# Integrative Mechanisms for Addressing Spatial Justice and Territorial Inequalities in Europe

## D8.3 Collation of Accessible Textual, Visual and Performance-Based Accounts of Spatial Justice in Europe.

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ii

## Acronyms and Abbreviations

| | |
|---|---|
| AROPE | At Risk of Poverty or Social Exclusion |
| EU | European Union |
| EU-SILC | European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions |
| GDP | Gross Domestic Product |
| OECD | Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development |
| RTE | Radio Telefís Éireann |

# Table of Contents

# 1. Explanation of scenario process (slide deck with voice-over)

Marie Mahon and Matt Finch

http://imajine-project.eu/2020/02/20/what-is-scenario-planning/

## 2. Performance of experiences of spatial injustice

**Video clips:**

1. Regionalist Movements:

    RegionalistMovements_Final_Version2.MP4

2. Access to Services :

    AccesstoServices_Final_Version2.MP4

3. Migration :

    Migration_Final_Version2.MP4

## 3. 1-2 Page Work Package Summaries

### Work Package1 Conceptual Review of the Literature

**Issues of justice and inequality are a pressing political concern in Europe.**

There are different ways to understand "spatial justice" - the linkage of social justice and space. When we think of where people live, what opportunities and resources they have access to in those places, what services, do we see a world that is fair? Do we see a world in which people's opportunities are measurably unequal, depending on the places where they live and work?

How fair and equal are people's access to services such as transport, energy, communications, education, and health care, depending on where they live and work? How do environmental sustainability, wellbeing, quality of life, and political power vary depending on where we are?

How can we talk about space and justice? How could we organize our communities, our regions, our nations in a way which ensures that even our least fortunate regions have the best possible prospects? How do the different jurisdictions and authorities which have power over the spaces where we live and work overlap, clash, reinforce or contradict each other?

How have countless decisions about where we put and do things built up over time to shape inequality and injustice across different spaces? What does it meant to try and bring about justice across and within Europe, when we live in an age of austerity and we have a particular notion of how the economy works?

It matters to think this through because the EU has understandings of space which it applies through policies, planning, practices, etc. It presents economic and social issues in a territorial framework.

Territorial cohesion is a strategic objective of the EU, broadly asking how policymakers can help Europe's territories to connect, cooperate, and build on their diverse strengths in a way which contributes to the balanced and sustainable development of the EU as a whole.  Like spatial justice, it is a term which is hard to pin down, used and understood in different ways by different writers, different organisations, different countries, different regions. Sometimes it's used in a very scholarly way; sometimes a very bureaucratic one; sometimes it's a buzzword. Knowing what you are trying to do with these concepts - whether use them for study, to make policy, as an activist, or some other reason entirely - is really important.  It can be used to justify decentralizing power and making it more regional or local; it can also be part of a more comprehensive integrated approach covering the whole of a given territory.

The EU's commitment to territorial cohesion lets different organisations and bodies within the EU create new ways of cooperating, across borders and across sectors (like health, transport, housing, etc.). It also raises the question of how much power, if any, the EU itself should have when it comes to planning - an issue which was traditionally always domestic and belonged to national governments.  EU enlargement, the 2008 economic crisis, and immigration from outside the EU (especially since 2016) have also affected this conversation about space and justice.

Should policymakers help safeguard services in the least accessible or most disadvantaged regions? How should they address migration, given that a large number of migrants, by moving in Europe, may create inequalities and imbalances depending on the places they settle in and how communities receive them?  Is territorial cohesion about sustainability? Is it about justice and solidarity between different regions and places? Is it about balanced and inclusive development of places? Should territorial cohesion policies help to make regions more competitive, or reduce disparities, or both? Is this kind of thinking just about economic values and growth, or other kinds of value too?

**Review of Discourses of Territorial Inequalities in EU Policies**

The EU's policy of "territorial cohesion" is difficult to define and subject to debate. We looked at how the term "territorial cohesion", and related terms, are used by academic researchers and EU policymakers, with special emphasis on the policymaking aspect.

"Territorial cohesion" is a fluid concept which changes as part of the political debates within Europe about the inequalities between European regions and the "European social model" - a way of life which includes economic growth, high living standards, and good working conditions protected by institutions like the welfare state.

It's so flexible that in a single 2007 speech, EU commissioner Hübner said we should try to have a common understanding of what the term exactly means, but also said that the Green Paper on territorial cohesion which she was launching, was not an attempt to impose a common definition or set of instruments for implementation. More than a decade later, there is still no single, explicit, and commonly shared meaning of the concept.

Territorial cohesion is a concept which is used, among other things, to channel public money in Europe. It is among other things a way of investing, with impact on economic growth,

competitiveness, and our sense of collective identity. It is tied to questions of investment and redistribution in and across Europe's regions.  Our researchers asked: what is territorial cohesion trying to do and why? How are EU funds being used to (re)balance unevenness across the Union's geography? Can the EU's concept of territorial cohesion be used as a strategy to create and define the EU as a single governable space?

We looked at political speeches because they often serve to establish shared values and build agreement with an audience. We saw that the concept of territorial cohesion is flexible - it can be applied at various scales and in various contexts, from landlocked or peripheral territories to cities and their surrounding regions.

Often politicians adapt the concept, in their speeches, to relate to and engage their audience - but as they stretch the concept, they remain connected to two major questions: Territorial disparities in the economic performance of European regions, and accessibility to services within these regions.

There has long been a focus on GDP and economic production at the macro scale, rather than, say, household income or purchasing power. How does GDP differ from one region to the next, and why, and how can we address that?

