

Integrative Mechanisms for Addressing Spatial Justice and Territorial Inequalities in Europe

D7.1 Conceptual Framework and Contextualisation Case Study Report

Version 1

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

AU	Aberystwyth University
IfL	Leibniz-Institut für Länderkund
IGSO PAS	Institute of Geography and Spatial Organization, Polish Academy of Sciences
RUG	Rijksuniversiteit Groningen
TUD	Technische Universität Dresden
UNIBAS	Universität Basel
UNISI	Università degli Studi di Siena
WP	Work Package

For acronyms of regionalist movements included in WP7, see **Table 2** below.

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1. Introduction

Across Europe, political actors claiming to represent historically, culturally, linguistically and/or economically distinct groups within the state's territory are increasingly seeking to challenge the stability and integrity of existing territorial structures of governance. Such actors have become enduring and influential players in regional (and in some cases) state-level political arenas, and in many cases have been successful in achieving demands for greater self-government for their sub-state territories (Hepburn, 2009; Mazzoleni and Mueller, 2017). A key feature of such political mobilisation is the pursuit of some form of 'sub-state territorial empowerment', in the name of a specific territorial group within the state's boundaries - be it referred to as a region, nation or people - which has a distinctive territorial identity (e.g. based on ethnicity, language, culture, traditions) and interests (economic, cultural, political, social and/or symbolic in nature) (De Winter, 1998; Hepburn, 2009).

This work packages examines the link between these actors' demand for territorial empowerment, and perceptions of inequalities and injustice in sub-state territories. In so doing, it aims to understand the extent to which regionalist movements are able to propose their own solutions for achieving territorial, economic and social justice. After briefly considering some terminological and conceptual challenges associated with the study of regionalist movements in section 2, section 3 provides a critical review of the scholarly literature on regionalist movements. Whilst this work broadly accepts that regionalist movements are rooted in the centre-periphery cleavage, and that inequalities between centres and peripheries are key drivers of regionalist mobilisation, there has been little consideration of whether and how regionalist actors justify their demands for territorial re-structuring in these terms.

This project aims to contribute such insights, through undertaking a comparative framing analysis of regionalist movements in 12 European regions. Section 4 outlines the rationale for selecting these regions, and identifies the most relevant regionalist parties and civil society organisations to be studied in each context.

2. Conceptualising Regionalist Movements

As noted in the Introduction, a defining feature of territorial mobilisation below, and against, the state is the shared goal of territorial empowerment, whereby what is demanded is some form of territorial re-organisation of the state's political authority. Beyond this core definition, however, scholars have disagreed over who the key political actors are, how they should be labelled, and how to conceptualise the territorial goals that they pursue.

As an illustration of these difficulties, De Winter *et al.* (2006) argued for the use of 'autonomist' as a descriptor of the political actors involved in sub-state territorial mobilization. They did so on the basis that it provided a more generic and objective label than others hitherto employed by scholars of territorial politics. For example, early studies of sub-state territorial mobilisation used terminology such as 'ethnic', 'ethno-nationalist' or 'ethno-regionalist' parties (Rudolph and Thompson, 1985; Newman, 1997; De Winter and Türsan, 1998; Gordin, 2001). Such labels are problematic because they do not accurately reflect the political discourse of many sub-state territorial actors which is explicitly conceived in 'civic' (as opposed to 'ethnic') terms, and excludes consideration of actors whose claims to territorial distinctiveness may be based on non-identity based interests (Hepburn,

2009: 481-2). Similarly, work that has referred to these political actors as 'peripheral' or 'minority' nationalists (Gourevitch, 1979; Lynch, 1996; Elias, 2008) has been criticised because the political actors concerned are not necessarily a minor political/electoral force in the territories in which they operate (Hepburn, 2009: 482). Such labels also imply a negative value judgement on the nature of these actors, as somehow being less important.

