex, since there is an important multi-level dimension that must be taken into account and which arguably reflects the different policy competencies of state/EU arenas. Thus, for example, territorial empowerment in relation to the state has predominantly focused on fiscal, infrastructure, cultural, political and education policy. In contrast, by far the most salient policy area in relation to the EU level is agriculture, followed by fiscal policy (including structural and cohesion funds), education and economic policies (as well as culture and infrastructure policies specifically in relation to action demands).

5.2 Overview of regionalist actors' framing of demands for territorial empowerment

In this section, we turn to consider the ways in which regionalist actors have framed their demands for territorial empowerment. In doing so, our data gives us insight into how these actors experience and interpret 'their' territory's relationship with higher levels of government, and the grounds on which they seek to make the case for changing the territorial status quo in some way.

43

We start by examining the use of frame categories in general, and for the entire time period considered by the project. The territorial politics literature in which our coding scheme is anchored (see section 3 above) has argued that regionalist mobilisation is underpinned by economic, cultural, political and environmental grievances against the territorial status quo. Our data, summarised in Figure 6, indicate a different set of justifications being used to make the case for territorial empowerment. They evidence the clear predominance of political arguments overall, accounting for 58% of all frames used. These are followed by socio-economic arguments, which make up 26% of all frames used. The remaining three frame categories (cultural, environmental and other frames) are relatively marginal in regionalist actors' discourses overall; they account for less than 10% of all the frames used by the regionalists in our study, with environmental frames being the least used (3% of total frames).

Figure 6 Overview of frames used across all cases, 1990-2018 (% of total segments coded with a frame, all cases and actors)

Disaggregating this data to examine change in the use of different frame categories over time allows us to nuance this initial finding, although it does not alter the main observation about the relative importance of different types of frames overall (see Figure 7). In other words, whilst the use of political frames declines slightly over the three decades examined by the project (from 62% of all frames used in the 1990s, to 56% in the 2010s), they remain the most used in all time periods. Similarly, our data points to the growing importance of socio-economic frames over time (accounting for 22% of all frames used in the 1990s, to 29% in the 2010s), but this still makes them of secondary importance in regionalist actors' discourses, behind political frames. With regard to the remaining three categories of frames, whilst cultural frames have been marginal overall, our data also suggests that they become even less a feature of territorial discourses over time (from 11% of all frames used in the 1990s, to 8% in the 2010s). In contrast, the use of 'other' frames increases very marginally (from 4% of all frames used in the 1990s, to 5% in the 2010s); environmental frames remain at a consistently low level over time, accounting for 4-5% of all frames used across the three decades considered. We thus find little evidence to support

the claim made in some work that there is an increasingly important environmental dimension to regionalist actors' arguments for territorial empowerment.[8]

Figure 7 Change in the use of frames over time (% of total segments coded with a frame, all cases and actors)

These findings can be further refined by examining the use of general categories of frames per case (see Figure 8). The data confirms, once again, the prevalence in general of political frames within all our cases, but there is also important variation between cases in their importance relative to other frame categories. For example, political frames are most dominant in Bavaria and Wales, where they account for 73% of all frames used; they are least used in Kashubia, Aosta Valley, Corsica and Galicia, where they represent less than 50% of total frames. The use of socio-economic frames in specific cases shows even greater variation. Whilst it remains the second most use category of frames in most cases, it is relegated into third position in Kashubia and Bavaria (7% of all frames used), with cultural frames being more important. Indeed, the Kashubian case is the one where cultural justifications are most used (40% of all frames used), although they also account for around a fifth of frames used in Friesland, Aosta Valley and Bavaria. In contrast, cultural justifications are marginal in other cases (Catalonia, Galicia, Northern Italy, Sardinia and Wales) and are almost never used in Scotland. The use of environmental frames shows less variation across cases, remaining marginal with the exception of two cases (Bavaria and Kashubia) where they do not feature at all. The use of 'other' frames surpasses 10% of all frames used in the Kashubian case, but otherwise fluctuates at a low level (between 0-5% of all frames used).

---

[8] It should not be concluded from this finding that regionalist actors have not mobilised on environmental issues; many have, and this is often an important aspect of the policy agenda that they seek to advance (e.g. within regional political institutions). But our focus here is only on these actors' demands for empowering the territory in relation to higher levels of government (and therefore changing the territorial status quo in some way). It is thus in this specific regard that we find little evidence that environmental arguments have been used to justify regionalist actors' territorial claims.

Figure 8 Overview of frames by case, 1990-2018 (% of total segments coded with a frame, all cases and actors)

The data on regionalist actors' use of different frame categories disaggregated by case begins to give a sense of the variation in territorial narratives in different places, characterised by more or less emphasis on political, socio-economic, cultural and (to a much lesser extent) environmental and other types of arguments. But the data considered at this level of analysis also masks significant variation in two further respects. Firstly, there is also change in the use of different types of frames over time in our cases. For example, in Catalonia, Galicia and Corsica, socio-economic frames increase in importance over time, at the expense of political frames; these are the most used frames for some pro-independence actors (the Candidatura d'Unitat Popular (CUP), Sumate), whilst Corsican moderate nationalists make use of socio-economic frames exclusively during the 2010s. For the Lega Nord, in contrast, we find a relative decline in the use of socio-economic frames over time, with such justifications peaking in the 2000s but becoming less important in the 2010s. For others, such as the Fryske Nasjonale Partij (FNP) and the Union Valdôtaine (UV), their use has fluctuated over time. Secondly, and as the example of Corsican moderate nationalists above indicates, there is also variation at the level of specific actors, both in terms of the contrasting rhetorical profiles of different regionalist actors within a case and as individual actors shift their rhetorical strategies over time. Such actor-specificity is exemplified in the Kashubian case. Whilst Kaszëbskò-Pòmòrsczé Zrzeszenié (KPZ) places the emphasis on cultural frames underpinned by the perceived need to protect and promote the identity, cultural and linguistic distinctiveness of the Kashubian community, KJ has consistently framed the survival of the Kashubian people in political terms (and on the basis of arguments about the inadequacy of extant institutions of territorial representation and the need to improve the democratic quality of the political system.

These examples do not exhaust the multiplicity of ways in which regionalist actors in different places, and over time, have used different frames in their territorial narratives. We explore this differentiation further below, where we consider each general category of frames in turn. We also examine how, and to what extent, different frames have been used to justify these actors' demands for territorial empowerment. A first sense of these linkages can be seen in Figure 8 below, which provides a general overview of how different types of territorial demands have been justified. In line with the finding

above, the data confirms the predominance overall of political frames in relation to all demand categories, although they are relatively less used in relation to those that seek some kind of action in the territory by higher levels of government. Rather, socio-economic frames are relatively more frequently linked to these demands (although they are less used over time, with 32% of action demands justified using socio-economic frames in the 2010s, down from 41% during the 1990s). Socio-economic arguments are also slightly more frequently used to justify calls for independence and a more detailed examination of the data also shows this to be increasingly so over time (34% all arguments used in relation to independence in the 2010s, compared to 17% in the 1990s) although these never out-number political justifications. Interestingly, the data in Figure 9 suggests that, whilst cultural arguments are relatively marginal across all demand categories, they are even less favoured in relation to demands that imply more far-reaching territorial re-structuring (independence and (to a lesser extent) fundamental reform). But a more detailed look at the data also points to their use in relation to demands for action by higher levels of government also declining over time (from 17% of all frames used in the 1990s to 11% in the 2010s). In contrast, environmental arguments are shown to be insignificant across the board, with only a marginally greater use of other frames.


Figure 9 Overview of the framing of territorial demands, 1990-2018 (% of all segments coded with a specific territorial demand and a frame, all cases and actors)

The rest of this section considers regionalist actors' framing strategies, and the way in which these are used to justify different territorial demands, in more detail. We structure the discussion by frame categories (from most to least used in regionalist actors' territorial discourses) and consider the most frequently used frames within each category, how these are defined and used in different contexts, and the extent to which they are advanced as justifications for territorial empowerment.

5.2.1 Political frames

As noted above, political frames are the most important category of frames. This is so in all of our cases, albeit with some variation in its salience relative to other types of frames, as outlined above. Within this category, however, our data points to a highly differentiated use of specific political frames (Figure 10); these are also used to different extents in different cases (Figure 11). We turn to consider the use of these frames in turn.

Figure 10 Use of political frames, 1990-2018 (% of all segments coded with political frames, all cases and actors)

Figure 11 Use of political frames by case, 1990-2018 (% of all segments coded with a political frame, all actors)*

*Note: Given the high number of frames in the 'political' category, those accounting for less than 7% of total political frames have been grouped together as 'other political frames'; these include policy, civil and human rights, political distinctiveness, peace and security, colonialism, central state unity, and political crisis frames.

Dissatisfaction with, and attribution of blame for, the territorial status quo

In section 3 above, we note that a core lament underpinning regionalist mobilisation is the sense that their territory's identity, needs and/or interests are not well served by existing political institutions, practices or policies. Our findings confirm the importance of such a grievance, with 17% of all political frames used expressing discontent with the territorial status quo in some way. We also find that such arguments are often accompanied with statements attributing blame for the current state of affairs, with these accounting for 13% of all political frames used across all of our cases. Taken together, these justifications set out regionalists' understandings of what the problem is with the territorial status quo and, in many places form an important part of the case for why (and how) this needs to change (see discussion below). For this reason, we consider these two frames together here.

Beyond conveying a common sense that the existing political system does not work, arguments expressing dissatisfaction assume myriad forms, with the territorial status quo denounced for being *inter alia* un-democratic, corrupt, inefficient, exploitative, unfair, unjust or prejudicial. On the one hand, the articulation of dissatisfaction frames has reflected specific characteristics of regionalists' political environment, as evidenced by the persistent critique of corruption and clientelism in the narratives of Corsican nationalists and the Northern Italian LN (with reference to the clans controlling island politics in the former case, and the perceived dominance of Southern Italian interests in central state institutions in the latter). On the other hand, narratives of dissatisfaction have also been deployed in response to changes in regionalists' operating environment. For example, the use of such arguments increased in Scotland and Wales after the creation of regional parliaments in 1999 as the inadequacies of the new devolved arrangements become more apparent. In contrast, in Catalonia frustration with the process of reforming the region's Statute of Autonomy in the mid 2000s and the subsequent decision of the Spanish Constitutional Court to annul several aspects of the new statute were increasingly cited by regionalist parties and civil society organisations as grounds for secession during the 2010s.

The attribution of blame for the territorial status quo has also assumed a plurality of forms, although interestingly such arguments are used overwhelmingly by political parties as opposed to civil society organisations; amongst the latter, these are most salient in the discourse of the Catalan ANC, but even there they only account for 12% of all political frames used by organisation. For regionalist parties, such arguments mainly target the central state, either in general (as in Corsica and Sardinia where the French/ Italian state is frequently denounced) or as represented by the actions of specific institutions and/or state-wide political parties. The Bayernpartei (BP) and LN, for example, regularly rail against "Berlin" or "thieving Rome" in reference to institutions, policies and practices that are perceived to be centralising power and (especially in the latter case) are inefficient, bureaucratic and corrupt. But such narratives also assume a multi-level dimension in some places. For example, the UV has often articulated its territorial project for the Aosta Valley within a supranational framework, and has blamed 'the Europe of the Nations and the technocrats' for hindering the construction of a Europe of the People (UV, 2013: no page number). A similar critique of "Brussels bureaucrats" has featured in the discourse of the BP, whilst the Galician BNG holds both state and European policy-makers responsible for "discriminating against the fishing sector and prioritising foreign interests" (BNG, 2012: 33). Regional-level institutions and actors have also been singled out for criticism, including regional political elites (by PSdAz and Corsican regionalists) and rivals within the regionalist movement (as identified by ERC in Catalonia, iRS and Sardigna Natzione Indipendentzia (SNI) in Sardinia, and the BP in Bavaria). A

significant growth of blame frames in the discourse of the BNG in the early 2010s reflects the party's strategy of direct confrontation with the regional government led by the right-wing Partido Popular (PP) in that period, with the party denouncing a situation of "less democracy, less self-government and less welfare", concluding that "this is Galicia in 2012 after four years of PP government" (BNG, 2012: 5).

The extent to which these narratives of dissatisfaction and blame-attribution have underpinned calls for changes to the territorial status quo has also varied from place to place. Interestingly, in Northern Italy and the Aosta Valley, such linkages are very rarely made; in other words, whilst these frames are an important feature of general territorial narratives, they are not used explicitly to justify demands for territorial empowerment. In contrast, such linkages are clear and important in several other cases. It is possible to differentiate here between the framing of demands for more radical or far-reaching territorial re-structuring (independence and fundamental reform) and those for more moderate or less far-reaching change (demands to modify, or act within, the existing political framework). The use of dissatisfaction frames is most frequent in relation to the former, where this is often articulated in general terms and against the system as a whole. For example, the data reveals a significant increase in the use of arguments expressing dissatisfaction with, and attributing blame for, Spain's territorial model in the discourse of the Galician BNG during the 2010s; the alleged breakdown of this model is advanced as grounds for its fundamental reform leading to Galicia's "acquisition of political sovereignty" (BNG, 2016: 2-3). Demands for independence in Catalonia have also been anchored in a generic critique of the Spanish political system; this was a feature of ERC's territorial narrative in the 1990s, and has re-emerged in more recent years as it (and other pro-independence actors including the Assemblea Nacional Catalana (ANC) and CUP) have linked secession to the break-up of the political regime established by the 1978 Spanish Constitution. As argued by the CUP, "the current structures of the Spanish State, heirs of the Francoist dictatorship, are designed to stop any initiative that questions the pillars of the regime, and the economic and political model issued from 1978' (CUP, 2015: 8). Others have conceived of the political system in multi-level terms. Especially during the 1990s, for example, demands for fundamental reform and/or independence in Bavaria, Wales and Galicia sought to overcome the constraints of the state and supranational arenas simultaneously, as exemplified by PC's lament that "Wales has the worst deal of all: a small country without self- government and without representation in the European Community" (PC, 1992: 15).

In contrast, demands for more moderate or less far-reaching change have been much less frequently justified in terms of dissatisfaction with, and blame for, the territorial status quo. Where such examples are found, arguments are on the whole articulated in more specific terms, pointing to (and seeking redress for) concrete instances of dysfunctionality. This is the case, for example, with demands for more self-rule for regional institutions. The KJ in Kashubia thus calls for further devolution of power to the Pomeranian region by lamenting the lack of protection for the Kashub language and culture:

> The Kashub language and our culture are still in existence, though this is at risk. Unfortunately, every action that is supposed to serve their behaviour and development is regulated by the central government. There is nothing that is being done to preserve the Kashubian national consciousness. (KJ, 2016: no page number).

Similarly, in Scotland in recent years, both the SNP and Women for Independence (WFI) have focused on the inadequacy of proposals to devolve further powers to the Scottish parliament in relation to fiscal policy, with the former pointing out that "decisions about more than 70 per cent of Scottish taxes and

85 per cent of current UK welfare spending in Scotland will stay at Westminster" (SNP, 2015: 35). Frustration with extant funding arrangements has also been articulated by PC in post-devolution Wales as grounds for enhancing the fiscal responsibilities of the National Assembly for Wales.

The use of dissatisfaction and blame attribution frames to justify demands for action by a higher level of government are even less frequent. As suggested by the quote above, the BNG has called for changes to the EU's fisheries policies to address what it perceives to be their discriminatory effect on the Galician fishing industry. In Catalonia in the 1990s, in contrast, CiU demanded the Spanish state withdraw its offices and services from the region to address the inefficiency of the existing set-up: 'The over-size of the peripheral administration of the State generates not only administrative inefficacies and an unjustifiable increase of public spending, given duplicates and parallelisms it provokes, but also a constant invasion of decentralised competencies' (CiU, 1996: 41). In Wales, PC has sought intervention by the UK government in relation to fiscal policy, for example to correct for perceived inequities in the territorial distribution of European funding or (in the more recent context of the financial crisis) public funding cuts leading to a "gross level of under-funding" for Welsh public services (PC, 2010: 21). These examples reflect a general sense of unfairness surrounding Wales' funding arrangements, on the basis of which the party has sought specific policy action (as well as the devolution of new competencies in relation to fiscal policy, as noted above) that would give Wales adequate resources to tackle a range of other policy challenges.