The other side of the question was how to ensure that people were not disadvantaged by wherever they happen to live or work in the EU. This seems to have been gaining ground at the expense of the other focus in recent years. As we acknowledge the limitations of GDP, we also start to search for more and better indicators.

This conversation goes hand in hand with discussions about how European cohesion involves solidarity between members, as well as economic progress. How does the EU balance solidarity and efficiency, growth and (re)distribution? Is cohesion policy about redistributing funds or stimulating growth - activating potential so that we all move forward together, rather than compensating for the problems of the past?

Also there's a question of whether the cohesion policy can be seen by individuals - highlighting physical results that make an easily observed difference in people's lives, such as broadband connections or physical amenities. Maybe a bicycle path in Bavaria or a swimming pool in Portugal seem trivial impacts? Maybe they are important parts of strategies to promote sustainable living or improve quality of life?

**Definitions of cohesion among policymakers**

The EU is constantly made up through overlapping practices and analyses. Europe's experts and academics, civil servants and officials, consultants and think-tanks, among others, interact and plan and negotiate in the name of European integration - the concept of the EU is a single political space.

In these discussions, questions arise as to the core versus periphery in Europe, the urban versus the rural, and related inequalities. It's important to understand how policymakers articulate the ideas of territorial inequality and social cohesion, because they have political implications.

Among interviews contacted with policymakers across the EU and a number of European national contexts, there was a generally consistent approach to territorial inequality or spatial justice in terms

of striving for "geographically or spatially equal access to certain services or opportunities". This approach was particularly dominant in national contexts, where it might be framed as "maintaining a basic level of accessibility" to a given service or "equivalent living conditions".

Sometimes policymakers add a threshold or limit to this, so that it doesn't become an unlimited notion that geography never matters when it comes to what services you have available to you - however, even where people had a notion of basic or bare minimum service, this had not always been clearly defined. In Germany around the turn of the millennium, for example, there was public and political debate about whether the government was obliged to subsidise equal or equivalent living conditions nationwide. (Despite the debate, the term remains under-defined).

There's also an issue about spatial "justice" - policymakers noted that it can be subjective, and difficult to tackle within a policy framework.

The urban-rural relationship was also a common feature. Perception of rural and peripheral areas, and their representation in the media, was also considered a factor in this divide. Negative representation of areas at the margins can shape public opinion about them.

The stories that we tell about ourselves locally also have an impact: for example, in a Welsh setting that had been predefined as rural and poor, discussions about these concepts tended to reference the concept of poverty above all. "Rural" and "former industrial" areas were even seen as synonyms for poverty and need.

Policymakers tended to frame these issues in terms of "spatially even or equal accessibility to certain services and opportunities" - "people should not be disadvantaged by their place of residence". This is problematic when put into practice. Perspectives and definitions were sensitive to national identities and narratives, and to some extent produced by stories told by the media and by communities about themselves. Differences in GDP between regions were not mentioned.

When it comes to the EU, policymakers perceived EU influence as stronger at regional than federal level - felt through structural funds but also import of ideas and concepts. Regional policymakers tended to have better communication and common agendas with the EU than national level governance entities.

Where cities are often emphasised in EU and national policymaking, they weren't mentioned by interviewees - perhaps because the interviewees were focussed on their own perspective, perhaps because national context is still seen as the most fundamental scale where these questions are brought up. In general, a stronger role for central governance was seen as necessary to address territorial inequality and advancing spatial justice. EU replacement of national funding was seen as a lack of interest at the national level for addressing inequality. One proposed way to integrate bottom-up and top-down approaches was multilevel governance.

The effect of post-2008 austerity on these discussions was largely seen as minimal, but stronger at regional than federal level, and for rural rather than urban regions. Economic crisis was seen to have exposed and intensified vulnerabilities, inequalities, and division within countries. END.

## Work Package 2 Analysis of territorial inequalities in Europe (income)

The Social Policy agreed and established by the European Union (EU) pursues social cohesion through enabling people to take advantage of social change and use it as a tool to improve their quality of life. Reducing inequality is essential for achieving this target. However, the EU embodies vast cultural diversity combined with significant disparities in the living conditions and material resources available for the inhabitants of the different European countries and regions, which makes it a very complex task.

Inequality is growing internationally as well as at EU level.  Countries and regions affected by higher levels of economic inequality also suffer from severe health and social problems, which tend to be concentrated in the lower income households. Interestingly, these issues not only affect the lower end of the income distribution; they bear broader implications for society as a whole in terms of life expectancy, for example. Economic inequality also has a negative impact on other dimensions such as information and transaction costs, which in turn harms political stability, investment or knowledge diffusion (Pervaiz and Chaudhary, 2015). Another troubling aspect of economic inequality is the way it perpetuates itself across generations leaving people less able to escape an impoverished environment.  Inequality can boost economic growth in the short run, with the negative effects out-weighing the positive ones in the long term. In European democracies the reduction of disparities is considered an important engine of social welfare (Alesina et al., 2004; Sachweh, 2012), making the issue of inequality even more difficult to handle from a policy perspective.

Devising and implementing measures oriented to improving living conditions and reduce economic disparities among countries and regions as different as the ones forming the European Union require detailed and timely information on how people live and the resources at hand in each area. In this sense, the lack of comparable data and indicators at a local level remains one of the main difficulties despite the advances in data collection and data access enabled by information technologies.  The distribution of income reveals deprivations of several types that may be preventing individuals from improving their situations and that may come from different sources depending on the regions of Europe in question.

A number of mathematical measures of income inequality exist.  They look at range (differences between maximum and minimum incomes), variance (distance between individual income and the average income), and combinations of variance (including Lorenz curve and Gini coefficient).