The 'autonomist' label acquired broad usage in scholarly and political circles, including in the Horizon2020 'Societal Challenges' programme of work within which this research is located. However, it is problematic in several respects. Firstly, 'autonomy' is one particular type of self-government demand that sub-state territorial actors can articulate. Rokkan and Urwin (1983), for example, offer a typology of self-government demands ranging from independence, confederalism, federalism, regional autonomy and peripheral protest, to a concern with peripheral identity-building. Similarly, De Winter and Türsan (1998) divide territorial claims into categories that include independentist, national-federalist, autonomist, and protectionist.¹ According to such classifications, the designation 'autonomist' refers to a particular sub-set of territorial actors to the exclusion of others whose goals are more or less radical. Using the same label to refer to a broader family of parties thus risks confusion over exactly who and what is being referred to.

Secondly, it has been argued that many regional branches of state-wide parties, such as the Quebec Liberal Party and the Scottish Labour Party, could also be described as 'autonomist' in so far as they have incorporated such a territorial goal into their broader political programme (Sorens, 2008; Hepburn, 2009: 482). Such a trend has been widely documented amongst state-wide parties that face strong political and electoral competition from political actors in specific parts of the state's territory who articulate demands for territorial re-structuring in the name of a distinctive regional/national community (Alonso, 2012; Toubeau and Massetti, 2013). The label 'autonomist party' thus risks failing to distinguish between these two distinctive party types.

For these reasons, this work will adopt the label '**regionalist**' to refer to political actors that mobilise below and against the state, in order to demand more self-government for 'their' territory (Massetti and Schakel, 2013: 801), and in the name of a sub-state territorial community that is considered to be distinctive in some way. We also focus on **regionalist movements**, composed of both political parties and civil society organisations. By taking both types of actor into account, the project is innovative because the territorial politics literature has focused almost exclusively on regionalist parties. With a few recent exceptions (e.g. Cramer, 2014, 2015; Della Porta *et al.*, 2017) regionalist civil society mobilisation has been given very little attention, and this has been limited to individual case studies where this has been a particularly strong feature of territorial conflict (see, for example, De Winter and Türsan, 1998).

We conceptualise these key players in regionalist movements as follows:

- **Regionalist parties** have, as their core mission, that of **sub-state territorial empowerment**, as defined above. They are also understood to be self-contained political organisations that have taken the decision to contest elections, although they only field candidates in a particular territory (region) of the state (Elias and Tronconi, 2011: 5; Massetti and Schakel, 2016: 62). This territorial limitation to their electoral activity is a consequence of their primary objective of defending only the identities

¹ Similar typologies are provided by Massetti and Schakel (2016) and Szöcsik and Zuber (2015).

and interests of their region. It serves to distinguish regionalist parties from other regional political parties such as regional branches of state-wide parties, and parties whose electoral support is territorially concentrated (e.g. because they are new) but whose political/electoral ambitions are state-wide (Masseti, 2009: 503-504).²

- **Regionalist civil society organisations** are understood as organisations with a certain degree of formal structure that **pursue the goal of territorial empowerment through non-electoral forms of action**. These may be of a permanent or temporary existence and take a variety of forms, for example, campaign organisations, advocacy groups and associations. Regionalist civil society organisations may include regionalist parties, but they may also include individuals, organisations and/or groups whose core ideological goal is not primarily territorial empowerment but who - in a given context and at a given point in time - mobilise around this territorial demand.³ Regionalist civil society organisations may thus encompass a range of political actors from diverse ideological backgrounds who coalesce around a common territorial goal.

3. Regionalist Movements, Territorial Inequalities and Demands for Territorial Empowerment

Notions of inequity and injustice are central to explanations of regionalist movements' mobilisation, since territorial grievances are usually based on perceptions that the region or nation is somehow losing out from the existing political union (Sorens, 2008: 310). In their seminal study of the origins and evolution of territorial politics in Western Europe, Rokkan and Urwin (1983) attributed these territorial grievances to differences between the centres and peripheries of states, observable along three dimensions: culture, economics and politics. Territorial challenges to the state are thus a response from the periphery to shifting economic, cultural and political circumstances that can alter regionalist movements' calculations about whether they win or lose from particular constitutional arrangements (Keating, 1998). At stake in these centre-periphery conflicts is the protection and preservation of the group's cultural distinctiveness and identity, the formal political status of the peripheral territory inside the state, and the way in which power of revenue and expenditure should