If dissatisfaction and blame attribution frames help to delineate the unsatisfactory nature of regionalist actors' territorial reality, the examples above point to the way in which such arguments can also be linked to the use of other frames that, in contrast, serve to map out an alternative (and better) territorial future that could be achieved as a result of a change in relations with higher levels of government. These include arguments about improving the democratic quality and efficiency of, and enhancing national sovereignty within, the political system; we consider these and other political frames in more detail below. But they may also include arguments that invoke socio-economic and (to a lesser extent) cultural and environmental dimensions of a different regional society; these are considered in the relevant sections below.

Quality of the democratic and political system

Arguments relating to the quality of the democratic and political system account for 22% of all political frames used (see Figure 9 above). It is also the most salient political frame in several cases (Catalonia, Friesland, Sardinia, Wales and Scotland). Our coding scheme defines this frame as referring to "the nature and quality of the democratic system, institutions, and the government" (see Appendix 2). In practice, it is used to capture arguments that imply the achievement of a specific territorial demand would eliminate flaws in the current system or lead to an enhancement in its (democratic quality) in some ways. But this still leaves scope for different actors to articulate arguments about the quality of the extant political system in myriad ways; indeed, it is one of the most versatile frames in our study both in terms of its definition and its use in relation to demands for territorial empowerment. Five key themes can be identified, depending on what aspect is emphasised: democracy, quality, representation and participation, accountability and transparency, and legality. We consider each of these in turn below, although in practice they are often used together and complement each other in regionalists' territorial narratives.

Firstly, regionalist actors have invoked 'democracy' in more or less specific ways in their territorial narratives. In Corsica, for example, moderate and radical nationalists have consistently denounced the 'undemocratic' nature of the French state in general and the clans controlling politics on the island in particular, although calls for a more democratic system are rarely linked to specific territorial demands that could deliver such a goal. In contrast, the Sardinian PSdAz is clearer in its belief that "federalism is a (…) proposal of renewal, of democratic progress" (PSdAz, 2015: 20), whilst "more self-government is more democracy" for the BNG (2016: 10). In other places, regionalist actors have focused more specifically on arguments about democratic legitimacy, especially in relation to making the case for a territory to secede from the state. For example, a long-standing feature of PC's discourse is its emphasis on securing the consent of the Welsh people for independence via a referendum. A similar argument is articulated in Catalonia from 2010 onwards, where calls on the Spanish state to allow a referendum on Catalan independence were framed in terms of democratic legitimacy: "In short, what Catalans want is a democratic act: we want to vote and we want to decide our future through a referendum" (OC, 2014: no page number). This narrative built on a theme already present during the process of reforming Catalonia's Statute of Autonomy, with Diguem No al nou Estatut's (DGM) campaign for a 'no' to the new statute claiming that the process through which the reform had taken place lacked democratic quality; this process, and the arguments advanced in relation to it, set the context for Catalan regionalist actors' shift to more pro-independence positions in subsequent years. It was a theme taken up later by ERC in response to the Spanish state's decision to take control of the Catalan regional institutions following the 2017 independence referendum, with the party strongly critical of the "democratic retreat and re-centralisation" objectives of the central government and its supporters (ERC, 2017: 16).

Secondly, in many cases territorial demands are justified by claims about improving the quality of democracy and/or decision-making. This is a feature of the UV's calls for a federal reform of the Italian state, although the exact ways in which this would be achieved is not specified. In other cases, 'quality' is often understood in relation to the public services available to citizens. The LN, for example, advocates decentralisation as a way of improving service delivery; it thus advocated the regionalisation of new fiscal powers on the grounds that "Padania's taxes should remain in Padania, in order to improve infrastructure, services, and our people's security" (LN, 2008: no page number). Here, as in other cases, quality arguments often feature alongside those relating to efficiency, both of which can (it is claimed) be improved by shifting the scale of decision-making downwards to the region. For example, the FNP in Friesland has argued that the overall quality of decision-making would be improved "if every layer (Europe, the state, the province, the municipality) executes those tasks which it can execute in the most efficient way, and as close to the citizens as possible" (FNP, 1994: no page number). That the proximity of decision-making to citizens can also enhance democratic quality is an argument also advanced in the Catalan case during the 1990s; like the FNP, CiU and ERC invoked the EU's principle of subsidiarity to justify the empowerment of the Catalan government on the grounds that "more autonomy entails more proximity to the social reality, and more efficiency of social services" (CIU, 1993: 36). A similar argument was made by Scotland Forward (SF) in support of creating a new Scottish Parliament in 1997, with the campaign group calling for "Scottish solutions to Scottish problems, bringing government closer to the people" (SF, 1997a: no page number).

A third interpretation of the frame places greater emphasis on issues of the representation and political participation of regionalist actors. These arguments have often been linked to frustrations with the existing system in terms of taking territorial needs and/or interests into account. For example, in

Scotland and Wales in the 1990s, demands for the regionalisation of decision-making in the UK were advanced as a means of making Scottish and Welsh 'voices heard.' In Bavaria, the BP has articulated a similar grievance in relation its demands for independence. It has taken specific issue with the lack of representativeness of Bavaria in upper, and thus, distant, layers of government, and claims that Bavaria's independence would improve the democratic representation of Bavaria and its citizens' needs (an argument which also invokes the principle of subsidiarity, see above). Whilst this kind of argument has mainly been directed at the state, it also takes on a European scope in some cases. The BNG, for example, calls for a fundamentally different kind of supranational policy, one which is "a participative, fully democratic European Union, based on integration and not exclusion, as a group and sum of national' identities and respect for economic, cultural and linguistic diversity" (BNG, 1999: 7). PC develops a more specific critique in relation to Wales's lack of independent statehood in the EU and its consequent dependence on the UK government to advocate for it: "Without a full voice at Europe's top table our people have to put up with second best" (PC, 2009: 11). The lack of representation of regions within the EU is also invoked in relation to demands for shared rule, specifically in terms of direct participation in European institutions. Such an argument is made in the majority of regionalist political parties in our study, and is exemplified by the following claim by the PSdAz:

> Sardinians and other stateless peoples have not signed the Maastricht treaty, others have signed for us; not only must we demand the revision of this treaty but also that on this occasion Sardinia has its own subjectivity and representativeness independent from that of the Italian state. (PSdAz, 2008: no page number).

A fourth iteration of the frame refers to aspects of transparency and accountability. Given what we note above about the clanist control of politics in Corsica, it is not surprising that calls for more accountable and open political institutions is a key theme in the territorial narratives of Corsican regionalist actors throughout the period of study (although again the frame is rarely linked to a specific territorial demand that could engender such a change). Elsewhere, such a linkage is made. It is an argument that has been especially invoked in relation to the creation and subsequent empowerment of regional institutions in places like Scotland, Wales and Catalonia. In the former, for example, the establishment of a devolved parliament in the 1990s was advocated by SF as a way to make Scottish politicians more accountable. At the same time, in Wales PC contrasted the 'un-democratic' territorial status quo characterised by a discrepancy between Welsh political preferences and the priorities of successive UK governments with the transformative potential of regional government; devolution, it would argue, would democratise Wales through more open, accessible and accountable decision-making. Post-devolution, the SNP in the 2010s called for a further devolution of powers to the Scottish parliament on the basis that this would enhancement financial and democratic accountability (SNP, 2014: ii). Similar arguments were advanced in Catalonia two decades previously, in relation to calls for more self-rule as well as demands for the Spanish state to publish data on fiscal balances. The latter reflects a long-standing frustration amongst Catalan regionalist parties (CiU and ERC) with the region's persistent fiscal deficit, which is perceived to be unfair and the result of a discriminatory system for the territorial re-distribution of resources; this grievance links to arguments about intra-territorial solidarity in Spain, and is discussed further below.

A fifth and final usage of the frame invokes a sense of legality, understood as being compliant with or respectful of the law in some way. It is an argument invariably linked to very pragmatic demands for action by higher levels of government in specific policy areas. It was articulated in a vague way by the moderate Corsican party U Partitu di a Nazione Corsa (PNC) in the early 2000s, which invoked the

framework of the EU's Amsterdam Treaty in its call for Brussels to grant Corsica "a certain number of derogations/waivers concerning transports, agriculture (deviations from overly restrictive standards from the point of view of identity production), and taxation" (PNC, 2002: no page number). Such arguments are particularly important in the Catalan and Galician cases, where they are linked to demands for action by the Spanish state in relation to the so-called "state of autonomies" territorial model. On the one hand, regionalist political parties in particular have called on the state to respect the general principles of such a model enshrined in the 1978 Constitution, and/or to implement the provisions enshrined in the statutes of autonomy subsequently granted to each territory. Such demands became particularly salient in Catalonia in the late 2000s when the central government was seen to be too slow in implementing the provisions of the region's revised autonomy statute, and where calls on pending transfers of competencies to be enacted was justified on the grounds that the Spanish state was obliged to do so by the new statute. This continued to be an issue into the 2010s, with CiU arguing in 2015 that "the Spanish government has not respected the agreement included in the third additional article of the Statute of Autonomy, that establishes that the State's investment in infrastructures must be equivalent to the relative contribution of Catalonia's GDP to that of the State, for a period of 7 years between 2007 and 2013" (CiU, 2015, no page number). On the other hand, regionalists have often called on the state to stop encroaching on the region's areas of exclusive competencies; such a position is exemplified by the BNG's demand that the Spanish state repeal a series of budgetary laws because "they invade the competencies of our Autonomy and severely limit the financial and political capacity of the Galician government to make the investments necessary for economic growth" (BNG, 2004: 59). Similar demands come to the fore in Bavaria during the 2010s, where the BP calls on the German federal government to refrain from further intervening in policy areas where Bavaria should have sole sovereignty, such as in fiscal, educational, security-related and culture policies.

The discussion above confirms our observation noted at the outset about the highly flexible use of the 'quality of the democratic and political system' frame. For this reason, and as some of the examples cited above attest, it is also a frame that bridges to many other political frames in regionalists' territorial narratives. We examine such linkages in our analysis of these other frames below.

Sovereignty and self-determination

Justifications relating to notions of sovereignty and self-determination account for 12% of all political frames used by regionalist actors in our study overall, although the data also indicate that these have become more frequently used in the last decade. The frame captures two inter-linked arguments. Firstly, it builds on claims for a distinctive collective identity (see the discussion of the 'identity' frame below) to assert the sovereignty of the nation or people. This is a principle largely taken for granted, with Yes Cymru (YC) in Wales arguing, for example, that "the sovereignty of nations forms the very basis of international law" (YC, 2017: 8-9). Secondly, it is argued that the fact of being a sovereign people or nation brings with it a set of rights to decide over their own affairs, as captured by a frequently invoked right to self-determination. Radical Corsican nationalists in the 1990s, for example, thus argued that national sovereignty is "a principle prescribed to allow the Corsican people to become master of its own destiny" (CN, 1998: no page number); similarly, in Sardinia the PSdAz has argued more recently that:

> The question of Sardinian sovereignty, constrained in its ability to be expressed and exercised,
> should be put on the agenda of European governments as a matter of denied self-determination.
> (PSdAz, 2012: no page number).

In practice, such arguments have been overwhelmingly used in relation to demands for radical or far-reaching territorial re-structuring. They featured, for example, in the discourse of the Friesian FNP in the 1990s when the party was committed to a fundamental reform of the Dutch state to give the province a degree of self-government comparable to the special constitutional status of overseas territories within the Dutch kingdom, like Curaçao. Such a demand was often complemented by a reference to the sovereign Frisian people with a right to self-rule. They were also used (albeit less frequently than arguments about democratic quality) by SF to make the case for a new Scottish Parliament in the same decade. In recent years, the frame has come to the fore in the Galician case, with the BNG in particular, but also ANOVA's electoral alliances, calling for a new territorial model in Spain that would significantly enhance the region's autonomy; the former has repeatedly argued that "we need these tools so that we can decide our future for ourselves" (BNG, 2015: 5).

More significant, however, has been the use of arguments about sovereignty and self-determination to make the case for secession. Radical Corsican nationalists and the Catalan ERC justified their demands for independence partly in these terms in the 1990s, alongside references to experiences of decolonisation to exemplify the application of the principle of self-determination in practice. More recently, whilst the salience of independence has declined overall in the rhetoric of the Bavarian BP in the last decade, when it is invoked in the party's literature it is mainly justified by an argument about the region's "freedom to decide on our own in which society we want to live in" (BP, 2018: no page number). But it is arguably in Scotland and Catalonia that such arguments have been most prominent, especially so in the last decade as a result of independence referendums that have provided an opportunity for regionalist actors to refine their case for secession. In the former case, these arguments were a feature of the narratives of all pro-independence actors, but especially the civil society organisations created to campaign for a 'yes' vote in the 2014 referendum (albeit articulated in vaguer terms than in many other places, and frequently contextualised by statements of dissatisfaction with the territorial status quo). The Radical Independence Campaign (RIC), for example, argued that:

> The entrenched intransigence of the Westminster establishment has made change almost impossible to imagine, but here in Scotland we now have an opportunity to break free, to develop new ideas and become the people we always wanted to be. (RIC, 2013: no page number).

In Catalonia, claims to a "right to decide" gained prominence in the 2000s as an expression of dissatisfaction with the statutory reform process (see discussion above), leading to the creation of a new organisation – Plataforma pel Dret de Decidir (PDD) – with the slogan "we are a nation and we have the right to decide". The argument gained broader traction within pro-independence parties and civil society organisations in the subsequent decade, initially as part of the case (along with claims related to democracy, see above) for the Spanish state to sanction a referendum on independence. When the Spanish state later suspended Catalan autonomy after an unapproved referendum held in October 2017, the same argument was used to frame demands for the central government to stop intervening in the Catalan territory: "It must be clear that Catalonia is a nation where its citizens decide what and how they want to be, and not a territory that can be governed from the Spanish State through imposition, repression and suppression of its institutions" (JXC, 2017: 2).

Comparisons

As indicated by some of the examples cited above, regionalist actors have also framed their territorial demands by making comparisons to other territorial contexts. These account for 8% of the political

frames used overall, with their use remaining relatively constant across the three decades analysed. Such arguments serve to benchmark the territorial reality against the experience of other places, which may be other regions or nations within the state, other regions or nations in Europe, other states or (less frequently) the EU. Doing so usually serves one of three purposes.

Firstly, comparisons have been used to highlight deficiencies in the territorial status quo, and as such are frequently used alongside arguments articulating dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs in some way. For example, the LN often invokes Italy's southern regions as part of its narrative about the inefficiency and unfairness of territorial re-distribution of resources, and the need to decentralise fiscal resources and policy-making to the richer north: "you should think that for each 100 Lire per inhabitant that the state transfers to the region of Lombardy, 332 Lire are transferred to the Sicily region (more than three-times), 188 to the Campania region Campania (almost two times) and so on" (LN, 1996: no page number). A similar argument is advanced by the FNP to illustrate the unfairness of a situation where other provinces with a similar constitutional status to Friesland receive higher levels of central government resources, and to demand a fairer model of territorial re-distribution.

Secondly, comparisons provide regionalist actors with a model of territorial empowerment that they aspire to or seek to emulate. Regionalist parties in Catalonia (and more recently in Galicia), for example, have always looked to the Basque Country's model of extensive fiscal autonomy as the benchmark when calling for an increase in their own fiscal responsibilities (via more self-rule in the 1990s and 2000s, or a fundamentally different fiscal regime along Basque lines in the 2010s). Catalan regionalists have also looked beyond Spain, and to places like Flanders, as examples of successful and far-reaching regional autonomy, whilst the LN in the mid 2000s also looked to the EU's 'euro-regions' as a point of reference for its proposal for new Italian macro-regions, conceived as 'optimal' areas that would eventually replace nation-states. It thus argued in its manifesto for the 2014 European election that:

> Alike regions are already aggregating beyond the state's borders. The Danube Euroregion and the new-born Alpine Euroregion are forerunners of the Europe of the (macro)Regions. It is only within these 'optimal regions' that the single currency can work (LN, 2014: 6).