Poverty analysis. Poverty analysis is concerned with studying the people at the lower end of the income distribution. It is very common to measure poverty at household level (as opposed to individual level).  In June 2010 the European Council set a target for promoting social inclusion in the EU, namely lowering by 20 million the population at-risk-of-poverty and/or living in severely deprived and/or in 'jobless' households. This target would be assessed by a multidimensional single indicator known as AROPE (rate of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion).  The AROPE indicator considers that an individual is at risk of poverty or social exclusion if he/she meets at least one of the following three criteria:

- Lives in a household with an income (including social transfers) below the poverty line, which is defined as an income that is 60% of the median of the national income's equivalent in consumption units.
- Lives in a household where its members cannot afford at least four of the nine basic consumption needs defined for Europe. The nine basic consumption needs are (1) late payment of rent, mortgage or utility bills of the primary residence over the last 12 months; (2) inability to keep the home adequately heated; (3) inability to take at least a one-week holiday each year; (4) inability to eat meat or protein at least every two days; (5) not having sufficient money for unforeseen expenses; (6) not having a telephone; (7) not having a colour television; (8) not having a washing machine; and (9) not having a car.
- Lives in a household with low work intensity. The intensity of work is defined as the ratio between the number of months actually worked by all the members of the household and the maximum number of months that all people of working age in the household could theoretically work.

The EU's emphasis on 'poverty and social exclusion' reflects a growing acceptance that deprivation is multi-dimensional. This concept of multidimensional poverty contains "a diverse range of characteristics such as limited financial resources, material deprivation, social isolation, exclusion and powerlessness, and physical and psychological illbeing". The concept of multidimensional poverty is supported by Sen's (1985) capability approach where poverty is defined as lacking capabilities such as being able to avoid hunger, escape avoidable morbidity, and take part in community life. This view of poverty is based on the notion of participation in society.

The EU has adopted a multidimensional indicator called the 'at-risk-of-poverty' (AROPE) indicator, which includes income poverty, severe material deprivation, and quasi-joblessness (when less than 20% of the members of the household are employed). Being poor in one dimension implies being at risk of poverty. Under this definition, known as the 'union definition', it is sufficient to be classified in any of these three dimensions to be considered at risk of poverty.

There are large and persistent differences in income inequality within European countries. The differences were very significant in the mid-2000s, presenting a clear divide between Northern and Mediterranean countries.  Although these persistent differences match with worldwide trends, there has been a generalized worsening of economic inequality in the majority of European countries from the 1980s. This increase has been particularly strong in Finland, Norway, Germany, Portugal and Italy, caused mainly by the rise in the relative income of the richest 20% of households which has been twice as large as that of the poorest 20%.  The recent crisis worsened income inequalities and increased unemployment and poverty in many European countries. In the last two decades efforts by governments to redistribute wealth have become less effective.  It is plausible to conclude that the inequality worsened because of the international economic downturn, and it remained high because of the weakened redistributive policies.

The European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) is a comprehensive dataset that allows for cross-sectional and longitudinal analysis between countries and regions of several socio-economic indicators. This data set has been used since 2010 to monitor poverty and social inclusion, and to set cohesion goals under the Europe 2020 Strategy.

The country level remains important for analysing economic inequality. However, there are wide disparities in incomes both within and between regions within countries, and more detailed local-level data is required to identify and address specific problems of a region/locality and find the most appropriate measures and resources to address them.  This implies looking at disparities in ways that pay more attention to specific geographical conditions and contexts.  The implications of neglecting economic disparities risk not only weakening economic growth prospects but may also compromise the social perception of European integration policies: If these are perceived as instruments that reinforce income inequalities, Euroscepticism will gain more and more strength over time, and the probability of conflict scenarios akin to the current one between the UK and the EU will grow. END.

## Work Package 3 Territorial inequalities and economic growth

Disparities in the standard of living between countries or regions within countries are very substantial.  Are these disparities likely to be persistent or just temporary in the course of economic growth? The relevant theoretical and empirical literatures are enormous.  The conclusions are not always straightforward.  Some economic models predict that over time income disparities between economies will reduce as they gain access to better information and technology.  Others predict that convergence will happen where there is investment in education. Yet others have predicted that capital investment will logically be targeted at poorer economies where labour is cheaper, thus raising economic standards.  None of these models have been established as fully accurate.  Higher population densities in poorer economies, barriers to investing in education, and lower savings rates by individuals and households are just some of the factors contributing to a lack of convergence of richer and poorer economies.

Access to technology, and the incentives to include research and development in production that lead to competitive advantage for certain firms is another aspect to understanding economic growth.  This kind of growth is regarded as 'endogenous', or from within the firm as part of their development and growth activities.  The structure and activities of financial markets are linked to this – their efficiency in promoting economic growth through access to investment capital, etc.  This kind of growth is also linked to things like availability and quality of knowledge capital in the form of engineering, scientific and industrial know-how.  An important aspect of theories of endogenous growth is that it accepts the existence of sustained differences in growth rates and levels of national income, and the fact that convergence between countries or regions may not occur.

**Defining convergence**

Economic convergence can be defined in various ways, such as convergence of GDP per capital, structural convergence and so on.  Measuring it depends on things like the characteristics of economies, the time span studied, and models and data used.  It is more likely to observe convergence in regional data. This is because regions within the same country tend to have similar institutions, technologies and preferences.  Significant shocks such as oil crises or agricultural crises have significant impacts on economic convergence particularly when economies are highly reliant on these markets.  In poorer economies, convergence does not happen automatically and requires continuous structural changes in modern services, manufacturing and other tradeables.  Because industrial policies and other measures like currency undervaluation are not easily implemented, poorer economies continue to struggle with issues like persistent high unemployment. Within the

EU, opinions differ on whether it has resulted in positive or negative benefits for poorer countries. Most studies find no evidence of total convergence, but rather support the idea of the existence of 'convergence clubs' of economies; a north, wealthy club and a south less wealthy one.