² It is worth providing examples here to illustrate the key difference between *regionalist* political parties (the focus of this project) and other political parties that may be present in regional political arenas. Firstly, regional branches of state-wide parties are a part of larger political organisations that are present and contest elections across all (or most) of a state's territory (Fabre and Swenden, 2013: 343). In the United Kingdom, for example, the three main state-wide political parties - Labour, the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats - are represented in Scotland and Wales by specific 'Scottish' and 'Welsh' party organisations; whilst these regional branches have different degrees of organisational and strategic autonomy from the central state-wide party organisation, they remain formally a part of the latter (Fabre, 2011). With regard to the second type of regional party noted here, Ciudadanos in Spain is an example of a political party which, when it was initially created in the early 2000s, limited its electoral campaigning to a particular sub-state territory, namely Catalonia. Ideologically, however, Ciudadanos defended the unity of the Spanish state and since the 2010s the party has sought (and managed) to mobilise electoral support beyond Catalonia and across Spain (Teruel and Barrio, 2016).

³ On the inclusion of political parties within this definition, Diani (1992: 15) notes (with regard to social movements) that a "political party may feel itself as part of a movement and be recognised as such both by other actors in the movement and by the general public". What differentiates regionalist civil society organisations is thus their choice of non-electoral forms of action, which political parties may participate in alongside their contestation of elections. An example of such a broad-based civil society organisation is that of 'Yes Scotland', established in 2012 to represent political parties, organisations and individuals in favour of Scottish independence (Thiec, 2015).

be distributed between the central state and peripheral administrations (Alonso, 2012: 25). With regard to the latter economic dimension, several scholars have understood regionalist mobilisation to be a response to under-developed economic peripheries (Rokkan and Urwin, 1983; Hechter, 1975). Subsequent work, however, has also drawn attention to regionalist mobilisation in economically better-off peripheries, giving rise to a 'bourgeois regionalism' (Harvie, 1994; Massetti and Schakel, 2015) or a 'nationalism of the rich' (Dalle Mulle, 2017).

A growing literature on regionalist parties has confirmed the importance of cultural, political and economic dimensions to regionalist mobilisation in Europe over time. For example, several studies of these actors' (re-)emergence and electoral performance have emphasised the link between territorial contestation and structural characteristics of the periphery. A particular emphasis has been given to uneven economic development and cultural markers of identity, although studies have disagreed on the relative importance of these different factors (e.g. De Winter and Türsan, 1998; Gordin, 2001; Fearon and Van Houten, 2002; Tronconi, 2005; Sorens, 2008; Massetti and Schakel, 2015; Dalle Mulle, 2017). Moreover, changes in socio-economic and cultural conditions have underpinned the re-configuration and re-emergence of territorial conflict in many plurinational states over time (Keating, 1988). Most recently, for example, scholars have argued that the financial crisis has fundamentally changed the economic context within which regionalist parties operate, with some regionalist parties changing their territorial demands (e.g. from demanding greater political autonomy to secession) to reflect this new socio-economic reality (Elias and Mees, 2017).

Other work has emphasised the political contexts of regionalist parties' mobilisation. For example, scholars have noted the impact of institutional structures and dynamics of party competition on these actors' electoral performance and strategies (De Winter *et al.*, 2006; Brancati, 2008; Elias and Tronconi, 2011b; Boschler and Szöcsik, 2013a; Boschler and Szöcsik, 2013b; Elias and Mees, 2017; Massetti and Schakel, 2017; Elias, 2018). Crucially, such factors have been found to shape the kind of territorial demands that regionalist parties make, and the types of 'issue packages' (Alonso *et al.*, 2015) that they propose to voters. A different strand of literature that has examined regionalist parties' positions on European integration finds that these parties' growing support for the European Union (EU) during the 1990s and 2000s was based on the perceived economic, political and cultural opportunities for sub-state territorial entities at the supranational level (Keating, 2004; Elias, 2008; Hepburn, 2010; Jolly, 2015; Cetrà and Liñeira, 2018).