Thirdly, comparisons can provide legitimation to a regionalist actors' territorial claims. Such an approach is particularly pronounced in relation to demands for a territory to be independent from the state. In the 1990s, for example, ERC framed its secessionist aspirations with the argument that a people's right to decide on its own future had been "understood years ago by the peoples of Eastern Europe who achieved independence. Currently, Quebeckers, Scots, Irish, Welsh, Flemish, Walloons, Basques and Galicians, along with us, are taking steps in the same direction" (ERC, 1995: 3). Elsewhere, the comparison to other independent states in Europe has focused more specifically on the feasibility and viability of secession. This has been a strategy adopted by the BP and the SNP, with the latter holding up Scandinavian countries in particular as exemplars of small, prosperous nations. In Wales, YC has similarly sought to make the case that small states can be successful: "You might think that Wales is too small to be independent, but some of the most prosperous, most equal, and happiest countries in the world are small nations" (YC, 2017: 10).

Efficiency

Arguments about efficiency accounted for 7% of all political frames used by regionalist actors in our study. We have already alluded to its use above, in relation to other frames focused on dissatisfaction

with the territorial status quo (Catalonia, Northern Italy) and the quality of democracy/political decision-making (Catalonia, Northern Italy and Friesland). It is almost exclusively a frame linked to demands for increased regional self-rule, often in specific policy areas; its use thus exemplifies a strongly pragmatic approach to territorial empowerment whereby specific efficiency gains are sought as one aspect of a territorial project that is much broader and (usually) more ambitious in the longer-term.

Arguments about efficiency (along with those related to democratic quality) dominate the LN's project to empower Northern Italy through increased decentralisation. We note above the party's tendency to compare Northern and Southern Italian regions in its discourse, and the efficiency dimension is a key feature. As such it is regularly invoked when the LN sets out the typical northern characteristics of efficiency, productivity, in contrast with the laziness and wasteful attitudes of Rome and of the southerners. Efficiency arguments are also prominent in the rhetoric of CY, a campaign group for further Welsh devolution that was active between 2004 and 2015. The organisation is critical of the efficiency and effectiveness of the extant constitutional arrangements, and its proposals for greater legislative decentralisation are framed in terms of ensuring more effective scrutiny of government actions and facilitating more efficient development and delivery of legislation and policy. A similar argument was advanced by the BNG in Galicia in the mid 2003, where reform of the region's autonomy statute was justified in terms of the efficiency gains to be had in areas such as fiscal, health, cultural and policing policies. Similar claims were advanced by the UV and Stella Alpina (SA) in the Aosta Valley.

Other political frames

The political frames discussed in detail above together account for nearly 80% of all frames used by regionalist actors across all cases, and for the three decades under examination. Other political frames are relatively less used overall but are particularly important in particular places, for specific actors and/or at specific times. Such is the case for the policy frame, for example, which captures instances where regionalist actors justify a territorial demand as a means to implement specific policies to achieve explicit policy outcomes. Whilst this makes up almost 7% of all political frames overall, it accounts for 18% of political frames employed in the Welsh case (it is an approach also evident in the Galician case in the mid 2000s, although to a lesser extent). It was a particularly important argument advanced by PC in the mid 1990s, whereby the party prepared a detailed policy programme to be implemented by a Parliament for Wales were such a body to be established; this encompasses *inter alia* education, housing, health care, jobs, agriculture, transport and environmental policy. These were packaged as "a radical programme based on social justice, environmental sustainability" (PC, 1997: 3), and as such aligned with the party's broader transformational aspirations leading to "a fairer Wales for all its people" (ibid.) (see also discussion of socio-economic frames below). A similar focus has been adopted by YC more recently to make the case for an independent Wales, with policy frames making up 19% of all the political frames used by the party. Like PC three decades earlier, YC focuses on flagging up the range of areas in which an independent Wales could forge a different policy path including *inter alia* taxes, banking, media, security and defence, and foreign affairs (YC, 2017).

The use of the 'Europe' frame shows a different pattern. Accounting for 5% of all political frames overall, it was most prevalent in the 1990s but declined markedly in subsequent decades (3% of all political frames used in the 2010s, compared to 9% in the 1990s). In that earlier period its use was also tied exclusively to demands by regionalist political parties for territorial empowerment in relation to the EU

through a fundamental transformation of the supranational arena (with many advocating for the creation of a federal Europe). In relation to such demands, the Europe frame captures arguments identifying the EU as a structure of opportunity for advancing territorial interests and securing empowerment, often as part of a 'Europe of the Regions' or 'Europe of the Peoples'. Some, like the UV, aligned such a vision with fundamental reform of the state, arguing that:

> These transformations should be realized in line with the federalist principles of free disposition of the people, autonomy, and subsidiarity, within the framework of a Union of the European people, which should be completely different from the design and logic of the Union of the States (UV, 2003: no page number).

For others (including the SNP, BP, PSdAz, ERC during the 1990s and PC from the mid 2000s onwards) the goal was rather that of "independence in Europe" (SNP, 2004). Interestingly, on the relatively few occasions that regionalist parties still frame their territorial demands in European terms in the 2010s, whilst the focus remains on independence demands the arguments have shifted to a consideration of the prospects of EU membership for a future Scottish or Catalan sovereign state. Such arguments have become more important in the former case in the context of Brexit, with the SNP arguing that if the UK is to leave the EU, we believe the least-worst deal for jobs and living standards would be to stay in the Single Market and Customs Union" (SNP, 2018: no page number).

The remaining political frames are marginal to the territorial narratives of regionalist actors overall, accounting for less than 3% of all political frames used in the study as a whole. There is also some context-specific nuance to mention here. For example, arguments about political distinctiveness were more relevant in the Aosta Valley than anywhere else (16% of political frames used), and links into a broader discourse developed by regionalist actors there in relation to territorial specificity. Likewise, political colonialism frames were relatively more frequent in Sardinia (10% of all political frames) and Corsica (5% of all political frames) and featured as part of a broader concern with colonialist-type relations with the state in both places, although they were less likely to be linked to specific demands for territorial change. We consider both of these overarching 'distinctiveness' and 'colonialist' narratives in further detail below. Finally, frames capturing justifications related to political rights, political crisis, the unity of the central state, and peace and security, were hardly used. The limited use of the latter is surprising given that it was conceived for those regions where political violence has characterised regionalist mobilisation. But even in Corsica, where a terrorist group (the Fronte di Liberazione Naziunale Corsu (FLNC)) was active for most of the period of analysis, its use only accounted for 5% of all political frames used by the island's regionalist actors. These were principally linked to action demands by the FLNC during the 1990s, whereby it outlined the conditions to be met by the French state in order to bring about peace on the island, such as the recognition of the Corsican people.

5.2.2 Socio-economic frames

As noted above, socio-economic arguments have been used to justify calls for territorial change in all of our cases, and by the majority of regionalist actors; there are only three - Mouv' and Union Valdôtaine Progressiste (UVP) in the Aosta Valley, and YC in Wales – who make no or limited use of socio-economic arguments at all in their territorial narratives. But the extent to which these are important also varies significantly from case to case (see Figure 8 above), across regionalist actors as well as over time. This section considers regionalist actors' use of specific socio-economic justifications. As shown in Figure 12, some arguments have been more salient than others overall, although (as with

the use of political justifications) we also find important variation in the extent to which, and how, specific frames are used in different contexts, as well as in how these are linked to different territorial demands.

Figure 12 Use of socio-economic frames across all cases, 1990-2018 (% of all segments coded with socio-economic frames, all actors)

Figure 13 Use of socio-economic frames by case, 1990-2018 (% of all segments coded with a socio-economic frame, all actors)

Socio-economic prosperity

The most frequently used socio-economic frame is one that refers to the prosperity of the region in some way. Overall, it accounts for 29% of all socio-economic frames used by regionalist actors in our study (see Figure 12), a level of usage that shows little fluctuation over the three decades analysed. It encapsulates claims that prosperity or wealth has somehow been compromised within the territorial status quo, as well as those that see this as something which can be achieved or enhanced as a result of territorial change.

Such arguments have been used consistently over the three decades under study. Moreover, with the exception of Catalonia, the prosperity frame was also the most frequently used socio-economic frame in all our cases (see Figure 13) even though, as noted above, socio-economic arguments in general are marginal to regionalists' discourses in Kashubia and Bavaria. It has also been linked to different territorial demands at different times in different places. Most frequent has been the use of arguments about prosperity to frame demands for action by higher levels of government (and especially the state); such a linkage was made by CiU in Catalonia (especially during the 1990s), moderate Corsican nationalists (during the 2000s), and more consistently over time by PC in Wales and the BNG in Galicia. For the former, for example, such demands for action were often linked to territorial distribution of resources within Spain, known as the fiscal pact; the party thus argued that "without sufficient economic resources, the current statutory framework will not allow us to continue making a contribution to wealth generation (…) That's why in the next legislature we will seek a new fiscal pact with the central Government' (CiU,1999: 85)

As noted above, arguments about prosperity have also been increasingly linked to demands for independence. These have been especially prominent in Scotland and Catalonia, although in both places a shift in the frame's meaning can also be detected, to refer specifically to the economic viability of the territory post-secession. Thus, for example, whilst the claim that Scotland's economic growth has been stifled within the UK has been a common theme in the SNP's documents over the years, the economic potential of an independent Scotland was a key argument advanced by the Yes Scotland campaign in favour of a 'yes' vote in the 2014 independence referendum, a theme which has been taken up by the more recently created Scottish Independence Convention (SIC).

Where regionalists have advanced arguments to support demands to modify the extant territorial system, prosperity arguments account for 24% of the frames used. Overwhelmingly, such demands are for more self-rule for the territory, and this has been linked to prosperity in Sardinia, Northern Italy, Catalonia, Scotland and Corsica. In the former case, for example, the PSdAz has consistently argued that through regional control of the island's natural resources "it is possible to lay the basis for the prosperity of our people" (PSdAZ-SNI, 2001: 2). A similar argument has been articulated in Corsica, although not until much more recently: since the 2010s, both moderate and radical nationalist groups have framed their calls for additional legislative powers for the Corsican parliament exclusively in these terms, with more self-rule advanced as the only way in which the Corsican economy could achieve its full potential.

The discussion thus far has considered the use of the prosperity frame in isolation, but in practice it is often found alongside, and is linked to, other social-economic arguments. The specific permutation of such linkages varies from case to case. In Scotland, for example, the goals of economic prosperity and social justice have long been linked in the SNPs political discourse, as exemplified by the argument that:

> With independence we can work together to make Scotland a more ambitious and dynamic country. We will be able to create an environment where our existing and new private industries can grow more easily. We will have the economic levers to create new jobs and take full advantage of our second, green energy windfall. And instead of many young people having to leave Scotland to fulfil their ambitions they will be able to stay and take advantage of the increased opportunities here. We will be able to address the priorities of people in Scotland, from better state pensions to universal free childcare. (SNP, 2011: 28).

Such an argument is shared by pro-independence organisations in Scotland, and is also a key feature of such actors in the Catalan context. A similar vision has been articulated by moderate and radical Corsican nationalists during the 2010s.

In contrast, in Friesland the linkage asserted is between prosperity and territorial cohesion, where the claim is advanced that a fairer distribution of resources by the Dutch state would contribute to the region's economic growth. A third linkage is evident in the Lega Nord's rhetoric, where it is argued that the decentralisation of responsibility over the economy would allow for policy better suited to Northern Italy's socio-economic specificities, which in turn would lead to economic growth. In all of these permutations, the core claim is that economic growth and prosperity are key for regionalists intent on transforming 'their' territorial reality, whether this be to create a more just, or a more solidary, society.

Social justice

After arguments about socio-economic prosperity, those referring to social justice in some way are the next most frequently used. Overall, these account for 28% of all the socio-economic frames used by regionalist actors in our study (see Figure 12). Over time, however, they have become more important (accounting for 27% of all socio-economic frames used in the 1990s, declining to 23% in the 2000s but increasing to 33% by the 2010s); moreover, together with arguments about socio-economic prosperity, they accounted for 62% of all socio-economic frames used by the regionalist actors in our study between 2010 and 2018.

But again this data masks important variation between cases. Thus, as shown in Figure 13, whilst this was the most frequently used socio-economic frame in Catalonia, it remained completely absent in the discourse of LN in Northern Italy. A closer examination of the specific use of this frame also reveals further variation along three dimensions: i. the nature of the arguments made; ii. the conceptualisation of social justice underpinning these arguments; and iii. the kinds of territorial demands that are linked to the frame.

Firstly, a distinction can be made between justifications that talk about social justice in very general terms (often as a goal to be achieved) vs. those that interpret specific policy situations through a social justice lens (usually to highlight perceived injustices). In relation to the former, regionalist actors' discourses have often used terms such as 'just', 'fair' and 'equal' to outline a vision of society that can be achieved as a result of territorial change. For example, PC during the 1990s advocated Welsh self-government as a means to realise a 'just and equal society' (PC, 1997: 8), as well as one which is more democratic (see above). Similarly, ERC relied on social justice arguments to make the case for more Catalan self-rule during the 1990s and 2000s, arguing that "a society that intends to be progressive, modern, fair, and solidary must tackle this problem (poverty and marginalisation) from the roots, as a basic priority for the well/being of all its citizens" (ERC, 1993: 70). Some actors also explicitly link the social transformation of the territory with the goal of national liberation, as exemplified by Alternativa

Galega de Esquerda's (AGE) argument that Galician independence is inextricably linked to the struggle for "a social model that serves the peoples' interests", since "national and social liberation are inseparable in a nation without a state" (AGE, 2012: no page number). Such generic social justice arguments have principally been articulated in relation to the state, although they have on occasion also been used more broadly to imagine a different supranational social reality. The BNG, for example, advocated an alternative Europe of the Peoples would "re-orientate the EU towards a real social Europe" (BNG, 2009: 4).

At the same time, however, regionalist actors have often interpreted specific policy areas to have a social justice dimension. Such arguments are a feature of regionalist discourses in insular contexts, for example. In Sardinia the PSdAz has emphasised people's unequal access to basic rights and resources, with specific examples of policy 'unfairness' (e.g. unaffordable utilities, transport and communication links with mainland Italy) providing grounds for demanding policy intervention by, or the decentralisation of policy competencies from, the Italian state. In Corsica, both moderate and radical nationalists have increasingly focused on grievances such as the high cost of living and levels of unemployment on the island, with the latter arguing that "the fight against inequalities" is part of a "project where social justice, solidarity, the right of everyone to work, housing and a better quality of life prevail" (CL, 2009: no page number). Similarly framed arguments are also present elsewhere, and have focused on inter alia access to healthcare (ERC, BNG), levels of poverty and inequality (PC), housing and employment (BNG) and gender equality (WFI).

This discussion of general vs. specific articulations of the social justice frame points to a second dimension of variation, namely in terms of how social justice is conceptualised. In its review of understandings of the term 'spatial justice' in the academic literature, Deliverable 1.1 makes the distinction between work that has used it to mean "rights to something" (e.g. participation in urban/political life) and those that have understood it in terms of the "distribution of something" (e.g. resources/services) (p7-8). We find evidence of both uses in the rhetoric of regionalist actors. The former is invoked in the quotes above from the Sardinian and Corsican cases. It is a conceptualisation echoed, for example, in the narrative of Galician regionalist actors: the BNG during the 2000s demanded action by the Spanish state to provide Galician citizens with a set of 'rights' (to education and "stable and high quality" employment (BNG, 2008: 52), whilst in recent years ANOVA has justified Galician independence with references to the interests and rights of both individuals and peoples. In Bavaria, social justice has been invoked by the BP specifically in relation to students' rights to study in the region. In contrast, the use of social justice arguments in relation to the distribution of resources is exemplified by Omnium Cultural's (OC) push, in the years after the approval of Catalonia's new statute of autonomy, for "a new fiscal statute as a means of ensuring adequate funding of public services in relation to Catalans' social needs" (OC, 2008: no page number). More recently, social justice arguments were widely used to justify demands for Catalan independence. In its campaign for a 'yes' vote in the 2017 independence referendum, for example, Sumate focused on the measures that an independent Catalonia could take in relation to citizens' welfare, with particular emphasis on opening up access to universal healthcare (Sumate, 2017: no page number). In Friesland, these take an even more specific form, with calls for the Dutch government to intervene to fairly compensate citizens in the region affected negatively by mineral extraction, an important sector of the Friesian economy (see FNP, 2002).

Thirdly, the examples cited above point to the use of social justice arguments to frame a range of territorial demands. The Friesian example above exemplifies their use in relation to demands for action

by higher levels of government. A similar linkage is made by radical Corsican nationalists, PC in Wales, the Sardinian SNI, regionalist actors in Galicia during the 2010s, and in Catalonia (especially ERC during the 2000s, and both CiU and ERC from 2009 onwards). The type of action demanded is almost exclusively for policy intervention by the state, and this across a range of policy areas including fiscal, energy, education, social and environmental policy. In the few cases where such demands have been aimed at the EU, they have sought intervention in relation to fiscal (Catalonia) and agriculture (Galicia, Sardinia) policies.