**Indicators of economic growth**

Most studies examine convergence between countries and/or regions in terms of growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita.  However in recent years an increasing number of authors question its appropriateness for such purposes. GDP measures the total output produced in a given time period (usually a year) in a certain economy.  Because it is essentially a measure of production, increases in GDP per capital denote that on average an expanded set of goods and services is available to the citizens of the economy in question.  It measures market activities but it leaves out a considerable proportion of output that households consume that are not part of market activities (e.g. consuming own farm produce, or certain services like childminding for free by family members). It is a gross indicator, i.e. it does not account for depreciation and depletion of resources involved in production of outputs.  A major drawback of GDP per capita as a welfare indicator is its lack of sensitivity to the distribution of resources.  At the extreme, think of two societies with the same population size and the same level of GDP per capita; in the first society income is equally distributed across all citizens while in the second it accrues to a single individual while the rest of the population members have zero incomes. Even under the simplest additive Social Welfare Function with diminishing utility of income, the first society enjoys a higher level of welfare than the second, but this is not reflected in the ranking implied by GDP per capita.  Naturally, this can have implications for the empirical investigation of convergence if growth is associated with substantial changes in the distribution of income - especially if growth is interpreted as convergence in the living standards of the representative population members of the various countries or regions. Other problems with it relate to how it takes account of the price that people pay for non-traded commodities in their countries, when comparing the welfare levels between countries.  Ideally a measure called Purchasing Power Parity would be applied, i.e. the idea of applying common prices for all commodities, traded and non-traded to assess what the differences then are between countries based on their real purchasing power.  The difference in non-traded and traded commodities is that traded commodities reflect things like transportation costs or border tariffs in their prices.  However, the main concern with GDP remains; that it is not a sufficient indicator of a country's level of economic development; that it does not take into account non-pecuniary dimensions of human welfare; that GDP is a means to an end, but not an end in itself.  GDP is also insensitive to the damage done to the environment in producing outputs.

The search for alternative indicators has therefore grown. Amartya Sen's theory of 'functionings and capabilities (1985) provides one such indicator. According to Sen the aim of economic development is to increase the capabilities of the members of a population to improve and expand their sets of functionings.  Functionings may be either elementary (for example, being adequately nourished) or complex (for example, being able to participate in the life of the community). Income is one of a number of factors that enhances individual capabilities.  It has led to the construction of the United Nations Human Development Index.  The index combines three dimensions of well-being: standard of living (approximated by Gross National Income per capita), health (approximated by life expectancy at birth) and education (approximated by average and expected years of schooling). Criticisms of this approach include the fact that some categories should be weighted differently, that

the set of dimensions of well-being should be expanded, and that values not just be averaged but account taken of their distribution across population members.  Others have endorsed the use of subjective values of well-being and construct 'happiness' indicators  as the ultimate goal of the growth process.  In studies, the Human Development Index is found to be strongly positively linked to GDP per capita.  Happiness is also correlated (but less strongly) with income per capital.  END.

## Work Package 5 Migration and spatial justice

Free mobility of persons is one of the defining pillars of the European Union.  Migration within the EU in particular is a well-established trend.  Migration can be thought about as flows of people – a process that shapes places in terms of how the people in them become exposed to (or perceive the occurrence of) just or unjust experiences (fair or unfair experiences?).  Economic migrants may move internally within countries (internal migration, often rural to urban) or from one country to another (emigration).  The form of migration varies; it might be seasonal or temporary, often to neighbouring countries.  It can be permanent, for example the flows of migrants to the UK from Ireland; more recently of Polish nations to the UK, Ireland and the Netherlands; Romanian nationals to Italy, UK or Spain; Greek migrants to Germany.  The choice of destination country can be linked to historical factors, such as colonial migration, guest worker programmes or individual country restrictions on emigration or immigration.  Migration of asylum seekers and refugees is another major trend.  It is due to a fear of suffering harm due to race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion – i.e. refugees and asylum seekers are fleeing persecution in their country of origin.

Migration can be thought about as a kind of barometer of the (un)attractiveness of places and regions.  In general, people are expected to migrate from regions with low perceived qualities of life (sending areas) to areas that promise better opportunities (receiving areas).  In this way, migration is a reflection of spatial disparities and inequalities.  For the receiving area, migration can bring a number of benefits.  Migration can alleviate pressure on public services in the receiving area through the presence of higher numbers in the population who are paying taxes that go towards provision of these services.  It also benefits the wider population through the increase in population numbers that has the effect of lowering taxes for everyone.

Migration can potentially contribute to territorial inequalities and spatial injustice in the way that it impacts negatively on the economic vitality of both sending and receiving locations.  For example, for sending locations, there is the 'brain drain' of highly educated groups, the 'care drain' where women migrate in significant numbers from rural areas and leave behind a male or age-dependent population.  If migrants are poorly paid in the receiving area, this potentially creates a negative pressure because their contributions are proportionately less.  Low-skilled migrants on the other hand contribute to essential sectors of the economy where labour shortages are a problem.

If local or regional government has the power to collect and distribute taxes, or to manage social welfare systems, with no 'costs' to migration, this could lead to uneven development depending on the motivation for migration, e.g. if it is to secure better welfare payments or benefits such as social housing – high earners may leave, but if they are migrants looking for better paid work this is less problematic). (the issue of welfare migration – fears around it – are felt to be exaggerated).  Migrants whose earnings increase on arrival in a destination country are going to experience a

relative rise in quality of life, meaning they are less likely to be a burden on health or social welfare services.  Their impact on crime rates is regarded as weak.