To summarise, economic, political and cultural dimensions of centre-periphery relationships are important for understanding regionalist mobilisation in plurinational states. A recurrent theme in much of this literature, however, is that regionalist movements are key "entrepreneurs" in mobilising territorial differences in political debate (Türsan, 1998: 6). In other words, whilst economic, political and cultural centre-periphery disparities inform and constrain regionalist mobilisation, they are not in themselves enough to explain the specific dynamics of territorial politics in plurinational states. Rather, since "territory is always contested, always being redefined and reframed in politics, society and economics" (Keating, 1998: 9), regionalist actors play a key role in making sense of structural inequalities between centres and peripheries, and translating these into arguments for territorial restructuring.

And yet, scholars of territorial politics have paid relatively little attention to the specific ways in which regionalist actors behave strategically to advance their territorial agendas (see, for example,

Elias *et al.*, 2015). It is only very recently that contributions have sought to analyse systematically the factors that shape the positioning of regionalist parties (Massetti and Schakel, 2016; Zuber and Szöcsik, 2015), and the justifications that regionalist parties use for their territorial positions (Basile, 2018, Elias, 2018). As a result, whilst it is generally acknowledged that cultural, economic and political inequalities underpin territorial tensions in plurinational states, we still know relatively little about whether and how such differences actually matter to regionalist movements in pursuit of the empowerment of 'their' territory.

This project aims to address this oversight by analysing regionalist movements' strategic choices about how to mobilise electoral support for territorial re-structuring. Specifically, it examines the link between demands for self-government and territorial inequalities rooted in the centre-periphery cleavage. It considers whether, and under what conditions, territorial demands are justified in terms of economic, political and cultural grievances; and whether the way in which territorial demands are justified has implications for the political relevance and/or electoral performance of regionalist movements at different territorial levels. We approach these questions through a consideration of how regionalist movements *frame* their territorial demands. In general terms, framing analyses aim to understand how political actors define a particular problem and present justifications that relate to different positions (Helbling *et al.*, 2010: 497). Preliminary work has confirmed that regionalist parties engage in issue framing as part of their strategic approach to contesting elections and advancing their policy goals (Massetti and Schakel, 2015; Field and Hamann, 2015; Basile, 2018; Elias, 2018). This project builds on and advances this work through undertaking a detailed and systematic empirical exploration of the different ways in which regionalist movements frame their territorial demands in plurinational states. Whilst the next deliverable will outline in detail the framing approach to be adopted, the next section outlines the cases and regionalist movements to be analysed.

4. Selection and Contextualisation of Case Studies

The identification of the relevant cases and actors for our study proceeds in two stages: (1) the selection of regions where regionalist movements have mobilised; and (2) the selection of regionalist parties and civil society organisations for empirical analysis. In this section, we outline the rationale for our case selection at each stage.

(1) Selection of regions where regionalist mobilisation has occurred

From the ten EU countries included in the IMAJINE project, we examine regionalist movements in twelve regions across eight states: Scotland and Wales (UK); Catalonia and Galicia (Spain); Corsica (France); Bavaria (Germany); Aosta Valley, Northern Italy⁴ and Sardinia (Italy); Friesland (Netherlands); Kashubia (Poland); and the Hungarian minority/the Szeklerland (Romania).

These cases are selected because they provide variation across a range of dimensions that the territorial politics literature has identified as being relevant for understanding regionalist mobilisation (see discussion in Section 2 above), and which may therefore have a bearing on

⁴ We use 'Northern Italy' here to refer to the broad geographical area that represents 'Padania', according to the Lega Nord, one of our cases (see **Table 2**) (Giordano, 1999). A Padanian territorial entity has never existed geographically or historically, and in practice the party's electoral appeal has been strongest in the regions of Lombardy, Veneto, Piedmont, Liguria and Emilia-Romagna (Massetti and Schakel, 2013).

regionalist movements' framing of their territorial demands. These dimensions are summarised in **Table 1 1**, and consider i) key features of the state within which the regions are located; ii) economic, cultural and political characteristics of the regions themselves; and iii) the nature of the regionalist movements that have mobilised in each territory.