Where social justice frames have been linked to demands to modify the existing political system, they have all taken the form of calls for increased self-rule for the territory. This is the case for the SNP, SNI and UV, with the latter conceptualising decentralisation as a matter of social justice to the extent that ensuring greater regional authority would allow giving people access to better welfare resources. The justification of self-rule demands in social terms has also become more widespread in some cases. In Catalonia, for example, whilst ERC was already advancing such an argument in the 1990s, by the 2000s all regionalist actors were making the case for increasing the competencies of the Catalan parliament in these terms.

Territorial demands for more fundamental territorial reform featured social justice justifications in Scotland and Wales, specifically in relation to the creation of a regional tier of government in both places during the mid 1990s. In the former case, campaigners for a new Scottish Parliament argued that such an institution would lead to better social policy and deliver more equality, for example: "stronger equal opportunities policies and the employment of more women in top posts will help promote change in these areas" (SF, 1997b: no page number). A similar framing of fundamental reform can be found in Galicia. In the 2000s, the BNG advocated the creation of a pluri-national Spanish state and linked this to the goal of "advancing the social welfare of all the [Spanish] state's peoples" (BNG, 2004: 7), whilst more recently the party has demanded more sovereignty for Galicia in order to reverse the "anti-social" policies of central government which have led to the "cutting and privatising public services, attacking social and workers' rights" (BNG, 2015: 4).

Finally, social justice frames have become increasingly salient in campaigns for independence in several places. As noted above, some regionalist parties have consistently advocated secession in such terms, including ERC and the SNP (the latter alongside arguments about the prosperity of a future independent Scotland). But our data indicates that such arguments have become more widespread over time, as a result of the emergence of new actors advancing similar positions and/or shifts in the rhetoric of more established political parties. In the Catalan case, for example, social justice arguments became increasingly important in the rhetoric of Junts pel Si (JxS) by the 2010s; they were also the most used justifications for CUP and (as suggested above) Sumate, and also featured in the discourses of ANC and OC. In Scotland, several civil society organisations formed to campaign for Scottish independence in recent years (especially RIC and SIC) have given relatively more emphasis to social justice arguments than the SNP, contributing to shifting the focus of the debate within the pro-independence movement. In Sardinia, the creation of the SNI in the mid 1990s also introduced new social justice arguments to the political debate on Sardinia's independence, with secession advocated as a way to ensure "a social state that can grant basic services" (SNI, 2008: no page number). A similar dynamic is evidenced in the Galician case, where ANOVA has sought to differentiate itself from its main regionalist competitor (the BNG) by emphasizing social transformation as one of the core reasons for supporting independence;

secession would thus mean "the right to decide, republic, radical democracy, and a new economic and social model" (Anova, 2015: no page number).

Territorial cohesion

Justifications relating to territorial cohesion accounted for 15% of all socio-economic frames used by regionalist actors in our study (see Figure 12), although these did not feature at all in the territorial narratives articulated in Bavaria and Kashubia, and were marginal (less than 10% of all socio-economic frames) in Corsica and Scotland (see Figure 13). Moreover, whilst social justice arguments have increased in importance over time, the use of territorial cohesion arguments has declined (from 18% of all socio-economic frames used in the 1990s and 2000s, to 11% in the 2010s). Such a finding is consistent with the shift noted in Deliverable 1.2 in relation to the EU's cohesion policies, from an understanding of inequality and solidarity defined in relation to intra-territorial disparities in economic performance, to one based instead on the inequality of (and solidarity between) individuals within society in more recent years.

Beyond this general trend, on the occasions where arguments about territorial cohesion have been used, they have been articulated differently in different places. On the one hand, these have been deployed by regionalist actors in relatively wealthier regions who feel they have been unfairly treated by the state's model for re-distributing resources across its territory; in such places, territorial demands have sought to protect and promote the socio-economic resources of the region. Such an argument is most clearly articulated in the Catalan case, where (as noted above) different regionalist actors during the 1990s and 2000s decried the Spanish system of inter-regional transfers, perceiving it to discriminate against Catalonia. The region's resultant fiscal deficit has repeatedly been put forward as grounds for granting the Catalan government more fiscal autonomy. Whilst this was not a key issue in more recent debates around Catalan independence, it still featured in the rhetoric of the ANC and JxS as grounds for seeking separation from the Spanish state. Regionalist parties in the Aosta Valley and Northern Italy have sought to package their grievances in less "selfish" terms, with the UV arguing that increasing regions' fiscal competencies would contribute to "the (…) goals of redistribution and solidarity among regions" (UV, 2013: no page number), whilst LN supported such reforms alongside a commitment to some kind of territorial re-distribution of resources "for equity and solidarity…with the least developed federated states" (LN, 1996: no page number). In the Friesian context, as alluded to above, territorial cohesion frames were also linked to calls on the Dutch government to enact a more equitable distribution of government jobs and investment.

On the other hand, territorial cohesion frames have been used by regionalist actors in relatively poorer territories, either to denounce the lack of solidarity with the region or in relation to a desire to catch up with more prosperous regions. In two cases where such arguments feature prominently (Sardinia and Galicia), it has been argued that territorial solidarity (understood in relation to economic development) should be pursued at both state and European levels. For example, PSdAz (1994: no page number) made the general case for solidarity within the framework of "integration and interdependence, in Italy and in Europe", whilst the BNG during the 2000s argued in favour of new regional taxation powers as "a guarantee of the necessary resources to fund public spending at a level that guarantees convergence with other territories within the state and our European environment. (BNG, 2005: 12). The BNG has also been a constant critic of specific EU policies (agriculture, structural funds, technology and infrastructure) for undermining Galicia's economic status relative to other parts

of the EU, and has urged the European Commission to take action to redress their negative impact on the region.

Social distinctiveness

Arguments about the socio-economic distinctiveness of the territory account for 13% of all socio-economic frames used by regionalist actors (Figure 12), although they have featured more prominently in some cases more than others (Aosta Valley, Sardinia, Northern Italy, Galicia, Wales and (to a lesser extent) Bavaria and Friesland) (Figure 13). But, as with the territorial cohesion frames, these have also declined in use over time (from an average of 18% of all socio-economic frames used in the 1990s and 2000s, to 11% in the 2010s). Such spatial disparities are often articulated in an abstract way, referring to the territory's different "realities" (LN, 1992: no page number), "peculiarities" (BNG, 2004: 47) or "needs" (BP, 2009: 1); in the Sardinian case, the PSdAz refers more specifically to the impact of insularity and geographical peripherality on the territory's socio-economic structures.

In all cases, however, arguments about socio-economic distinctiveness are used to justify a different treatment for the territory in some way. These predominantly take two forms: demands to modify the existing territorial structure; or demands for action by higher levels of government to recognise, protect and/or support the territory's socio-economic specificities. With regard to the former, there are several examples of regionalist parties pushing for further powers for their regions so that policy-making can be tailored to, and capitalise on, its specific conditions. Such an argument was advanced by the LN in the 1990s, to the effect that "the competence on industrial policy should be transferred to the macro-region, so as to allow legislation that is adequate for different Italian socio-economic realities" (LN, 1992: no page number). Similar arguments have been a salient feature of the discourses of the BNG and the UV. The latter has consistently justified its autonomist claims on the basis of the necessity to protect and safeguard the specificities of its mountain territory, understood in socio-economic as well as political terms (see above).

With regard to regionalist parties' demands for action by higher levels of government, these have mainly called on the state to intervene in specific policy areas. For example, the FNP has occasionally sought a shift in central government policies (including in relation to the economy) to allow for regional differentiation in areas "where Friesland is ahead of others" (FNP, 2006: 5). In the Welsh case, PC often decries the inadequate recognition by the UK government of Welsh needs, particularly in relation to the impact of poverty, an ageing population, social problems, and migration patterns. In Catalonia, CiU has also linked the idea of Catalan socio-economic distinctiveness with the issue of social justice in its attempts to secure more funding for welfare provision from the central state; it has thus argued that "one can't treat equally situations that are different, because this generates significant injustices (…); uniformity without taking into account demography, the cost of living (…) cannot guarantee in all cases, decent and sufficient pensions" (CIU, 2011: 137). But socio-economic distinctiveness frames also feature in discourses targeted at levels of government above the state in some cases. The BNG, for example, has persistently sought intervention in relation to Galicia's economic prosperity from the Spanish state and the EU; the claim is either that policies need to be changed because they have been economically damaging to specific sectors of Galicia's economy (e.g. changes to the EU's agricultural and fisheries policies) or that a different policy approach is needed in order to "make possible and encourage the development of the Galician economy" (BNG, 1993: 3).

Other socio-economic frames

The remaining socio-economic frames – colonialism, sustainable development, crisis and globalisation – are marginal in the territorial discourses of regionalist actors, each accounting for less than 5% of all socio-economic frames used in our cases. As with the frames above, however, this aggregate data masks case-specific variation that merits brief consideration. For example, as with the political colonialism frame, the use of socio-economic colonialism arguments is largely confined to the Sardinian and Corsican contexts and we consider this broader colonialist narrative further below. But the frame is also invoked (albeit relatively infrequently) in a few other cases. For example, in the Aosta Valley, the UV during the 1990s links such a frame to its more prominent concern with protecting the territory's specificity (see above); it thus calls for "protection of the Valley against attempts at cultural standardisation and economic colonialism" (UV, 1994: no page number). In Catalonia a decade later, OC would frame its demands for additional fiscal revenues and a new fiscal pact with the argument that "the Spanish state plunders the resources of Catalonia and compromises its future capacity of wealth creation. They invoke a false solidarity to legitimise a practice that corresponds to the old economic colonialisms" (OC, 2003: no page number).

In contrast, the globalisation frame is exclusively used by radical Corsican nationalists to make the case for independence in 2010s, which they present as an "innovative project" that seeks to protect the island's land, language and culture, all of which is "seriously threatened after more than two centuries of French oppression today and reinforced by global aggression" (CL, 2008: no page number). However, as independence becomes much less of a prominent concern in this decade, globalisation arguments remain a marginal in their overall territorial narrative. Arguments about sustainable development are also present in regionalists' territorial narratives, especially in the 2010s although they are less frequently used to justify specific demands for territorial empowerment. Exceptions in this respect are ANOVA in the Galician context, whose electoral alliances have called on the Spanish state to enact economic policies that "are based on economic, social and environmental sustainability" (ENM, 2016: 35). In Friesland, this frame accounts for 10% of all the socio-economic frames used by the FNP; it is frequently linked to demands for fundamental territorial reform or greater self-rule where 'sustainability' is a catch-all phrase that implies creating a more attractive social, economic and environmental context that would stem the migration of young people to the economic centres of the Netherlands.

Finally, we see very little use of the socio-economic crisis frame. This is surprising, not least because we might have expected the 2008 financial crisis to have impacted in some way on the territorial narratives of regionalist actors. However, we should not conclude from this finding that the economic crisis did not have an impact on these actors' pursuit of territorial empowerment. Rather, evidence from the Galician case study suggests a different strategic response, one that interprets the economic crisis through the lenses of its impact on other aspects of regionalist parties' territorial calculations. As a result, the financial crisis was framed using a different repertoire of justifications that captured grievances in relation to the crisis's impact on the territory, and the nature of the political responses to this impact. For example, the BNG drew on different strands of argumentation (dissatisfaction, blame and social justice) to argue that the financial crisis had made fundamental territorial re-structuring more urgent than ever:

> The neo-liberal and centralising policies imposed from Brussels and Madrid, with the submissive collaboration of the Galician government, are designed for the big banks, businesses, energy and construction lobbies...These policies are destroying the productivity of our basic and strategic sectors, threatening current and future employment, cutting and privatising public services, attacking social and workers' rights…The medium-term consequences of these anti-social and re-centralising policies demand an urgent and comprehensive response from the country…We need sovereignty in order to decide for ourselves and…prohibit the re-centralisation instigated by the central government…We want to reverse this process and break with the mould of the 1978 Constitution. (BNG, 2015: 4).

As such, it is arguable that the financial crisis may have had a more significant impact on regionalist actors' discourses than our data would seem to suggest, and that this is captured in a broader range of frames that reflects the multi-faceted way in which regionalist actors' perceive and experience their territorial reality.

5.2.3 Cultural frames

As noted above, a key finding from our data is the relative marginality overall of cultural frames. In none of our cases did these constitute the most frequently used frames in regionalist actors' territorial narratives. As shown in Figure 13, they were most salient in the Kashubian case, and (as already indicated) were especially salient in the discourse of KPZ, a socio-cultural movement established in 1956 to defend the Kashubian language and the unity of Kashubians as an ethnic and cultural group within Poland. In particular, arguments citing the existence of a distinctive Kashubian identity and (to a lesser extent) a distinctive culture, language and history, have been linked to demands for action to give political recognition to the Kashubian people as the most numerous and distinct political group residing within the region of Pomerania. Such demands have become more salient since the creation of a regional level government in Pomerania in 1998 and local government reforms in 1999, which together satisfied the association's claims hitherto for the unification of the Kashubian territories within a broader framework of a regionalised Polish state. From 2000 onwards, the KPZ has thus shifted its attention to the symbolic empowerment of Kashubia as a distinctive cultural group within this new regional arena.

In all other cases, where cultural justifications are employed (albeit relatively infrequently), these did not draw on the full range of frames identified in the academic literature as being important in regionalist mobilisation (see Figure 14). Most widespread across the cases was a linkage between territorial demands and claims to the existence of a distinctive territorial identity. In most cases, such an identity is presented in national terms; the Bavarian BP is an exception in this respect, referring instead to a distinctive identity linked to a Bavarian homeland.

Beyond this general trend, however, we see considerable variation in the specific nature of demands justified in identitarian terms, and the salience of this frame over time. For example, in the Galician case, the BNG used such an argument to justify its demands for a fundamental reform of the Spanish state and the creation of a 'Europe of the Peoples' during the 1990s and 2000s, claiming that "peoples exist and should be respected within any system of a supranational character, starting with pluri-national states such as Spain" (BNG, 2008: 67). However, this argument has effectively disappeared from the party's rhetoric in more recent years, with a radicalisation in the party's long-term territorial ambitions (demands for Galician sovereignty and independence) accompanied by an almost exclusive reliance on socio-economic and political justifications (see above). In Catalonia, similar justifications

were most used during the period 2003-2009, when regionalist mobilisation was focused on efforts to reform Catalonia's Statue of Autonomy. They were especially prominent in the efforts of regionalist actors (especially CiU and OC) to make the case for enhancing the authority of the Catalan Parliament; the assertion that Catalonia is a nation become an important theme in the debate, with the inclusion of such a claim in the preamble of the revised statute of autonomy supported by these actors seen as a way of giving formal recognition to the pluri-nationality of the Spanish state. As for the BNG, however, such an argument becomes less important in subsequent years as the Catalan regionalist movement shifts towards more secessionist positions, with only the ANC continuing to assert Catalonia's nationhood as an argument in favour of Catalan independence.

Figure 14 Use of cultural frames across all cases, 1990-2018 (% of all segments coded with cultural frames, all actors)

In other cases, other types of cultural arguments feature more prominently. In the Aosta Valley, for example, references to linguistic and (to a lesser extent) cultural distinctiveness stand out as the most recurrent frames in the territorial discourse of the UV, in line with party's historical focus on the linguistic and cultural protection of the Francophone minorities in the region and the salience more general of arguments anchored in a sense of territorial difference (see above). These frames are often used in relation to demands for intervention by the Italian state, where what is sought is specific policy action to protect and promote the Valley's language, culture and history. Such demands have increased since a 2001 reform of the Italian constitution increased the powers of the country's regional tier of government, largely satisfying the UV's calls up to that point for more self-rule for the Aosta Valley. Linguistic distinctiveness arguments also feature in the Friesian case, accounting for 36% of the cultural frames used overall; here too they are linked to demands for action by the Dutch state to protect the Friesian language, although these have declined in salience over time. In Wales, arguments for linguistic distinctiveness are also linked exclusively to demands for policy intervention, in this case advanced by PC in order to strengthen the status of the Welsh language at the UK and European levels. In Bavaria, in contrast, references to the historical relationship with the German state have become more important over time; the long history of Bavarian autonomy is thus frequently cited, alongside laments

that Bavaria was forced into the Germany Empire in 1871 and has remained, in contrast to a warmongering German empire and later Third Reich, a peaceful nation.