## Work Package 6 Multi-level policymaking and territorial inequalities

Governments as policymakers share broadly similar policy problems including territorial inequalities but address them in different ways and with varying levels of success.  Ideally, they should learn from and where possible share each other's success (i.e. a process of policy/policymaking learning and transfer).  How do they define and then seek to solve a policy problem? How can we as researchers establish the evidence to track how a policy problem was identified, addressed and then say that policy outcomes were a success in reducing inequalities? How can it then be successfully transferred from one country or region to another?

Part of the challenge lies in the way that different countries and/or regions have different political and policymaking systems – the policy *process* is not comparable from one region to another.  Ways must therefore be devised to support the systematic use of *evidence* in policy transfer; this must be able to take account of the technical and political feasibility of policy solutions for governments wishing to import them.  This work package focuses on how to identify and draw attention to policy success stories, identifying how the case study government defined the policy problem, and worked with actors in other political systems to understand how they would interpret and use the evidence. This is another challenge – how to build stakeholder knowledge into research design as part of revealing how policymakers make sense of inequalities as a policy problem (how they define it). This is particularly because inequalities tend to be ill-defined and 'inequalities policy' is really a collection of policies with direct and indirect effects.  Knowing how policymakers relate solutions to their local context is part of this.

This work package chooses several case study examples – examples identified because their governments have described their own success in relation to them or have developed a reputation for innovation in that regard.  These experiences will be used to inform case studies of policy learning, encourage policy transfer when appropriate, and refine a general model for learning and transfer across the EU.  The policy processes involved will also be used to help produce pragmatic ways to encourage the routine use of evidence in policy transfer.  This involves an overview of theoretical insights on learning and transfer to explain, for example, the limits to government action; the fact that evidence-based policymaking is not practically efficient and not the only factor that policymakers take into account; the fact that policy learning is a political process rather than a new process of knowledge attainment.  Learning is often about winning or negotiating political outcomes rather than improving policy outcomes.

Some governments can import policy ideas without knowing what they did or whether it was successful, or they can import a broad idea and only use part of it to fit local circumstances. How policymakers prioritise information is important here – the psychology of policymaker choice.  Who makes and influences policy, and how much control they have over the policy process – the complexity of the policymaking environment - what is the reality here? What caused policy success, why and under what conditions? What is the evidence that a government was successful in reducing inequalities? What level of detailed evidence is needed to export the initiative to another government/decision-maker?  Is it possible to start the process by identifying governments with comparable political and policymaking systems?

Can the success stories gain wider attention, to facilitate transfer?  This requires considering the following:

- how actors in each system try to define inequalities as policy problems, and which policy tools or instruments they choose as feasible responses
- how 'inequalities policy' has been produced in the past, as a context for present choices
- the link between policy and outcomes, e.g. establishing some cause and effect
- how to describe policy success so that it is relevant to importing countries and contributes to discussions on its feasibility in different policymaking contexts.

The aim is not to recommend specific policy changes but to provide new knowledge and analysis to help inform continuous discussion.

The policy making context is in reality characterised by limited choice, limited attention, limited central control and limited policy change. Limited central control of policy (because it is ultimately spread across many levels and types of government centres and shared by many actors) means that often policy outcomes appear to 'emerge' locally (influenced by local rules and context in which any new measure would be introduced) despite central government attempts to control their fate.

In trying to influence policy, particularly with research evidence, evidence supply is more effective when it is connected to policymaker demand; for example, when policymakers are already consulting on an issue and the evidence is tailored to meet that need.  Researchers also need to avoid competing with each other to provide evidence at multiple points in the process.  Multiple networks between policymakers and influencers also adds complexity.  Challenging established core beliefs that have become dominant, as well as being prepared for policy conditions and events such as economic crises that prompt lurches of attention from one issue to another must also be addressed.  Effective communication between researchers and policymakers is key.  Pragmatic ways to encourage policy learning are essential, which includes understanding the conditions under which policymakers acquire, interpret and apply knowledge in a political environment, the levels of uncertainty they are willing to tolerate, the motivations for seeking it in the first instance, and its intended applications.  It depends on their status, e.g. EU or OECD (who are more powerful and able to innovate), or whether the policy transfer is voluntary or coercive.

This work package outlines 3 broad principles of a policy learning strategy:

1. draw continuously on the insights from policy theory
2. learn from and adapt established learning techniques, such as those outlined by Rose (2005):
   - Learn Rose's language of lesson-drawing, including what 'programme' and 'lesson' mean
   - Catch the attention of policymakers
   - Do some preliminary work to identify where to look for lessons
   - Learn by going abroad
   - Produce a model to describe how and why a programme works
   - Turn the model into a lesson fitting your own national context
   - Decide whether the lesson should be adopted
   - Decide whether the lesson can be applied
   - Simplify the lesson and its application to increase its chance of success
   - Evaluate the success of your lesson-drawing process.

3. Learn how to maximise the impact of research for policy learning.

The challenge is to develop innovative ways to discuss and share new knowledge such as via WP8's participatory scenario planning exercises.

## Work Package 7 Regionalist movements

This work package focuses on the rationale behind regional actors' motivations to seek greater self-government for what we refer to as 'sub-state territories' within states. These sub-state territories usually have a distinctive territorial identity based for example on ethnicity, language, culture, traditions, along with distinctive interests (e.g. economic, cultural, political, social and/or symbolic), and forms the basis of a shared goal of territorial empowerment. What is being demanded is a form of territorial reorganisation of the state's political authority. The work package examines the link between these actors' demand for sub-state territorial empowerment and perceptions of inequalities and injustice in sub-state territories. Through this examination, it sets out to understand the extent to which regionalist movements are able to propose their own solutions for achieving territorial, economic and social justice. This includes examining whether and how regionalist actors justify their demands for territorial restructuring. The WP does this by conducting a comparative analysis of regionalist movements in 12 European regions.