Firstly, in terms of the key features of the state within which the regions are located, our cases provide variation in terms of the territorial structure of the state. This defines the institutional environment within which regionalist movements operate, and informs what goals they pursue and the strategies they adopt for achieving these (Elias and Tronconi, 2011a: 16-21). Following Basile (2018: 28-34), we distinguish between three models for the territorial organisation of political authority: unitary states (where powers and competencies are not shared across territorial authorities, and political authority is concentrated at the central, national level); decentralised⁵ states (political systems resulting from top-down, reversible processes of decentralization in which the central government has transferred powers and resources to sub-national levels); and federal states (where the division of power between regional/state levels is specified and guaranteed by the constitution, where territorial interests are formally represented at the level of the state, and where a constitutional court adjudicates on the exercise of power between different territorial levels).

Our cases also provide variation in terms of the state's membership of the EU. This is a relevant consideration since, as noted in section 2 above, regionalist actors have often looked to the EU as a framework within which territorial grievances could be addressed. Whilst four of our cases are located in states that were founding members of the EEC (Germany, Italy, France and the Netherlands), for the others, membership of the European club came later. Such variation will allow us to explore whether, and how, the timing and nature of EU accession impacts upon regionalist movements' framing of their territorial goals.

Secondly, our cases vary in terms of the economic, cultural and political characteristics of the regions themselves. The discussion in section 2 emphasised the importance of these dimensions of difference in relation to the centre-periphery cleavage in general. But individual peripheries also vary considerably in terms of the specific configuration of economic, cultural and political circumstances. As **Table 1** indicates, this variation is observable across the different regions, but also between regions located within the same state. Such variation thus allows us to explore the context-specific impact of economic, cultural and political factors on regionalist movements' discursive strategies within and across states.

⁵ Basile (2018: 29-30) breaks this category down further to distinguish between deconcentrated and devolved states. The former constitutes the weakest form of decentralisation, since the central state merely assigns administrative function and responsibilities to peripheral offices across the territory but nevertheless retains central supervision of these delegated functions. In contrast, in devolved states, regions are endowed with exclusive legislative competencies in specific policy areas and these prerogatives may be enshrined in the constitution.

Table 1: Selection of regions where regionalist mobilisation has occurred

			Corsica	Bavaria	Aosta Valley	Northern Italy	Sardinia	Friesland	Kashubia	Hungarian minority / the minority / the Szeklerland	Catalonia	Galicia	Scotland	Wales
(1) Key features of the state within which the regions are located														
EU membership	Date of accession		1958	1958	1958			1958	2004	2007	1986		1973	
Type of political system	Unitary													
	Decentralized		X					X	X	X	X		X	
	Federal			X	X									
(2) Economic, cultural, and political characteristics of the regions themselves														
Economic strength of the region	GDP at current market prices by NUTS2 regions (million of Euros) ¹	2000	4,930	358,740	3,286	257,315	25,296	12,506	10,446	4,943	122,057	33,391	134,573	63,568
		2010	7,916	450,203	4,487	345,569	33,150	17,315	20,470	14,332	203,334	57,028	142,879	62,401
	GDP at current market prices by NUTS2 regions (PPS) per inhabitant) ¹	2000	17,400	27,500	30,000	31,200	16,800	19,600	9,200	5,300	23,000	14,700	20,100	16,600
		2010	22,700	34,600	34,900	35,200	19,800	24,000	15,300	12,600	28,600	21,700	25,400	19,100
(3) Nature of the regionalist movements that have mobilised														