As indicated by Figure 14, other cultural frames have been little used. Claims relating to some kind of cultural invasion are almost exclusively found in Sardinia and Corsica, as part of the broader colonialist discourse advanced in these contexts (see below). The identity/cultural crisis and religious distinctiveness frames are even less used, together accounting for less than 1% of all cultural frames used.

5.2.4 Environmental frames

As noted above, our data indicates that regionalist actors in our cases very rarely draw on environmental arguments to justify their territorial demands. As with the other frame categories considered above, however, this general finding must be nuanced in order to account for case- and actor-specific variation. For example, on the limited occasions that regionalist actors have drawn on environmental frames Figure 15 indicates that these are principally concerned with environmental sustainability. Such arguments have been used by the FNP in Friesland, and increasingly so in the 2010s; these have been used to frame demands for (non)intervention by the Dutch state in relation to issues such as the negative consequences of mineral extraction, the underground storage of CO_2 or radio-active waste, or the neglect of sea dikes.

They have also come to the fore in the political documents of moderate Corsican nationalists since 2010; the discussion has focused on the need to preserve the environment and tackle climate change (FAC_2010: no page number; PAC_2017: no page number) although (as is predominantly the case with these actors, see also above) such goals are not linked specifically to any territorial demands that would enable such environmental advances to be achieved beyond a very vague reference to "territorial public policies" (ibid.).

Figure 15 Use of environmental frames across all cases, 1990-2018 (% of all segments coded with environmental frames, all actors)

In contrast, arguments invoking environmental distinctiveness are confined to the Aosta Valley, where (along with political, socio-economic and cultural permutations of this theme) they have featured in the rhetoric of UV and the UVP (since its creation in 2012) as part of a broader concern for the protection of the territory's specificities. Such claims are often linked to demands for more self-rule or policy intervention, directed mainly at the EU, based on the argument that the Aosta Valley's mountainous terrain (and the policy challenges that this poses) must be taken into account. For example, in its manifesto for the 2003 European Parliament elections, the UV argues that "it is essential that the (…) EU acknowledges the right to self-government in respect of local resources, to rebalance (…) environmental handicaps" (UV, 2003: no page number).

Finally, whilst we see environmental colonialism occasionally invoked as an argument in the colonial discourses of Sardinian and Corsican regionalist actors (see below), the environmental crisis frame is only used on a handful occasions. It was thus used by PC in Wales in the mid 1990s as part of a narrative setting out the broader context for its demands for the creation of a Welsh parliament, and by the BNG in 2004 in response to the Prestige oil spill of the Galician coast in 2002 where it was linked to calls on both the Spanish state and the EU to act to tackle and provide financial compensation for its environmental and economic consequences.

5.2.5 Other frames

As noted in Section 3 above, the coding scheme included a code for 'other frames' to capture additional justifications not accounted for by the other frame categories. Overall, such frames accounted for 4% of all the frames used in the study. In some cases, such arguments were almost entirely absent (less than 1% of all frames used in the Friesian and Northern Italian cases); in the Kashubian case, in contrast, these make up 11% of all frames used. Some of these invoke aspects simply not considered by the coding scheme, such as KJ's justification of more self-rule for the Pomeranian region as a way of countering the threat of "individualisation" (KJ, 2016: no page). Others put forward arguments that are too vague to be allocated to a specific frame, as exemplified by KPZ's demand for intervention policy by the Polish central government in the area of media policy "which first of all should express the needs of the region and its inhabitants" (KPZ, 2007: no page number). Similar references by PC to "Welsh needs" were also coded in this way, as were expressions such as "for the future", "in order to enhance creativity" or the desire for "a better country" in the Catalan case (OC, 2012).

In only a few other cases do we find more substantive arguments that cannot be captured adequately by our coding scheme. In Bavaria for example, there are frames that focus on regionally and nationally specific circumstances; these include arguments about the context in which the German Basic Law was approved as well as the nature of German unification, and others invoking the legal and practical feasibility of Bavarian independence in a political context where such a demand is very uncommon. In Catalonia, in contrast, this frame category captured the emergence of arguments related to repression by the Spanish state in the period after the 2017 independence referendum. This was linked to claims denouncing the perceived aggression and violence of the governing PP's response to holding of the unofficial referendum, and calls on the central government to release Catalan political prisoners. Finally, in the case of radical left actors included in the study, the coding scheme inadequately captured the full scope of arguments invoked in support of secession. This includes, for example, the Catalan CUP's argument that independence is about bringing an end to "vulture economics" (CUP, 2017), or the Scottish RIC's references to class struggle in statements such as the following: "This Vow honours… the

growing numbers who recognise that independence from Westminster is the best way in which Scotland can (…) inspire fellow workers across the British Isles, Europe and the world to take up a struggle against their own masters' (RIC, 2014: no page number).

5.2.6 Regionalist mobilisation, territorial empowerment and the framing of a different territorial future

The discussion of regionalist actors' framing strategies thus far has examined each thematic cluster of frames in turn, and the use of the most salient frames within each of these clusters. However, as we have already indicated above, in practice frames are often linked together to create a broader narrative that makes the case for territorial empowerment. Some of these narratives are specific to one or a few cases and reflect a particular interpretation of the territorial reality in particular places. But our data also points to frame linkages that are less contextualised and resonate across different actors in different cases. In this final section, we reflect further on these linkages in order to better grasp the specificities and commonalities of regionalist actors' conceptualisations of territorial (in)equalities and spatial (in)justice, and the ways in which these are brought together to substantiate claims for a different set of territorial relationships conducive to a better regional future.

We have already flagged up in the preceding discussion two narratives that are highly case-specific, and that offer a distinctive interpretation of the territory's relationship with higher levels of government that reflects a particular set of issues and concerns that have underpinned regionalist mobilisation in those places. Firstly, in the Aosta Valley, regionalist actors have advanced a territorial discourse strongly anchored in the political, socio-economic, cultural and environmental distinctiveness of the region, where these are elements to be protected and promoted. Such a position has long characterised the UV's rhetoric, but it also echoed in that of other (newer) political actors who have arguably sought to emulate the UV's strong electoral and political track-record. In the former case, for example, demands for more self-rule from and for policy action by the Italian state – which make up the majority of calls for territorial empowerment between 1990 and 2018 - have been justified in terms of the socio-economic and environmental particuliarities of the territory's mountainous territory and the specific policy challenges and needs (e.g. relating to infrastructure, the economy and agriculture) resulting from that reality, as well as to the region's distinctive identity, language and culture. Where the party has called for more fundamental territorial reforms (mainly in the form of a federal EU), it has appealed to arguments about the region's political distinctiveness. Taken together, these provide evidence of how territorial relationships are interpreted along political, socio-economic, cultural and environmental dimensions, albeit with different emphases and to argue for different forms of territorial change.

A similar multi-dimensionality characterises the colonialist narrative found in Sardinia and Corsica, as the second example of a particularly distinctive territorial narrative that has characterised regionalist mobilisation in these two places. Whilst this is not the only or always the most salient reason for demanding territorial change, it is nevertheless a persistent theme in regionalist actors' broader territorial narratives and, as such, distinguishes these cases from the others analysed. Both places are framed (in more or less explicit terms) as an oppressed colony of the state, subject to processes of forced assimilation and exploited by the central government. In Sardinia, generic references to political colonisation have featured alongside more specific opposition to the imposition of military bases (the so-called 'military slavery' issue) and economic structures that have been imposed to the island to fulfil the needs of foreign countries and economic companies:

> The Italian state has been (…) the most deceitful and destructive invaders of Sardinia's colonialist history (…). It has overseen a precise use of the island as an 'area of service', strategically placed in the Mediterranean to create military and economic structures oriented by the needs and will of external companies and governments (PSdAz, 2006: no page number)

These are accompanied by references (albeit less frequent) to cultural assimilation, whereby "a dominating and majoritarian ethnicity, like the Italian one, compress and makes subaltern a minor ethnicity like the Sardinian one" (PSdAz, 1994: no page number).

In Corsica, the narrative – which is present in the three decades examined but gains in salience during the 2010s and especially for radical nationalist groups - has placed the main emphasis on socio-economic and political aspects of the island's relationship with France. The latter's economic policies are thus perceived to be exploitative and prejudicial, contributing to Corsica's economic under-development and dependence, exemplified by CL's argument that "the economic ultra-dependence of Corsica is not a fatal condition but a form of politics organised by France" (CL, 2015, no page number). Accusations of political colonialism take up this theme by framing the politics of the French state as an imposition and constituting acts of repression and subjugation; CN, for example, denounces the state's "violence […] which for more than 200 years has imposed its law in our country by the strength of its armies and by a constant repression, which continues today' (CN, 2000, no page number). A common call in both strands of the colonialist narrative is for emancipation, politically through territorial empowerment (where the specific demands, when stated, range from independence to policy intervention (e.g. to create a new form of Corsican citizenship) and via "economic and social re-conquest" (PAC, 2015, no page number).

There are many other examples of frame linkages that are common across cases and we have referred to some of these in the discussion above. For example, the co-occurrence of arguments expressing dissatisfaction with, and attributing blame for, the territorial status quo is a feature of regionalist actors' framing strategies across all our cases; moreover, as noted above, these are highly versatile frames that encompass a wide range of political, socio-economic and (to a lesser extent) cultural and environmental grievances. But whilst this focus on identifying the 'problem' is a key theme emerging from the data, even more striking is the frequent linkage of such arguments to others that propose a solution to the problem, and serve to map out a different territorial reality that can be achieved through territorial empowerment. The most salient of these is the linkage between dissatisfaction frames and those referring to the quality of the democratic and political system in some way, and where territorial empowerment is advanced as a way of delivering a kind of politics that is *inter alia* more democratic, of better quality, more representative and accountable, and/or more respectful of the rule of law. But dissatisfaction frames are also linked with other political frames, especially those asserting the existence of a sovereign people/nation's right to self-determination, and those taking issue with (and seeking to redress) the inefficiency of extant decision-making structures. Indeed, there are plentiful examples of regionalist actors drawing on several (or all) of these frames within a single narrative, as part of a broader political case for territorial empowerment.

As noted at the outset of this section, one of the key findings of this study is the clear predominance overall of such a political perspective on a territory's relations with higher levels of government in the rhetoric of regionalist actors. But socio-economic frames are also important, and increasingly so in many places, as indicated above. Here too, frame linkages are key to setting out the socio-economic case for territorial empowerment. The bridging with dissatisfaction and blame frames is also evident in

relation to socio-economic arguments, and especially with those that address issues of prosperity and social justice in the regional context. Furthermore, our data suggests that regionalist actors have increasingly come to see the latter two aspects as highly inter-related, with the economic standing of the territory having a direct impact on the extent to which a fairer, more just society can be delivered. Taken together, they form the basis of a socio-economic case for territorial empowerment that has gained significant traction in many places over the thirty-year period examined by this study; interestingly, this seems to be at the expense of a concern with territorial cohesion and solidarity, which has declined in salience over time.

Two further observations can be made about the distinctive 'issue-packages' put together by regionalist actors to justify demands for territorial empowerment. Firstly, whilst we have talked above about political vs. socio-economic justifications for territorial change, these are often inter-woven in regionalist actors' territorial narratives (albeit with different emphases by different actors at different times). Whilst cultural and (to a lesser extent) environmental arguments are important to some actors in some places at some points in time, these are exceptions that confirm the key finding that regionalist actors interpret their territorial realities predominantly through political and socio-economic lenses, and it is primarily on these grounds that they seek to justify a different (and better) set of territorial relationships. Secondly, however, it is much more difficult to find a clear pattern whereby different political vs. socio-economic justifications are linked to specific kinds of territorial demands. They have been used to justify calls for the full range of demands ranging from independence to action by higher levels of government, mostly with a view to empowering the territory in relation to the central state but without completely neglecting the broader supranational political context for such a project.

The exception in respect of this last point relates to demands for independence. We note above that, over the three decades for which we have collected data, secessionist demands have become relatively more salient overall (see Figure 3 above). What becomes apparent from our data is that such a goal has also seen a case for independence gaining traction in several (albeit not all) places anchored in a general sense of dissatisfaction with the territorial status quo, but also placing increasing emphasis on other political and socio-economic arguments. On the one hand, these focus on the territory's *right to decide for itself on whether it wants to remain a part of the state* (because this would be democratic and/or the expression of the nation's right to self-determination); on the other hand, they set out a *vision for a different future* that can only be achieved through independence (a more democratic, prosperous and fairer/more just society). Such a narrative has long been a feature of the territorial discourse of some pro-independence parties analysed in this study (e.g. ERC, SNP, BP, PSdAz), but it has gained more traction in recent years as some established political parties have converged around the goal and the justification of it (CiU, PC) and new political parties and civil society organisations have emerged to advance such a case (e.g. in Scotland, Wales, Catalonia and Sardinia).

6. Conclusion

Through undertaking an examination of how regionalist actors frame their territorial demands, the aim of Task 7.2 was twofold. Firstly, it sought to provide insights into how such actors conceptualise territorial (in)equalities and spatial (in)justice. Secondly, it sought to understand to what extent such conceptualisations underpin demands for the sub-state territories that these actors represent to be empowered in some way, to enable them to pursue their own path towards a fairer, more just society.

Of particular interest is the extent to which demands for territorial empowerment are justified in terms of socio-economic inequalities and (in)justice, with such an emphasis reflective of the predominant way in which territorial disparities have been conceptualised in supranational policy approaches to tackling territorial cohesion (see Deliverables 1.1 and 1.2).

Our findings reveal a huge variation in terms of how regionalist actors in different places have experienced differences between 'their' territory and higher territorial scales. The data highlights the strong contextualisation of actors' territorial narratives, characterised by more or less emphasis on political, socio-economic and (to a lesser extent) cultural and environmental arguments in different places, by different actors as well as over time. More specifically, there is a clear socio-economic dimension to regionalist actors' perceptions of spatial relationships, and a particular concern in many places about 'their' territory's prosperity and degree of social justice. But these preoccupations feature alongside (and are often secondary to) political priorities, where what is being contested is the democratic quality and efficiency of political institutions and processes as well as the right to sovereign nations/peoples to decide for themselves how they are governed. Just as varied is the range of territorial demands that are justified by these arguments, ranging from calls for independence from the state to action by higher levels of government (the state and (to a lesser extent) the EU) as a means of addressing perceptions of unfairness and injustice that are conceived primarily in political and socio-economic terms.

We have not here investigated the factors underpinning these highly varied territorial narratives that reflect different territorial specificities and priorities; this will be the focus of Task 7.3 (with the findings to be reported in Deliverable 7.3). There are, nevertheless, two key findings that we believe to be especially significant in terms of understanding how regionalist actors have experienced territorial disparities, and the consequences of this for their attempts to make the case for a different (and fairer, or more just) set of territorial relationships.

On the one hand, as we outline above, regionalist actors have mainly interpreted territorial differentiation through political and (to a lesser extent) socio-economic lenses. Such a finding offers a significantly different perspective on regionalist mobilisation to that found in much of the territorial politics literature, and which has assumed cultural distinctiveness to be a key dimension (and driver) of regionalist grievances in relation to the territorial status quo. It also, however, points to an understanding of territorial relationships that is broader than the socio-economic concerns invoked in policy and practitioner conceptualisations as identified in Deliverables 1.2 (Weckroth and Moioso, 2018a) and 1.4 (Weckroth *et al.*, 2018b). As such, regionalist actors' pursuit of a fairer, more just set of territorial relationships is as much about the pursuit of institutional and/or political arrangements that are more democratic, representative, accountable and efficient, and respectful of the rule of law and of the right of 'nations' or 'peoples' to decide for themselves how they want to be governed and what kind of society they want to live in, as they are about making their territories wealthier and/or more socially just. But it is also significant that, whilst regionalist actors have pursued territorial empowerment to redress a range of (political, socio-economic and (to a lesser extent) cultural) grievances against the territorial status quo, they also (and more often) have sought to justify such a change on the basis of a more positive narrative about a different territorial future, one that is closely aligned with the needs and interests of the regional territory. Our findings thus exemplify the way in which plural understandings of development, justice, well-being and the 'good life' develop and manifest themselves differently in various spatial contexts (Jones *et al.*, 2019: 113). As such, they

suggest an approach to spatial justice that is sensitive to, and anchored in, the experiences of specific actors in specific places of territorial disparities and (in)equalities.