The work package focuses on **Regionalist movements**; these are regarded as being composed of both political parties and civil society organisations. The inclusion of civil society organisations provides wider scope to examine the nature of regionalist civil society mobilisation. Some distinctions between regionalist political parties and regionalist civil society organisations are as follows: Regionalist political parties have, as their core mission, that of sub-state territorial empowerment. They are also understood to be self-contained political organisations that have taken the decision to contest elections, although they only field candidates in a particular territory, or region, of the state. This limited electoral activity arises from their primary objective of defending only the identities and interests of their region. It distinguishes them from other regional political parties with state-wide political and electoral ambitions. Regionalist civil society organisations are understood as organisations with a certain degree of formal structure that pursue the goal of territorial empowerment through non-electoral forms of action. These may be of a permanent or temporary existence and take a variety of forms, for example, campaign organisations, advocacy group and associations. They may include regionalist parties, but they may also include individuals, organisations and/or groups whose core ideological goal is not primarily territorial empowerment but who – in a given context and at a given point in time – mobilise around this common territorial demand or goal.

Perceptions of inequality and injustice are usually central to regional movements' reasons for mobilising against the existing political structure. These are identified along three dimensions – culture, economics and politics. Territorial challenges to the state (that emerge as a form of core-periphery conflict) come most often as a response to changing cultural, economic and political circumstances; for example, protection and preservation of the group's cultural distinctiveness and identity; the formal political status of the peripheral territory within the state; and, how power of revenue and expenditure should be distributed between the central state and peripheral administrations. A further dimension to the regionalist mobilisation dynamic is that regionalist movements act as key 'entrepreneurs' in mobilising territorial differences in political debate; in other words there is more to mobilisation and contestation with the state than just reactions to cultural, political and economic disparities; regionalist actors also play a key role in articulating these issues in strategic ways that translate into arguments for territorial restructuring. A key aim of this work package is to better understand the extent to which these issues actually matter to regionalist movements in pursuit of the empowerment of 'their' territory. It does this by examining the link between demands for self-government and territorial inequalities rooted in the centre-periphery divide; whether, and under what conditions, territorial demands are justified in terms of economic,

13

political and cultural grievances; whether the way in which territorial demands are justified has implications for the political relevance and/or electoral performance of regionalist movements at different territorial levels.  These questions are approached through examining how regionalist movements *frame* their territorial demands.  This means to understand how political actors define a particular problem and present justifications that relate to different positions.  Existing research has established that regionalist parties engage in issue framing as part of their strategic approach to contesting elections and advancing their political goals.  This work package advances this work through undertaking a detailed and systematic empirical exploration of the different ways in which regionalist movements frame their territorial demands in plurinational states.

**Case studies:**

12 regions, across 8 states (from the 10 included in IMAJINE): Scotland and Wales (UK), Catalonia and Galicia (Spain), Corsica (France), Bavaria (Germany), Aosta Valley Northern Italy and Sardinia (Italy), Friesland (Netherlands), Kashubia (Poland), Hungarian minority/the Szeklerland (Romania). These reflect 3 different models for the territorial organisation of political authority: 1. Unitary states (powers and competencies are not shared across territorial authorities, and political authority is concentrated at the central, national level); 2. Decentralised states (political systems resulting from top-down reversible processes of decentralisation in which the central government has transferred powers and resources to sub-national levels); 3. Federal states (where the division of power between regional/state levels is specified and guaranteed by the constitution, where territorial interests are formally represented at the level of the state, and where a constitutional curt adjudicates on the exercise of power between different territorial levels).  The fact that some case studies are in states that were founding EU members, and others joined later is relevant to explorations of whether and how the timing and experience of EU accession has mattered (earlier accession states having a different experience of EU support for territorial grievances).  Other measures to profile the case study territories include type of political system, economic strength of the region, nature and strength of territorial identity (e.g. language/historical sovereignty), regional authority of region (regional authority index), type/number of actors within the regionalist movement, type of self-government demands.

Regionalist parties and civil society organisations are also selected based on the time period 1990-2018 and relevance to the study.

## 4. 1 page IMAJINE Information Sheet

**IMAJINE – Integrated Mechanisms for Addressing Spatial Justice and Territorial Inequalities in Europe**

**The question for IMAJINE is: what is the experience of spatial injustice and how do we identify it?**

Issues of justice and inequality are a pressing political concern in Europe.

There are different ways to understand "spatial justice" - the linkage of social justice and space/place. When we think of where people live, what opportunities and resources they have access to in those places, what services, do we see a world that is fair? Do we see a world in which people's opportunities are measurably unequal, depending on the places where they live and work? What does it meant to try and bring about justice across and within Europe, when we live in an age of austerity and we have a particular notion of how the economy works?

How can we talk about place and justice? How could we organize our communities, our regions, our nations in a way which ensures that even our least fortunate regions have the best possible prospects? How have countless decisions about where we put and do things built up over time to shape inequality and injustice across different places? How do the different jurisdictions and authorities which have power over the places where we live and work overlap, clash, reinforce or contradict each other? How appropriate is it that regionalist movements such as those in the Basque region of Spain, or Scotland would propose their own solutions for achieving territorial, economic and social justice – breaking away from central government in the process?

How fair and equal are people's access to services such as transport, energy, communications, education, and health care, depending on where they live and work? How do environmental sustainability, wellbeing, quality of life, and political power vary depending on where we are?