Nature and strength of territorial identity	Language index		2 ²	0	1	0	3	3	N/A	2 ²	3	3	2	2
	Historical sovereignty index		2 ²	2	0	1	1	0	N/A	2 ²	2	0	2	0
	Territorial/institutional congruence		Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No (until 1998); Yes (since 1998)	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Regional authority of region	Regional Authority Index (for region)	1980	12.5	26.0	15.0	10.0	15.0	16.5	n/a	n/a	19.5	19.5 (1981)	2.0	2.0
		1990	12.5	26.0	16.0	12.0	16.0	16.5	3.0	6.0 (1991)	21.5	21.5	2.0	2.0
		2000	12.5	26.0	18.0	14.0	18.0	17.5	8.0	8.0	22.5	22.5	20.5	15.5
		2010	12.5	27.0	19.0	18.0	19.0	17.5	8.0	8.0	23.5	23.5	20.5	15.5
Type/number of actors within the regionalist movement	Regionalist parties		6	1	6	1	2	1	0	3	4	3	1	3
	Regionalist civil society organisations		0	0	0	0	1	0	2	1	4	0	5	5
Type of self government-demands	Autonomist vs. secessionist		Aut. / sec.	Sec.	Aut.	Aut./ sec.	Sec.	Aut.	Aut. ³	Aut./ sec. ³	Aut./sec.	Aut./sec.	Sec.	Sec.

¹ For the Szeklerland the NUTS 2 Region 'Centru' was taken into consideration; for Kashubia NUTS 2 region 'Pomorskie'.

² Data for Corsica and the Szeklerland were not provided by Fitjar (2010); calculated by the authors using the same method.

³ Data for Kashubia and the Szeklerland were not provided by Massetti and Schakel (2016); calculated by the authors using the same method.

We include two indicators of the economic status of the regions under consideration: the Eurostat Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at current market prices by NUTS 2 regions measured in absolute values (in millions of Euros), and in purchasing power standards (PPS) per inhabitant.⁶ The first indicator conveys the absolute economic performance of the regions in our sample. This varies considerable across our cases, ranging from Bavaria, Northern Italy and Catalonia at the high end of the scale; to Corsica, the Aosta valley and the Szeklerland at the lower end. However, the regions considered differ considerably in size and population. The second indicator thus allows for the comparison of economies that differ in absolute size because it expresses the GDP in purchasing power standards (PPS) per inhabitant. It thus eliminates differences in price levels between countries and gives us a better impression of the economic context.⁷ The profile of our cases in this respect changes in important ways. The Aosta Valley emerges as the second most prosperous region, together with Northern Italy, Bavaria and Catalonia. Both Scotland and Corsica are located in the middle of the range of values, whilst Kashubia, the Szeklerland and Wales are the least prosperous regions in our sample.

Variation in cultural distinctiveness is represented by two indicators taken from Fitjar's (2010) work on the causes of regionalist mobilisation in Europe. They aim to measure the nature and strength of a group's territorial identity. Whilst it is difficult to capture the nuance of cultural identity adequately through such quantitative indicators, we employ them here for illustrative purposes. The 'language index'⁸ thus considers the importance and indigenusness minority languages have within states, whilst the 'historical sovereignty index'⁹ considers the quality of historical experiences of autonomy/sovereignty the groups have had in the past. Our cases show variation across both indices. With regard to the former, whilst some regions have an indigenous language spoken by the majority of the population (Sardinia, Friesland, Catalonia and Galicia), others have lower levels of language speakers and/or where the language spoken is that of a neighbouring state. With regard to the latter, whilst several regions have some experience of historical sovereignty, others (such as Friesland and Galicia) have not.

Finally, we use two sets of indicators pertaining to the political nature of the regions to be considered. The first of these relates to the specific degree of formal political authority granted to the regions in our sample. This data is included in addition to that noting the territorial model of government characterising the state, because structures of territorial government may not be symmetrical across all parts of the state, and the scope of territorial autonomy has also shifted over time in many places (Toubeau, 2013). To capture this variation in the timing and degree of territorial re-distribution of authority within and across regions, we draw on data provided by the 'regional authority index' developed by Hooghe *et al.* (2016). Scores are derived from evaluating the authority

⁶ Source: <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database> (accessed 9 November 2018).

⁷ The GDP per inhabitant in PPS is the key variable for determining the eligibility of NUTS 2 regions within the European Union's structural policies.

⁸ The 'language index' consists of three items, with one point awarded for each item: (1) There is an indigenous regional language that is different from the dominant language in the state. (2) The regional language is spoken by at least half the region's population. (3) The language is not the dominant language of any state (Fitjar, 2010: 53-54).