On the other hand, and in relation to the finding in Deliverable 1.4 (Weckroth *et al.*, 2018b)that the territorial level at which territorial inequalities and spatial injustices should be addressed is contested among local/regional/state/EU policy-makers, our findings confirm that regionalist actors take for granted that the territory that they represent is an appropriate one for addressing inequalities and unfairness. As we note above, we find almost no instances of calls to re-centralise policy competencies (either to the central state or to the EU). Moreover, on the few occasions that actors commit to the empowerment of local-level institutions it is dependent on the region being given the power to decide on the internal organisation of the territory in the first place.

The basis on which such an assumption rests can be inferred from the arguments advanced by regionalist actors to justify calls for territorial empowerment. Whilst in practice these arguments are often inter-linked and/or overlap, four distinct lines of reasoning can be identified. Firstly, territorial empowerment is needed because "the territorial status quo does not work". This is reflected in the dissatisfaction articulated across all our cases with extant (state and (to a lesser extent) supranational) political systems. But it is also captured in the frustration evident in many places with specific aspects of these actors' territorial realities, where this concerns *inter alia* the quality of the democratic process and rights to self-determination, the degree to which the region is prosperous and socially just, and/or the extent to which political decisions take into account dimensions of territorial distinctiveness. The latter dimension points to a second basis for regionalist actors' assumption that a fairer, more just society can only be achieved by empowering 'their' territory, namely because "we are different". Such an argument has primarily assumed a socio-economic form, although it also encompasses cultural (and occasionally political and environmental) dimensions in some places. But the basic complaint is the same: our different interests and needs are not recognised or taken into account in the current territorial regime. A third line of argumentation focuses in on one specific manifestation of territorial difference, namely the conviction that "we are a nation" or some version thereof. Many of the regionalist actors examined in this study have rarely expanded on why this matters for decisions about the territorial scale at which inequalities and injustice should be addressed. In recent years, however, the fact of having a distinctive collective identity has been linked with the notion of sovereignty in many places, underpinning claims that "we have the right to decide" on how we are governed and what kind of society we want to live in.

If these arguments make up the regionalist case for empowering their sub-state territories to tackle inequalities and create a fairer, more just society, there is nevertheless significant differentiation (by case, actors, and for both over time) in the nature and scope of territorial change sought. Two important trends nevertheless emerge from our findings. The first relates to the extent of territorial change sought by regionalist actors. Our data point to a general trend whereby these actors have shifted territorial positions over time, pursuing 'moderate' strategies of territorial empowerment during the 2000s focused on working within the extant political system (by modifying it, or securing policy action by higher levels of government), but opting for relatively more 'radical' strategies in the last decade whereby what is sought is some kind of fundamental reform of, or full separation from, the territorial status quo.

At the same time, however, a second finding points to the highly pragmatic nature of regionalist actors, pursuing territorial strategies that reflect both long-term aspirations and short-term realities. In this respect, a key innovation of our coding scheme is its capture of data on territorial demands for action by higher levels of government. The salience of such demands for all the cases considered here does not mean that regionalist actors are satisfied with elements of the status quo; the fact that many pro-independence actors also make such calls for policy (non)intervention gives the lie to such an interpretation. Rather, it points to the strongly strategic orientation of many regionalist actors (and especially political parties) in respect of meeting their territory's needs and advancing its interests in the absence of more fundamental, long-term re-structuring. Our findings thus point to the way in which regionalist actors may seek territorial empowerment in different ways, for different reasons, and at different scales. From such a perspective, the pursuit of fairer, more just territorial relationships may be anchored in a vision of a different future, but it also (often) requires a realistic plan for how to get to such an end point if is to appeal to (and secure the support of) the territory's citizens.

7. References

Primary Sources

Note: Each reference is followed by the document code used to organise the primary material within the qualitative content analysis software MaxQDA.

AGE (2012) *Alternativa Galega de Esquerda (Esquerda Unida – ANOVA). Acordo Programático*. Santiago de Compostela: BNG. Available at: http://www.blogoteca.com/anovacambre/index.php?cod=115936 (accessed 3 February 2019). (GAL_AGE_2012_1_m).

ANOVA (2015) 'Sobre unidade popular, nacionalismo, mareas e outros mundos', resolution approved at National Political Conference, 11 July 2015. Available at: https://www.anova.gal/info/2015/07/11/sobre-unidade-popular-nacionalismo-mareas-e-outros-mundos/ (accessed 25 November 2019). (GAL_ANV_2015_1_ps).

BNG (1993) *Programa Xerais 1993.* Santiago de Compostela: BNG (GAL_BNG_1993_2_m).

BNG (1999) *Galiza Con Voz Própria en Europa. Programa Eleitoral.* Santiago de Compostela: BNG (GAL_BNG_1999_1_m).

BNG (2004) *Eleccións Xerais 2004. Útil Para Galiza, Útil Para Ti*. Santiago de Compostela: BNG (GAL_BNG_2004_1_m).

BNG (2005) *Programa de Goberno Eleccións ao Parlamento de Galiza, Xuño 2005*. Santiago de Compostela: BNG (GAL_BNG_2005_1_m).

BNG (2008) *Contigo, Galiza Decide. Programa Electoral Eleccions Xerais 2008*. Santiago de Compostela: BNG (GAL_BNG_2008_1_m).

BNG (2009) I*mos A Euroea, Ves? Con Galiza, outra idea de Europa, Programa electoral*. Santiago de Compostela: BNG (GAL_BNG_2009_2_m)

BNG (2012) *Programa Electoral Eleccións Galegas 2012*. Santiago de Compostela: BNG (GAL_BNG_2012_1_m).

BNG (2015) *A Forza Do Noso Pobo. Programa Electoral Xerais 2015*. Santiago de Compostela: BNG (GAL_BNG_2015_1_m).

BNG (2016) *Construír Galiza. Con Ilusión. Galiza Contigo*. Santiago de Compostela: BNG (GAL_BNG_2016_1_m).

BP (2009) Editorial. *Party Journal Freies Bayern, Europawahl/2009*, p. 1. (BAV_BP_2009_1_o).

BP (2018) *Volksbegehrenstext*. Available at: http://freiheit-fuer-bayern.de/volksbegehrenstext (accessed 8 April 2020) (BAV_BP_2018_5_lp).

CIU (1993) *Miquel Roca, el nostre candidat. Programa de Govern 1993-1997.* Barcelona: CIU (CAT_CIU_1993_1_m).

CIU (1996) *Eleccions Legislatives 1996.* Barcelona: CIU (CAT_CIU_1996_1_m).

CIU (1999) *Eleccions al Parlament de Catalunya, 1999. Programa electoral.* Barcelona: CIU (CAT_CIU_1999_2_m).

CIU (2011) *Programa electoral de Convergencia i Unio. Elecciones Generales de 20 de Noviembre de 2011.* Barcelona: CIU (CAT_CIU_2011_1_m).

CIU (2015) *Farem posible el teu sí. Democracia i Llibertat.* Barcelona: CIU (CAT_CIU_2015_1_m).

CL (2008) *Creation de Corsica Libera. Motion d'orientation politique*. Available via web archive only at: https://www.corsicalibera.com (accessed 1 February 2018) (COR_CL_2008_1_ps).

CL (2009) *L'alternative.* Available via Web archive only at: https://www.corsicalibera.com (accessed 1 February 2018) (COR_CL_2009_1_pp).

CL (2015) *I Quaterni di l'indipendenza - 10 Idee False*. Available at: https://www.corsicalibera.com/photos/I-Quaterni-di-L-indipendenza-10-idee-false_ga393845.html (accessed 19 February 2020) (CL, 2015_3_o).

CN (1998) *Couper les liens de la dependance*. Available via Web archive only at: http://www.corsica-nazione.com (accessed 19 February 2020) (COR_CN_1998_1_m).

CN (2000) *Synthèses Des Orientations Votées En Assemblée Générale Du 14 Mai 2000.* Available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20010831143125fw_/http://www.corsica-nazione.com/infocornazione.htm (accessed 19 February 2020) (COR_CN_2000_1_ps).

CUP (2015) *Crida Constituent. Programa polític per a les eleccions al Parlament de Catalunya el 27 de Setembre de 2015.* Barcelona: CUP (CAT_CUP_2015_1_m).

CUP (2017) + de 155 propostes pels drets socials, per la República i per l'Assemblea Constituent! Barcelona: CUP (CAT_CUP_2017_1_m).

ENM (2016) *Un País Xusto. Programa 2016*. Santiago de Compostela: ENM (GAL_ENM_2016_1_m).

ERC (1993) *Pels Catalans, per Catalunya, Cap a la Independència.* Barcelona: ERC. Available at: www.esquerra.cat (accessed 1 December 2018). (CAT_ERC_1993_2_m).

ERC (1995) *Força! Cap a la Independència. Eleccions al Parlament de Catalunya 1995.* Barcelona: ERC. Available at: www.esquerra.cat (accessed, 1st December 2018). (CAT_ERC_1995_1_m).

ERC (2017) *La democracia sempre guanya. Eleccions al Parlament 2017.* Barcelona: ERC. Available at: www.esquerra.cat (accessed 1 December 2018). (CAT_ERC_2017_1_m).

FAC (2010) *U nostru prughjettu.* Available via Web archive only at: http://www.femuacorsica.com/U-nostru-prughjettu_r20.html (accessed 12 February 2018) (COR_FAC_2010_1_pp).

FNP (1994) *FNP. Wat oars! Program 1995-1999*. Leeuwarden: FNP (FRI_FNP_1994_1_m)..

FNP (2002) *FNP-program 2003-2007, Foar elkoar*. Leeuwarden: FNP (FRI_FNP_2002_1_m).

FNP (2006) *Foar in sterk Fryslân. Ferkiezingsprogram 2007*. Leeuwarden: FNP. (FRI_FNP_2006_1_m).

JXC (2017) *Puigdemont, el nostre president.* Barcelona: JXC. Available at: www.juntspercatalunya.cat (accessed, 1st December 2018) (CAT_JXC_2017_1_m).

KJ (2016) *Resolution of the Kashubian Unity*. Available at: http://kaszebsko.com/uploads/Dejowi%20%C3%B9chw%C3%B4l%C3%ABnk%20PL.pdf (accessed 17 January 2020) (KAS_KJ_2016_1_ps)

KPZ (2007) *Program resolution of the Kashubian-Pomeranian Association*, Lesôk, 12, 2007, p. 16-17. Available at: http://szemud.pl/wp-content/uploads/import-files/12-206.pdf (accessed 17 January 2020) (KAS_KPZ_2007_1_ps)

LN (1992) *Programma elettorale. Politiche 1992*. Milano: LN. (NIT_LN_1992_m).

LN (1996) Programma elettorale per la Padania. Elezioni politiche del 21 aprile 1996. Available via Web archive only at: http://www.leganord.org/frames/politica.htm (accessed 26 February 2020). (NIT_LN_1996_m).

LN (2008) *La Forza del Nord passa dal tuo voto, ora tocca a te*. Milano: LN. (NIT_LN_2008_o).

LN (2014) *Elezioni Europee 25 maggio 2014. Programma elettorale*. Available at: https://leganord.org/phocadownload/elezioni/europee/Programma%20elettorale%20europee%202014.pdf (accessed 26 February 2020). (NIT_LN_2014_m).

OC (2003) *11-S la festa per la llibertat.* Barcelona: OC. (CAT_OC_2003_2_ps).

OC (2008a) *Junts! Per Catalunya.* Barcelona: OC. Available via Web archive only at: www.omnium.cat (CAT_OC_2008_1_o).

OC (2012) *Declaració de Santa Coloma de Gramenet d'Òmnium Cultural.* Barcelona: OC. Available at: www.omnium.cat (only accessible via Web Archive). (CAT_OC_2012_1_ps).

OC (2014) *Manifesto "Catalans want to vote. Human towers for democracy"*. Barcelona: OC. Available at: www.omnium.cat (only accessible via Web Archive). (CAT_OC_2014_1_ps).

PAC (2015) Pè a CORSICA. Obtained at Facebook public profile @peacorsica (accessed 12 February 2020) (COR_PAC_2015_1_m).

PAC (2017) *Elezzione territoriale | 3 è 10 di dicembre di u 2017. Pè a Corsica.* Obtained at Facebook public profile @peacorsica (accessed 12 February 2020) (COR_PAC_2017_1_m).

PC (1992) *Towards 2000: Plaid Cymru's Programme for Wales in Europe.* Cardiff: PC (WAL_PC_1992_m).

PC (1997) *Plaid Cymru's programme for the New Millennium.* Cardiff: PC (WAL_PC_1997_1_m).

PC (1999) *The Manifesto of Plaid Cymru. The party of Wales.* Cardiff: PC (WAL_PC_1999_1_m).

PC (2009) *On your side. Plaid Cymru European Manifesto 2009.* Cardiff: PC (WAL_PC_2009_m_1).

PC (2010) *Think different, think Plaid.* Cardiff: PC (WAL_PC_2010_m).

PNC (2002) *Priorité législative. Reconnaissance du peuple corse et pouvoir législatif. Arriti*, 25 April 2002 (COR_PNC_2002_2_m).

PSdAz (1994) *Tesi congressuale – Federalismo and Tesi congressuale – Quale sviluppo per la Sardegna del 2000*, XXV Congresso Nazionale, Oristano 5-6 February 1994[9.]. (SAR_PSDAZ_1994_ps).

PSdAz (2006) *XXX Congresso Straordinario Nazionale - La via ed i contenuti della sovranita' "In caminu po s'indipendentzia*" – Contribution to the debate and Congressual thesis. Document inspired to Congressual theses and reelaborated by the party section of Oristano, Arborea, 2-3 December 2006. (SAR_PSDAZ_2006_ps).

PSdAz (2008) *Programma elettorale del Partito Sardo d'Azione*. Oristano: PSdAz. (SAR_PSDAZ_2008_m).

PSdAz (2015) *XXXIII Congresso nazionale - L'unità del sardismo per un progetto di governo della Sardegna*, Arborea, 24-25 ottobre. Available at: http://www.psdaz.net/index.php/articoli-homepage-blog/608-le-tesi-del-xxxiii-congresso-nazionale (accessed 20 December 2019). (SAR_PSDAZ_2015_ps).

PSdAz-SNI (2001) Programma elettorale politicas 2001. (Digitalised document). (SAR_PSDAZ_SNI_2001_m).

RIC (2013) *One year to go… Radical Perspectives* Available at: https://radical.scot/ (accessed 1 December 2019) (SCO_RIC_2013_3_ps).

RIC (2014) *The People's Vow* Available at: https://radical.scot/ (accessed 1 December 2019) (SCO_RIC_2014_4_ps).

---

[9] See note attached: the congress was postponed with respect to the original scheduled date. The reported date in the document is 1994, date of the congress, but the relation was issued in 3.10.1993. They are actually two documents presented in two different moments.

SF (1997a) *Leaflet 1.* Edinburgh: SF (SCO_SF_1997_2_o).

SF (1997b) *Leaflet – Women.* Edinburgh: SF (SCO_SF_1997_3_o).

SNI (2008) *Programma elettorale*. (Digitalised document). (SAR_SNI_2008_1_m).

SNP (1997) *Win the best for Scotland. The SNP general election manifesto.* Available via Web archive only at: www.snp.org.uk (accessed 1 December 2019) (SCO_SNP_1997_1_m).

SNP (2004) *Vote for Scotland.* Available via Web archive only at: www.snp.org (accessed 1 December 2019). (SCO_SNP_2004_1_m).

SNP (2011) *Re-elect*. Available via Web archive only at: www.snp.org (accessed 1 December 2019). (SCO_SNP_2011_1_m).

SNP - Scottish government (2014) *More powers for the Scottish Parliament*. Edinburgh: Scottish Government. Available at: https://www2.gov.scot/Topics/constitution/more-powers (accessed 1 December 2019). (SCO_SNP_2014_1_pp).

SNP (2015) *SNP Manifesto 2015*. Available via Web archive only at: www.snp.org (accessed 1 December 2019). (SCO_SNP_2015_1_m).