How can we talk about place and justice when it relates to migration? Migration can be thought about as a kind of barometer of the (un)attractiveness of places and regions. In general, people are expected to migrate from regions with low perceived qualities of life (sending areas) to areas that promise better opportunities (receiving areas). In this way, migration is a reflection of spatial disparities and inequalities. For the receiving area, migration can bring a number of benefits. Migration can alleviate pressure on public services in the receiving area through the presence of higher numbers in the population who are paying taxes that go towards provision of these services. It also benefits the wider population through the increase in population numbers that has the effect of lowering taxes for everyone.

It matters to think this through because the EU has understandings of these issues which it applies through policies, planning, practices, etc. It presents economic and social issues in a territorial framework. Territorial cohesion is a strategic objective of the EU, broadly asking how policymakers can help Europe's territories to connect, cooperate, and build on their diverse strengths in a way which contributes to the balanced and sustainable development of the EU as a whole.

Like spatial justice, it is a term which is hard to pin down, used and understood in different ways by different writers, different organisations, different countries, different regions. Sometimes it's used in a very scholarly way; sometimes a very bureaucratic one; sometimes it's a buzzword. Knowing

what you are trying to do with these concepts - whether use them for study, to make policy, as an activist, or some other reason entirely - is really important.  It can be used to justify decentralizing power and making it more regional or local; it can also be part of a more comprehensive integrated approach covering the whole of a given territory.

The EU's commitment to territorial cohesion lets different organisations and bodies within the EU create new ways of cooperating, across borders and across sectors (like health, etc). It also raises the question of how much power, if any, the EU itself should have when it comes to planning - an issue which was traditionally always domestic and belonged to national governments.

EU enlargement, the 2008 economic crisis, and immigration from outside the EU (especially since 2016) have also affected this conversation about space and justice.

Should policymakers help safeguard services in the least accessible or most disadvantaged regions? Is this kind of thinking just about economic values and growth, or other kinds of value too?

# 5.  'The Big City Conference - 'Storbykonferansen', Oslo, Norway

**Conference Session title**: 'Unscripted Futures'.

Marie Mahon, National University of Ireland Galway (presenting)

Matt Finch, Independent facilitator (on behalf of NUIG, presenting)

Presentation Title: 'Unscripting Europe'; Using future scenarios to rethink EU territorial inequalities

**Abstract:**

In principle, the EU promises citizens equal rights and opportunities. However, it is questionable whether different places in Europe are treated fairly in reality: European citizens' ability to enjoy those rights and opportunities are still affected by where they live and work.

The IMAJINE project is a Horizon 2020-funded research programme tasked with exploring issues of territorial equality and spatial justice across the EU's member states. However, significant environmental, social, political, and economic uncertainties mean that the inequalities of tomorrow may not look like those which can be researched empirically in the present or recent past.

Therefore, IMAJINE includes a foresight component, creating plausible future scenarios for the Europe of 2048. Each of these generates a distinct version of territorial inequality - from a world where climate change and ongoing pandemics have driven people from cities and coastlines back into rural living, to one where life has been so thoroughly digitalised that citizenship is decoupled from geography and many inequalities occur in virtual space, among people living in close physical proximity.

Can an imagined future help us to see potential opportunities and threats beyond those we can expect, predict, or extrapolate from the present and past? This paper will present the four initial scenarios generated by the IMAJINE project and discuss their use in "unscripting" existing thinking, helping people to see how the inequalities and injustices of the future may be entirely different to those of today. The paper will discuss the construction of meaningful, well-defined scenarios for such a broad topic and stakeholder group, and the process behind effective, time-sensitive scenario creation in a time of quarantine and lockdown.

Conference URL: https://www.storbykonferansen.no/sesjoner/unscripted-futures-making-room-for-the-openness-uncertainty-and-radical-potential-of-tomorrow/

Link to conference video:

https://film.oslomet.no/secret/64938116/6284346696903b575beb3efc62dff52e.  (IMAJINE presentation starts from 34'30")

**Link from IMAJINE website**: http://imajine-project.eu/2020/11/09/the-first-imajine-scenarios-discussed-on-the-conference-and-in-media/.

## 6.  'Brainstorm' – RTE (Irish national broadcaster).

**Brainstorm' article discussing IMAJINE scenarios: Radio Telefís Éireann (RTE) (Irish national broadcaster) '**

https://www.rte.ie/brainstorm/2020/1015/1171725-what-could-europe-look-like-30-years-from-now/

**How do you prepare for a future that you didn't see coming?**

This year has given us a clear reminder of how easily events can surprise us. Even though experts had been warning a new pandemic was likely, few of us were prepared for the upsets we've seen in 2020.

From the financial crisis in 2008 to recent US presidential elections, the Brexit referendum, and now COVID-19, we're living through an age of uncertainty. Predictions fail to come true and forecasts break down. All too often we simply don't know what's coming next or how to prepare for it.

People like to talk about using data to support decisions, but you can't gather data from the future, so they're also expressing faith in a predictive model. If that model has blind spots, the future can take you by surprise. As the economist Thomas Schelling put it, "One thing a person cannot do, no matter how rigorous his analysis or heroic his imagination, is to draw up a list of things that would never occur to him."

Schelling worked in foreign policy in the years after World War II, trying to understand the unprecedented possibility of nuclear war. One tool developed to deal with this challenge was scenario planning - a way of telling stories about the future to test our assumptions and find our blindspots.

Scenario planners knew they couldn't make strategic decisions based on examples from the past, so they devised examples from the future. These weren't predictions, expected to come true; the aim was to find futures which stretched and challenged our sense of what was possible.  Scenario planning became increasingly popular with big government and big business during the 20th century. It's now widely used by policymakers and institutions trying to spot futures that regular forecasts might have missed.