⁹ The 'historical sovereignty index' is based on three criteria. The region is awarded one point for each of the following characteristics: (1) The region has not been part of the current state since its formation. (2) The region was not part of the current state for the entire twentieth century. (3) The region has been an independent state (Fitjar, 2010: 54-55).

that a sub-national government exercises both in its own territory (self-rule) and in the country as a whole (shared-rule) (ibid.:23).¹⁰ Our cases show variation, firstly, in terms of the scope of regional government. Based on the most recent data available (2010), whilst some regions enjoy very high levels of political authority (Bavaria, Catalonia and Galicia) others are much more limited in this respect (Kashubia and the Szeklerland).¹¹ Secondly, there is variation over time, with some regions (Scotland and Wales) having seen significant increases in regional authority since the 1980s whilst others (Bavaria and Corsica) have seen their powers remain largely stable.

We also indicate whether or not the territorial community which regionalist movements claim to represent is congruent with the existing administrative structures of the state. This is an important consideration given that access to such institutional arenas has often opened up a new set of opportunities for regionalist parties to articulate and advance their territorial goals (Elias, 2009; Elias and Tronconi, 2011b). Whilst such congruence exists for the majority of our cases, it does not for two of them and a further two are less straight-forward. As noted above, the Lega Nord's notion of Padania spans several regions in Northern and Central Italy. The historical Szeklerland also spans several counties (*judetes*), which are the main administrative sub-unit of the Romanian state, but its exact boundaries remain open to interpretation and contestation. A third case is more ambiguous: whilst regionalist electoral and political mobilisation in Catalonia has often focused on, and has been most successful within, the Catalan autonomous community, at the same time most of these actors equate Catalonia to the 'Catalan countries' (*països Catalanes*), as territories where the Catalan language (or a variant of it), is spoken. The exact geographical scope of these territories is contested, but usually includes the regions of Catalonia, Valencia and the Balearics. In a fourth case, this relationship has changed over time: the Kashubs are a linguistic group in northwestern Poland. Until 1998, their area of settlement - known as Kashubia - spanned the three provinces (*voivodeships*) of Gdańsk, Bydgoszcz and Słupsk; since territorial reforms in 1998, however, Kashubia is located entirely within the voivodship of Pomerania. Our empirical analysis will explore the implications of such a mismatch for the nature of and justifications for actors' territorial demands in these places.

Thirdly, our cases vary in terms of the nature of the regionalist movements that have mobilised in each place. The composition of the regionalist movement has been shown to matter in some cases, with strong intra-movement competition having contributed to shifts in territorial demands in some places (Elias and Mees, 2017). **Table 1** thus indicates the number of relevant regionalist actors that have mobilised in each case (based on definitions and relevance criteria provided below). Our cases also vary in terms of the type of territorial demands advanced by different actors. Whilst the full range of demands will be explored in more detail in the empirical analysis to be conducted as part of the subsequent tasks for this project, here we limit ourselves to distinguishing whether such demands are radical or moderate. In this respect, we use data compiled by Massetti and Schakel

¹⁰ Each of these dimensions in turn measures specific aspects of the exercise of regional authority. Thus 'self-rule' is evaluated in terms of institutional depth, policy scope, fiscal authority, borrowing authority and representation. 'Shared-rule' evaluates capacity for law-making, executive control, fiscal control, borrowing control and constitutional reform (Hooghe *et al.*, 2016: 24-26).

¹¹ As noted later in this section, in the case of the Lega Nord and the Hungarian minority in the Szeklerland, the territory of concern does not exist as an institutionalized region. The values for the regional authority index for the Hungarian minority hence were taken for the sub-unit 'judetes' (counties), whilst for the Lega Nord they were taken for 'regions with ordinary status'.

(2013)¹² that distinguishes between autonomist (moderate) and secessionist (radical) territorial demands; where both positions are present (either because a party has shifted position over time, or because of different positions adopted by different regionalist actors) this is noted.

(2) Selection of regionalist parties and civil society organisations

As noted at the outset, within the selected regions we focus on regionalist parties and civil society organisations that have mobilised around demands for territorial empowerment. An initial scoping exercise served to identify the full range of regionalist parties and civil society organisations across our cases. On the basis of the data gathered, and as a result of the large number of regionalist actors identified across the 12 regions, the following decisions were taken with regard to the scope of the empirical analysis:

- To limit the time period for analysis to 1990-2018.