SNP (2018) *Our vision*. Available at: www.snp.org (accessed 1 December 2019). (SCO_SNP_2018_1_pp)

SUMATE (2017) *Tu salud está en riesgo. ¿Por qué?* Barcelona: SUMATE. Available at: www.sumate.cat (accessed, 1st December 2018). (CAT_SUMATE_2017_2_o).

YC (2017) *Independence in Your Pocket.* Cardiff: Yes Cymru. (WAL_YC_2017_1_ps)

UPC (1997*) Autunumia! Contre le système clans/État jacobin. Arriti,* 1558, 9 February 1997 (COR_UPC_1997_1_m).

UV (1994) *Programma della lista FEDERALISMO.* (AOS_UV_1994_2_m).

UV (2003) *UNION VALDÔTAINE - Élections du Conseil de la Vallée 2003 - Programme Electoral*. (AOS_UV_2003_m).

UV (2013) *Élections Regionales 2013 – Notre Programme*. (AOS_UV_2013_2).

Secondary sources

Alonso, S. (2012) *Challenging the State: Devolution and the Battle for Partisan Credibility: A Comparison of Belgium, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Alonso, S., Gómez, B. and Cabeza, L. (2013) 'Measuring centre–periphery preferences: The regional manifestos project', *Regional & Federal Studies*, 23:2, 189–211.

Alonso, S., Gómez, B. and Cabeza, L. (2017) 'Disentangling peripheral parties' issue packages in subnational elections', *Comparative European Politics*, 15: 2, 240-263.

Basile, L. (2015) 'A dwarf among giants? Party competition between ethno-regionalist and state-wide parties on the territorial dimension: The case of Italy (1963–2013)', *Party Politics*, 21: 6, 887-899.

Basile, L. (2019) *The Party Politics of Decentralization: The Territorial Dimension in Italian Party Agendas*. London: Palgrave.

Basta, K. (2018) 'The social constriction of transformative politics events', *Comparative Political Studies*, 51: 10, 1243-1278.

Béland, D. and Lecours, A. (2010) 'Does nationalism trigger welfare-state disintegration? Social policy and territorial mobilization in Belgium and Canada', *Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy*, 28:3, 420–434.

Béland, D. and Lecours, A. (2019) 'Nationalism and the politics of austerity: Comparing Catalonia, Scotland and Québec. *National identities* (available online: 10.1080/14608944.2019.1660312).

Benford, R.D. (2013) 'Master frame', in Snow D.A., della Porta, D., Klandermans, B. and McAdam, D. (eds), The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements. London: Blackwell Publishing.

Benford, R.D. and Snow, D.A. (2000) 'Framing processes and social movements: An overview and assessment', *Annual Review of Sociology,* 26, 611-639.

Brown Swan, C. (2017) *The Art of the Possible: Framing Self-government in Scotland and Flanders*. PhD dissertation. Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh.

Brubakers, R. (1996) *Nationalism Reframed. Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cairney, P., Keating, M. and St.Denny, E. (2018) 'Conceptual framework for empirical research', *Integrated Mechanisms for Addressing Spatial Justice and Territorial Inequalities in Europe (IMAJINE)*. Available at: http://imajine-project.eu/result/project-reports/ (accessed 26 April 2020).

Chong, D. and Druckman, D. (2007) 'Framing theory', *American Review of Political Science*, 10: 3, 103-126.

Coakley, J. (1993) 'Introduction: The ethnic management of territorial conflict', in *Regional Politics and Policy*, 3: 1, 1-22.

Curtice, J. (2013) 'Who supports and opposes independence – and why?' ScotCen Briefing Paper. Available at: http://www.scotcen.org.uk/media/176046/2012-who-supports-and-opposes-independence-and-why.pdf (accessed 19 March 2020).

D'Angelo, P. (2012) 'Studying framing in political communication with an integrative approach', *American Behavioural Scientist*, 56: 3, 353-362.

Dalle Mulle, E. (2016) 'New trends in justifications for national self-determination: Evidence from Scotland and Flanders', *Ethnopolitics*, 15:2, 211–229.

Dalle Mulle, E. (2017) *The Nationalism of the Rich: Discourses and Strategies of Separatist Parties in Catalonia, Flanders, Northern Italy and Scotland*. London: Routledge.

Dalle Mulle, E. and Serrano, I. (2018) 'Between a principled and a consequentialist logic: Theory and practice of secession in Catalonia and Scotland', *Nations and Nationalism*, 25: 2, 630-651.

Dandoy, R. (2010) 'Ethno-regionalist parties in Europe: A typology', *Perspectives on Federalism*, 2: 2, 194-220.

Dardanelli, P. (2019) 'Conceptualizing, measuring and mapping state structures—with an application to Western Europe, 1950–2015', *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, 49: 2, 271–298.

David, C.C. and Baden, C. (2017) 'Frame analysis', in J. Matthes (ed), *The International Encyclopedia of Communication Research Methods*. New York: Wiley, pp. 1–22.

De Vreese, C. H. (2005) 'News framing: Theory and typology', Information Design Journal and Document Design, 13: 1, 51-62.

De Vreese, C.H., Boomgaarden, H.G. and Semetko, H.A. (2011) '(In)direct framing effects: The effects of news media framing on public support for Turkish membership in the European Union', *Communication Research*, 38: 2, 179-2011.

De Winter, L. (1998a) 'The *Volksunie* and the dilemma between policy success and electoral survival in Flanders', in De Winter, L. and Türsan, H. (eds.), *Regionalist Parties in Western Europe*. London: Routledge, pp. 28-50.

De Winter, L. (1998b) 'A comparative analysis of the electoral, office and policy success of ethnoregionalist parties', in De Winter, L. and Türsan, H. (eds.), *Regionalist Parties in Western Europe*. London: Routledge, pp. 204–247.

De Winter, L., Gómez-Reino Cachafeiro, M. and Lynch, P. (2006) *Autonomist Parties in Europe: Identity Politics and the Revival of the Territorial Cleavage*. Barcelona: Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials.

De Winter, L. and Gómez-Reino Cachafeiro, M. (2002) 'European integration and ethnoregionalist parties', *Party Politics*, 8: 4, 483-503.

De Winter, L. and Türsan, H. (eds) (1998) *Regionalist Parties in Western Europe*. London: Routledge.

Dekavalla, M. (2016) 'Framing referendum campaigns: The 2014 Scottish independence referendum in the press', *Media, Culture and Society*, 38: 6, 793–810.

Della Porta, D. and Diani, M,(2006). *Social movements: An introduction*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Della Porta, D., O'Connor, F., Portos, M. and Subirats Ribas, M. (2017) *Social Movements and Referendums from Below: Direct Democracy in the Neoliberal Crisis*. London: Policy Press.

Dowling, A. (2009) 'Autonomistes, Catalanistes and Independentistes: Politics in contemporary Catalonia', *Journal of Iberian Studies*, 22: 3, 185-200.

Elias, A. (2009a) *Minority Nationalist Parties and European Integration: A Comparative Analysis*. London: Routledge.

Elias, A. (2009b) 'From protest to power: Mapping the ideological evolution of Plaid Cymru and the Bloque Nacionalista Galego', *Regional & Federal Studies*, 19: 4/5, 533–58.

Elias, A. (2015) 'Catalan independence and the challenge of credibility: The causes and consequences of Catalan nationalist parties' strategic behaviour', *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, 21: 1, 83-103.

Elias, A. (2019) 'Making the economic case for independence: The Scottish National Party's electoral strategy in post-devolution Scotland', *Regional & Federal Studies*, 29: 1, 1-20.

Elias, A. and Tronconi, F. (eds.) (2011) *From Protest to Power: Autonomist Parties and the Challenges of Representation*. Viena: Braumüller.

Elias, A., Szöcsik, E. and Zuber, C. I. (2015) 'Position, selective emphasis and framing: How parties deal with a second dimension in competition', *Party Politics*, 21: 6, 839–850.

Elias, A. and Mees, L. (2017) 'Between accommodation and secession: Explaining the shifting territorial goals of nationalist parties in the Basque Country and Catalonia', *Revista d'Estudis Autonòmics i Federals*, 25, 129-165.

Elias, A., Szöcsik, E., Siegrist, R., Miggelbrink, J. and Meyer, F. (2018) 'D1.1 Conceptual review of the Scientific Literature', *Integrated Mechanisms for Addressing Spatial Justice and Territorial Inequalities*

in Europe (IMAJINE). Available at: http://imajine-project.eu/result/project-reports/ (accessed 4 April 2020).

Entman, R.M. (1993) 'Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm', *Journal of Communication*, 43: 4, 51–58.

Entman, R.M. (2003) 'Cascading activation: Contesting the White House's frame after 9/11', *Political Communication*, 20: 4, 415-432.

Field, B. and Hamann, K. (2015) 'Framing legislative bills in parliament: Regional-nationalist parties' strategies in Spain's multinational democracy', *Party Politics*, 21: 6, 900–911.

Fitjar, R.D. (2009) *The Rise of Regionalism: Causes of Regional Mobilization in Western Europe*. London: Routledge.

Franco-Guillén, N. (2016) 'Selfishness of the affluent? Stateless nationalist and regionalist parties and immigration', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 42: 8, 1304–1316.

Gamson, W.A. and Modigliani, A. (1989) 'Media discourse and public opinion on nuclear power: A constructionist approach', *American Journal of Sociology*, 95: 1, 1–37.

Giordano, B. (2000) 'Italian regionalism or 'Padanian' nationalism—the political project of the Lega Nord in Italian politics', *Political Geography*, 19: 4, 445-471.

Goffman, E. (1974) *Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience*. Boston: Harvard University Press.

Gómez-Reino Cachafeiro, M. (2006) 'The Bloque Nacionalista Galego: From political outcast to success', in De Winter, L., Gómez-Reino Cachafeiro, M. and Lynch, P. (eds.) *Autonomist Parties in Europe: Identity Politics and the Revival of the Territorial Cleavage*. Barcelona: Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials, pp. 167–196.

Helbling, M. (2014) 'Framing immigration in Western Europe', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 40: 1, 21–41.

Helbling, M., Hoeglinger, D. and Wüest, B. (2010) 'How political parties frame European integration', *European Journal of Political Research*, 49: 4, 495–521.

Hemminga, P. (2006) 'The Fryske Nasjonale Partij: Frisian and federal in the Netherlands', in De Winter, L., Gómez-Reino Cachafeiro, M. and Lynch, P. (eds.) *Autonomist Parties in Europe: Identity Politics and the Revival of the Territorial Cleavage*. Barcelona: Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials, pp. 196-218.

Hepburn, E. (2009a) 'Regionalist party mobilisation on immigration', *West European Politics*, 32: 3, 514–535.

Hepburn, E. (2009b) 'Introduction: Re-conceptualizing sub-state mobilization', *Regional & Federal Studies*, 19: 4–5, 477–499.

Hepburn, E. (2009c) 'Explaining failure: The highs and lows of Sardinian nationalism', *Regional & Federal Studies*, 19: 4-5, 595-618.

Hepburn, E. (2010) *Using Europe: Territorial Party Strategies in a Multi-level System*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Hertog, J.K. and McLeod, D.M. (2001) 'A multi-perspectival approach to framing analysis: A field guide', in S.D. Reese, O.H. Gandy and A.E. Grant (eds.), *Framing Public Life*. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, pp. 139–162.

Hough, D. and Koß, M. (2009) 'A regional(ist) party in denial? The German PDS and its arrival in unified Germany', *Regional & Federal Studies*, 19: 4–5, 579–593.

Van Houten, P. (2007) 'Regionalist challenges to European states: A quantitative assessment', *Ethnopolitics*, 6: 4, 545–568.

Huszka, B. (2014) *Secessionist Movements and Ethnic Conflict: Debate-Framing and Rhetoric in Independence Campaigns*. New York: Routledge.

Jolly, S. (2015) *The European Union and the Rise of Regionalist Parties*. Michigan: University of Michigan Press.

Jones, R., Moisio, S., Weckroth, M., Woods, M., Luukkonen, J., Meyer, F. and Miggelbrink, J. (2019), 'Re-conceptualising territorial cohesion through the prism of spatial justice. Critical perspectives on academic policy and discourses', in Lang, T. and Görmar, F. (eds.), *Regional and Local Development in Times of Polarisation: Re-thinking Spatial Policies in Europe.* London: Springer Nature, pp. 97-120.

Keating, M. (1988) *State and Regional Nationalism: Territorial Politics and the European State*. Michigan: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Lluch, J. (2014) *Visions of Sovereignty. Nationalism and Accommodation in Multinational Democracies*. Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Keating, M. (2001) 'Nations without states. The accommodation of nationalism in the new state order', in Keating, M. and McGarry, J. (eds), *Minority Nationalism and the Changing International Order*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 19-43.

Keating, M. (2006) 'Is there a regional level of government in Europe?', in Le Gales, P. and Lequesne, C. (eds.), *Regions in Europe: The Paradox of Power*. London: Routledge, pp. 23–36.

Krippendorff, K. (2004) *Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its Methodology*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Levine, M. (1990) *The Reconquest of Montreal: Language Policy and Social Change in a Bilingual City*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Lluch, J. (2014) *Visions of Sovereignty: Nationalism and Accommodation in Multinational Democracies*. Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Lynch, P. (2002) *SNP: The History of the Scottish National Party*. Cardiff: Welsh Academic Press.

Máiz, R. (2003) 'Making opportunities: Contemporary evolution of Galician nationalism in Spain (1982-2001)', *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism*, 3: 2, 20–34.

Máiz, R. and Ares, C. (2018) 'The shifting framing strategies and policy positions of the Bloque Nacionalista Galego', *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, 24: 2, 181–200.

Massetti, E. (2009) 'Explaining regionalist party positioning in a multi-dimensional ideological space: A framework for analysis', *Regional & Federal Studies*, 19: 4, 501-531.

Massetti, E. and Schakel, A.H. (2013) 'Ideology matters: Why decentralisation has a differentiated effect on regionalist parties' fortunes in Western democracies', *European Journal of Political Research*, 52: 6, 797–821.

Massetti, E. and Schakel, A.H. (2015) 'From class to region: How regionalist parties link (and subsume) left-right into centre-periphery politics', *Party Politics*, 21: 6, 866–886.

Massetti, E. and Schakel, A.H. (2016) 'Between autonomy and secession: Decentralization and regionalist party ideological radicalism', *Party Politics*, 22: 1, 59–79.

Matthes, J. (2009) 'What's in a frame? A content analysis of media framing studies in the world's leading communication journals, 1990-2005', *Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly*, 86: 2, 349–367.

Matthes, J. and Kohring, M. (2008) 'The content analysis of media frames: Toward improving reliability and validity', *Journal of Communication*, 58: 2, 258–279.

Mazzoleni, O. (2016) 'A regionalist league in Southern Switzerland', in: De Winter, L. and Türsan, H. (eds.), *Regionalist Parties in Western Europe*. London: Routledge, pp. 164–180.

Mazzoleni, O. and Mueller, S. (2016) 'Introduction: Explaining the policy success of regionalist parties in Western Europe', in: *Regionalist Parties in Western Europe. Dimensions of Success*. London: Routledge, pp. 501-31.

Mazzoleni, O. and Mueller, S. (2017) 'Cross-border integration through contestation? Political parties and media in the Swiss–Italian borderland', *Journal of Borderlands Studies*, 32: 2, 173–192.

McEwen, N. (2002) 'State welfare nationalism: The territorial impact of welfare state development in Scotland', *Regional & Federal Studies*, 12: 1, 66–90.

McRoberts, K. (1988) Quebec: Social Change and Political Crisis. Unknown: McClelland and Stewart.

McRoberts, K. (2001) *Catalonia: Nation Building Without a State*. Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford University Press.

Mees, L. (2003) *Nationalism, Violence and Democracy: The Basque Clash of Identities*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Mees, L. (2015) 'Nationalist politics at the crossroads: The Basque Nationalist Party and the challenge of sovereignty (1998–2014)', *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, 21: 1, 44–62.

Müller-Rommel, F. (1998) 'Ethno-regionalist parties in Western Europe: Theoretical considerations and framework for analysis', in: De Winter, L. and Türsan, H. (eds.), *Regionalist Parties in Western Europe*. London: Routledge.

Muñoz, J. and Tormos, R. (2014) 'Economic expectations and support for secession in Catalonia: between causality and rationalisation', *European Political Science Review*, 7: 2, 1-27.