- To focus on the most relevant actors for each case. For regionalist parties, we follow Schakel and Massetti (2017) by examining those that (since 1990) have obtained at least 1% of the vote and/or one seat in one state-wide (national) or regional elections. For civil society organisations, establishing such an objective criterion is considerably more difficult since the electoral criterion does not apply, and as the nature of these actors varies extensively across our cases. We thus adopt a more subjective approach, whereby case-study experts select the organisations considered to be the most salient in and relevant to debates about territorial restructuring during the time period under consideration.

On the basis of these decisions, WP7 will consider 29 regionalist parties and 19 civil society organisations. These are listed in **Table 2** below.

Table 2: Selection of regionalist parties and civil society organisations (CSOs)

Region	State	Actors: Parties and civil society organisations	Type of actor	WP7 partner
Corsica	France	Unione di Populu Corsi (UPC)	Party	AU
		Partitu di a Nazione Corsa (PNC)	Party	
		Femu a Corsica (FaC)	Party (Party coalition)	
		Pe a Corsica (PaC)	Party (Party coalition)	
		Corsica Nazione (CN)	Party	
		Corsica Libera (CL)	Party	
		Cunsulta Nazionale di a Corsica (CNC)	CSO	
Bavaria	Germany	Bayernpartei (BP)	Party	IfL/TUD
Aosta Valley	Italy	Union Valdôtaine (UV)	Party	UNISI
		Union Valdôtaine Progressiste (UVP)	Party	
		Fédération Autonomiste (FA)	Party	
		Stella Alpina (SA)	Party	
		Autonomie Liberté Participation Écologie (ALPE)	Party (Party coalition)	

¹² The full dataset is available at http://www.arjanschakel.nl/images/pub_articles/EJPR_2013a_appendix.pdf (accessed 2 December 2018).

		Mouv'	Party	
Northern Italy	Italy	Lega Nord (LN)	Party	UNISI
Sardinia	Italy	Partito Sardo D'Azione (PSdAz)	Party	UNISI
		Sardigna Natzione Indipendentzia (SNI)	Party	
		indipendentzia Repùbrica de Sardigna (iRS)	CSO	
Friesland	Netherlands	Fryske Nasjonale Partij (FNP)	Party	RUG
Kashubia	Poland	Kaszëbskò-Pòmòrsczé Zrzeszenié (KPZ)	CSO	IGSO-PAS
		Kaszëbskô Jednota (KJ)	CSO	
Hungarian Minority/ The Szeklerland	Romania	Romániai Magyar Demokrata Szövetség (RMDSZ)	Party	UNIBAS
		Erdélyi Magyar Néppárt (EMNP)	Party	
		Magyar Polgári Párt (MPP)	Party	
		Székely Nemzeti Tanács (SZNT)	CSO	
Catalonia	Spain	Convergència i Unió (CiU)	Party	AU
		Partido Democrata Europeo Catalan (PDeCAT)	Party	
		Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC)	Party	
		Candidatura d'Unitat Popular (CUP)	Party	
		Assemblea Nacional Catalana (ANC)	CSO	
		Omnium Cultural (OC)	CSO	
		Plataforma pel Dret de Decidir (PdeDD)	CSO	
		Sumate	CSO	
Galicia	Spain	Bloque Nacionalista Galego (BNG)	Party	AU
		Alternative Galega de Esquerda (ANG)	Party	
		En Marea (EnM)	Party	
Scotland	United Kingdom	Scottish National Party (SNP)	Party	AU
		Scottish Independence Convention	CSO	
		Scottish Constitutional Convention	CSO	
		Scotland Forward	CSO	
		Yes Scotland	CSO	
		Radical Independence Campaign	CSO	
Wales	United Kingdom	Plaid Cymru (PC)	Party	AU
		The Parliament for Wales Campaign	CSO	
		Yes for Wales 1997	CSO	
		Cymru Yfory	CSO	
		Yes for Wales 2011	CSO	
		Yes Cymru	CSO	

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