Nairn, T. (2003) *The Break-up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-nationalism*. London: Common Ground Publishing

Pallaver, G. (2006) 'The Südtiroler Volkspartei: From irredentism to autonomy', in De Winter, L., Gómez-Reino Cachafeiro, M. and Lynch, P. (eds.), *Autonomist Parties in Europe: Identity Politics and the Revival of the Territorial Cleavage*. Barcelona: Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials, pp. 31–64.

Parks, J. and Elcock, H. (2000) 'Why do regions demand autonomy?', *Regional & Federal Studies*, 10: 3, 87–106.

Pérez-Nievas, S. (2006) 'The Partido Nacionalista Vasco: Redefining political goals at the turn of the century', in De Winter, L., Gómez-Reino Cachafeiro, M. and Lynch, P. (eds.), *Autonomist Parties in Europe: Identity Politics and the Revival of the Territorial Cleavage*. Barcelona: Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials, pp. 31–64.

Reese, S.D. (2010) 'Finding frames in a web of culture: The case of the war on terror', in D'Angelo, P. and Kuypers, J. (eds.) *Doing News Framing Analysis*. New York: Routledge, pp. 33–58.

Rokkan, S. and Urwin, D. W. (1983) *Economy, Territory, Identity: Politics of West European Peripheries*. London: Sage.

Rovny, J. (2013) 'Where do radical right parties stand? Position blurring in multidimensional competition', *European Political Science Review*, 5: 1, 1–26.

Scantamburlo, M. and Pallaver, G. (2014) 'The 2013 South Tyrolean election: The end of SVP hegemony', *Regional & Federal Studies*, 24: 4, 493-503.

Schakel, A.H. (2009) 'Explaining policy allocation over governmental tiers by identity and functionality', *Acta Politica*, 44:4, 385–409.

Schreier, M. (2014) 'Qualitative content analysis', in Flick, U. (ed.), *The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Data Analysis*. London: SAGE Publications, pp. 170-183.

Serrano, I. (2013) 'Just a matter of identity? Support for independence in Catalonia', *Regional & Federal Studies*, 23: 5, 523–545.

Snow, D. and Benford, R.D. (1992) 'Master frames and cycles of protest', in Morris, A.D. and Mueller, C.M. (eds), *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, pp. 133–155.

Snyder, L. (1982) *Mini Nationalisms: Autonomy or Independence*. Westport: Greenview Press.

Sorens, J. (2008) 'Regionalists against secession: The political economy of territory in advanced democracies', *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, 14: 3, 325-360.

Statham, P. and Trenz, H.-J. (2012) *The Politicization of Europe: Contesting the Constitution in the Mass Media*. London: Routledge.

Tankard, J.W. (2001) 'An empirical approach to the study of media framing', in Reese, S.D., Gandy, O.H. and Grant, A.E. (eds.), Framing Public Life: Perspectives of Media and Our Understanding of the Social World. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, pp. 95-106.

Türsan, H. (1998) 'Introduction: Ethnoregionalist parties as ethnic entrepreneurs', in De Winter, L. and Türsan, H. (eds.), *Regionalist Parties in Western Europe.* London: Routledge, pp. 1-16.

Urwin, D. (1981) *Western Europe since 1945: A Short Political History*. London: Longman.

Van Gorp, B. (2007) 'The constructionist approach to framing: Bringing culture back in', *Journal of Communication*, 57: 1, 60–78.

Vliegenthart, R. and van Zoonen, L. (2011) 'Power to the frame: Bringing sociology back to frame analysis', *European Journal of Communication*, 26: 2, 101–115.

Weaver, R.K. (2018) 'The nays have it: How rampant blame generating distorts American policy and politics', *Political Science Quarterly*, 133: 2, 259-289.

Weckroth, M. and Moisio, S. (2018a) 'Deliverable 1.2 Review of discourses of territorial inequalities in EU policies literature', *Integrated Mechanisms for Addressing Spatial Justice and Territorial Inequalities in Europe (IMAJINE).* Available at: http://imajine-project.eu/result/project-reports/ (accessed 13 March 2020).

Weckroth, M. and Moisio, S. (2018b) 'Deliverable 1.3 Glossary of some of the key terms/concepts related to IMAJINE', *Integrated Mechanisms for Addressing Spatial Justice and Territorial Inequalities in Europe (IMAJINE).* Available at: http://imajine-project.eu/result/project-reports/ (accessed 13 March 2020).

Weckroth, M., Luukkonen, J. Moisio, S., Meyer, F., Miggelbrink, J., Papadopoulos, A., Fratsea, M-L., Mavrommatis, G. (2018a) 'Deliverable 1.1 Conceptual review of the scientific literature', *Integrated Mechanisms for Addressing Spatial Justice and Territorial Inequalities in Europe (IMAJINE)*. Available at: http://imajine-project.eu/result/project-reports/ (accessed 13 March 2020).

Weckroth, M., Moisio, S., Papadopoulos, A., Fratsea, L-M., Jones, R., Woods, M., Goodwin-Hawkins, B., Mayer, F., Miggelbrink, J., Basile, L. and Mahon, M. (2018b) 'Deliverable 1.4 Definitions of territorial cohesion among EU and national and regional policy makers: Interviews', *Integrated Mechanisms for Addressing Spatial Justice and Territorial Inequalities in Europe (IMAJINE)*. Available at: http://imajine-project.eu/result/project-reports/ (accessed 13 March 2020).

Werner, A., Lacewell, O. and Volkens, A. (2015) *Manifesto Coding Instructions (5th revised edition), February 2015*. Available at: https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/information/ documents/handbooks (accessed 17 December 2018).

Wyn Jones, R. (2007) *Rhoi Cymru'n Gyntaf: Syniadaeth Plaid Cymru*. Cardiff: University of Wales Press.

Wyn Jones, R. and Scully, R. (2011) *Wales Says Yes: Devolution and the 2011 Referendum*. Cardiff: University of Wales Press.

Appendix 1 – Overview of Cases and Regionalist Actors

State	Region	Actors: Parties and civil society organisations	Type of actor	WP7 partner
France	Corsica	Corsica Nazione (CN)	Party	AU
		Corsica Nazione Indipendente (CNI)	Party	
		Corsica Libera (CL)	Party	
		Fronte di Liberazione Naziunale Corsu (FLNC)	CSO	
		Accolta Naziunale Corsa, A Chjama Per l'Indipendenza, Corsica Nazione, Corsica Viva, Cuncolta Indipendentista, I Verdi Corsi, Partitu Per l'Indipendenza, Per a Suvranità (VVAA)	Mixed Coalition	
		a Cuncolta Naziunalista (aCN)	Party	
		U Partitu di a Nazione Corsa (PNC)	Party	
		Unione di u Populu Corsu (UPC)	Party	
		Femu a Corsica (FAC)	Party (Party coalition)	
		U Partitu di a Nazione Corsa European Elections (PNC EE)	Party	
		U Partitu di a Nazione Corsa Régions & Peuples Solidaires (PNC RPS)	Party	
		Unione Naziunale (UN)	Party	
		Pè a Corsica (PAC)	Party (Party coalition)	
		Unione per una suluzione pulîtica (UPSP)	Party (Party coalition)	
Germany	Bavaria	Bayernpartei (BP)	Party	TUD
Italy	Aosta Valley	Union Valdôtaine (UV)	Party	UNISI
		Union Valdôtaine Progressiste (UVP)	Party	
		Stella Alpina (SA)	Party	
		Autonomie Liberté Participation Écologie (ALPE)	Party (Party coalition)	
		Mouv'	Party	
	Northern Italy	Lega Nord (LN)	Party	UNISI
	Sardinia	Partito Sardo D'Azione (PSdAz)	Party	UNISI
		Sardigna Natzione Indipendentzia (SNI)	Party	
		indipendèntzia Repùbrica de Sardigna (iRS)	CSO	
Netherlands	Friesland	Fryske Nasjonale Partij (FNP)	Party	RUG
Poland	Kashubia	Kaszëbskò-Pòmòrsczé Zrzeszenié (KPZ)	CSO	IGSO-PAS

State	Region	Actors: Parties and civil society organisations	Type of actor	WP7 partner
		Kaszëbskô Jednota (KJ)	CSO	
Romania	Hungarian Minority/ The Szeklerland	Romániai Magyar Demokrata Szövetség (RMDSZ)	Party	UNIBAS
		Erdélyi Magyar Néppárt (EMNP)	Party	
		Magyar Polgári Párt (MPP)	Party	
		Székely Nemzeti Tanács (SZNT)	CSO	
Spain	Catalonia	Convergència i Unió (CiU)	Party (coalition)	AU
		Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya (CDC)	Party	
		Partit Demòcrata Europeu Català (PDeCAT)	Party	
		Junts x Catalunya (JxC)	Mixed Coalition – electoral list – Party.	
		Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC)	Party	
		Junts pel Sí (JxC)	Electoral List	
		Candidatura d'Unitat Popular (CUP)	Party	
		Assemblea Nacional Catalana (ANC)	CSO	
		Omnium Cultural (OC)	CSO	
		Plataforma pel Dret de Decidir (PDD)	CSO	
		Sumate (SUMATE)	CSO	
		Estatut Jo Sí (EJS)	CSO	
		Diguem No al nou Estatut (DGM)	CSO	
	Galicia	Bloque Nacionalista Galego (BNG)	Party	AU
		ANOVA	Party	
		Alternativa Galega de Esquerda (AGE)	Electoral list	
United Kingdom	Scotland	Scottish National Party (SNP)	Party	AU
		Scottish Independence Convention (SIC)	CSO	
		Scottish Constitutional Convention (SCC)	CSO	
		Scotland Forward (SF)	CSO	
		Yes Scotland (YS)	CSO	
		Radical Independence Campaign (RIC)	CSO	
	Wales	Plaid Cymru (PC)	Party	AU
		Parliament for Wales Campaign (YSG)	CSO	
		Cymru Yfory (CY)	CSO	
		Yes Cymru (YC)	CSO	

Appendix 2 – Coding Scheme: Framing Strategies of Regionalist Actors

[see attachment]

Appendix 3 – Procedure for Ensuring the Reliability of the Coding Scheme

In order to maximise the reliability of the coding process (i.e. the extent to which different coders are consistent in their application of the coding scheme), a systematic procedure was established to assess inter- and intra-coder reliability. There were two stages to this process:

Stage 1 – Inter-coder reliability tests prior to commencement of coding
Stage 2 – Inter- and intra-coder reliability tests after commencement of coding

This appendix describes the procedure for assessing the reliability of coding and summarises how this was implemented in the two stages indicated above.

Description of the coder reliability test

The design of the procedure for evaluating the reliability of coding draws on the theoretical literature on content analysis, as well as the practices of other projects that have undertaken a qualitative content analysis of electoral manifestos such the Comparative Manifestos Project (Werner *et al*. 2015), the Euromanifestos Project (Schmitt *et al*. 2016) and the Regional Manifesto Project (Alonso *et al*. 2011).

The coder reliability test is divided into two parts:

1. The first part of the test checks a coder's ability to identify quasi-sentences correctly. The aim is to test whether coders are able to divide a text into the right number of quasi-sentences. Coders are provided with an Excel file. In this file, the first column lists the natural sentences of the text one after another. Coders are asked to specify how many quasi-sentences each natural sentence contains and insert the number of quasi-sentences they identify into the next column.

2. In the second part of the test, we check how well coders apply the coding scheme to quasi-sentences. Coders receive a MaxQDA project that contains the coding scheme and the same text used for the first part of the test. This time the text is already split up into quasi-sentences so that every line in the MaxQDA project represents one quasi-sentence. Coders are asked to code the quasi-sentences using the coding scheme's code categories.

In both tests, the segmentation and the coding of the text by the coders are compared with a 'golden standard' text that has been segmented and coded by the core team.

In both tests, we compared the segmentation (test 1) and coding (test 2) of the two texts and calculated Cohen's kappa. Following Neuendorf (2002: 143, citing Banerjee et al. (1999) and Landis and Koch (1977)), Cohen's kappa can be interpreted in the following way:

>0.75 represents an excellent agreement beyond chance,
0.4-0.75 represents a fair to good agreement beyond chance,
<0.40 represents a poor agreement beyond chance.

- Coders performed satisfactorily in the test if they reach a kappa of at least 0.4.

Evaluating inter- and intra-coder reliability

As noted above, the reliability of coding was assessed in two stages:

Stage 1 – Inter-coder reliability tests prior to commencement of coding

An inter-coder reliability test served as an entry-test for each coder. In other words, each person wanting to code documents in our project was required to pass the inter-coder reliability test before proceeding. The entry test served to ensure that coders 1) are able to correctly split documents into quasi-sentences and 2) that they assign the right codes to the quasi-sentences.

Coders were trained until they reached a kappa of at least 0.4 in the two tests. Coders participated in at least three tests, each one based on a different text. The latter covered different regions included in the project, and featured a range of territorial demands and frames. Before coding each text, coders received some background knowledge on the regionalist actor who published the text and the broader context to it. In addition, some texts were translated into English by the core team. Where coders failed to reach the required thresholds of inter-coder agreement, members of the core team discussed the areas of disagreement with the coders.

The following texts were included in this first stage of the process:

ICR tests carried out by all coders (coded in sequence):
- Regional election manifesto of PC, 1999 (Wales, UK)
- General election manifesto of PC, 1997 (Wales, UK)
- General election manifesto of EMNP, 2012 (Hungarians, RO)

Additional ICR tests carried out by some coders who failed to meet required thresholds:
- Regional election manifesto of SNP, 2011 (Scotland, UK)
- Programmatic document of KJ, 2016 (Kashubia, Poland)

Out of a total of 13 coders involved in the project, 11 successfully passed the inter-coder reliability test and were able to proceed to code documents for their specific cases. In the remaining two cases, coders failed four successive tests, after which an alternative procedure for coding the relevant documents was agreed. These were translated into English and coded by a member of the core project team. Ambiguous meanings in the texts, as well as the final coding, were agreed with the case-study experts; the latter undertook to analyse the coding data as the basis for the report on that case.

Stage 2 – Inter- and intra-coder reliability tests after commencement of coding

Once the inter-coder reliability threshold for both tests had been achieved in stage 1, the reliability of coding was monitored on an on-going basis in two ways:

i) Monthly coding webinars (total of 7) provided an opportunity for each coder to present coding queries and/or doubts arising from their specific cases, for general discussion by all coders working on the project. All queries and agreed solutions were documented in a shared-access spreadsheet and served as a reference point for all coders.

ii) For each case study, inter- and intra-coder reliability tests were undertaken on an on-going basis throughout the coding process, with areas of disagreement were reviewed and (if necessary) codings revised. This entailed two different coders coding the same document (1 political party and one civil

society organisation per case), and a single coder re-coding their own documents (random sample of 20% of the documents per case), with the aim in both instances of checking the consistency and reliability of coding. Where the results indicated insufficient or low reliability of coding (between two different coders, or in relation to one coder's coding across different documents/actors), areas of inconsistency were reviewed and (if necessary) codings revised. All coders were required to document the results of inter and intra-coder reliability tests, as well as any changes implemented as a result.

References

Alonso, S., Volkens, A., Cabeza, L. and Gómez, B. (2011). *Regional Manifestos: Coding Manual*. Available at http://www.regionalmanifestosproject.com/ingles/download-dataset (accessed 17 December 2018).

Banerjee, M., Capozzoli, M., McSweeney, L. and Sinha, D. (1999) 'Beyond kappa: A review of interrater agreement measures', *Canadian Journal of Statistics*, 27: 1, 3-23.

Landis, J.R. and Koch, G.G. (1977) 'The measurement of observer agreement for categorical data', *Biometrics*, 33: 1, 159-174.

Neuendorf, K.A. (2002) *The Content Analysis Guidebook*. London: Sage.

Schmitt, H., Braun, D., Popa, S.A., Mikhaylov, S. and Dwinger, F. (2016) *European Parliament Election Study 1979-2014, Euromanifesto Study.* GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA5102, Data file Version 2.0.0. Available at: https://dbk.gesis.org/dbksearch/sdesc2.asp?no=5102&db=e&doi=10.4232/1.12830 (accessed 17 December 2018).

Werner, A., Lacewell, O. and Volkens, A. (2015) *Manifesto Coding Instructions (5th revised edition), February 2015*. Available at: https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/information/ documents/handbooks (accessed 17 December 2018).