At the IMAJINE project, researchers study regional equality across the European Union. In principle, the EU promises citizens equal rights and opportunities. We're interested in whether different places in Europe are treated fairly: is your ability to enjoy those rights and opportunities affected by where you live and work?

IMAJINE's researchers are investigating regional equality in the past and present, but we also wanted to look ahead to how things might change. To do this, and find any blindspots in the way we currently understand inequality, we're building scenarios for Europe thirty years from now. They're based on key factors like how well EU member states and their regions pull together, whether Europeans prioritise wellbeing over economic prosperity in

18

years to come, and whether the Union's human resource base remains strong enough to achieve those goals.

Under our first scenario, the EU achieves economic equality across all its regions. Next-generation manufacturing technology helps the Union to thrive, and a prosperous Europe expands to include Turkey, the Ukraine, and even Belarus. However, this creates tensions and sporadic military conflict on its eastern border. The rise of automation also means fewer low-skilled migrant workers are needed, and "Fortress Europe" becomes increasingly aggressive in fending off climate refugees.

In our second scenario, ongoing pandemics and climate change drive people away from cities and coasts to rural regions. A new world order emerges, focused on sustainability and resilience. Businesses and individuals are given ratings based on sustainable development goals. These determine access to contracts and opportunities for advancement. Life is hard, but people celebrate their sense of community. A new humanitarianism shapes Europe's values.

A third future explores a world where digital technology reshapes the economy and our ideas of citizenship. When people work with colleagues around the globe using next-generation communications technology, communities and businesses might no longer be defined by physical distance. You're as likely to collaborate with people in Shenzhen, Melbourne, or Mexico City as colleagues in Dublin or Galway, and corporations have as much clout as nations. If citizenship becomes digital too, then its rights and privileges might become things you can split up, share, or trade - loaning your healthcare or residence rights to someone elsewhere in the world.

The last scenario involves a huge cultural break-up across Europe, with people unable to agree on basic values. Existing institutions are unable to command consensus and there is widespread collapse in public trust.  Different regions embrace wildly varied notions of identity, social value and human wellbeing.  In some regions, people become increasingly strict about traditional values. Others are highly progressive; they treat animals as equals and have granted special status to rivers, mountains, and even digital devices.  This fragmentation has created opportunities for degrowth and a "back to nature" pastoralism, but also huge spatial inequalities and diminishing solidarity.

You can read about the initial scenarios here: http://imajine-project.eu/2020/09/07/scenario-sketches-for-imajine-future-visions-for-european-spatial-justice/:

From now until 2021, we'll be exploring each scenario in greater depth. We'll also relate these future visions back to the choices Europe faces in the present. We'll look at current trends and signs of change highlighted by these futures, and help decisionmakers think about what it would mean to inhabit worlds so different from our own; in particular, how perspectives on equality, prosperity and solidarity would become framed.

Contd/…

Bios:
Dr. Marie Mahon is Senior Lecturer in Geography at the School of Geography, Archaeology & Irish Studies, NUI Galway.  NUIG leads the work package 'Participatory Scenario Planning' for the IMAJINE project.

Dr. Matt Finch is an Adjunct Research Fellow at the University of Southern Queensland, and a regular facilitator on the Scenarios Course at Oxford's Saïd Business School. He helps communities, companies, and institutions to look at the future, find bright ideas, and make them happen.

## 7. 'The Conversation' – Australia

The Conversation is an independent source of news and views, sourced from the academic and research community and delivered direct to the public.
https://theconversation.com/uk/who-we-are


**The Conversation Article on IMAJINE scenarios:**

https://theconversation.com/climate-protected-citadels-virtual-worlds-only-for-the-privileged-is-this-the-future-of-inequality-146680

**The Conversation - Text:**

Imagine visiting the Europe of 2048. The cities are strangely silent. The ghetto communities of Paris, London, and Berlin struggle in the shadow of decaying buildings. The once-popular coastal resorts have also been abandoned, as rises in sea level took their toll.

Heading out to rural areas, you find where the people have gone: shining citadels, high-tech gated communities designed to protect residents from the ravages of climate change and ongoing pandemics. The Western politicians of our time are hated for their failure to prevent the climate crisis. This world is on a war footing, and its mission is human survival.

That doesn't mean life is always grim. The world is gearing up for the 39th Summer Olympics, held in the Indonesian city of Surabaya. The greatest athletes will be attending, but also thinkers, artists, and heroes nominated from around their world for their work fighting the climate crisis. Europeans are hoping for a great medal haul, but this year, as in most others, the country expected to dominate is China, the world's superpower and leader in the fight for human survival.

Is this the future we face? Even if it isn't, what can visions like these teach us about challenges in the present?

At the IMAJINE project, researchers explore issues of regional inequality and injustice across the EU's member states. Europe promises equal rights and opportunities for all, but citizens' ability to enjoy those rights and opportunities are affected by where they live and work.

Most of the project investigates inequalities which exist today. However, the unfairness of the future might not look like the unfairness of the past. So much is changing in our societies, economies, and environment that it's not enough to predict on the basis of the data we have. We need to imagine future worlds which might have entirely different forms of inequality and injustice.

To do this, IMAJINE researchers use scenario planning, a tool for finding the futures which challenge our assumptions, even if they never come to pass. The aim of IMAJINE's four scenarios isn't to forecast what will certainly happen, but to find our blindspots when it comes to the future of inequality.

This might mean a Europe in which cities are abandoned, the fight against climate change is a global priority, and today's rural backwaters become the most desirable places to live. It might mean one where a Europe made prosperous by next-generation clean manufacturing technology has successfully expanded to include even Belarus - but at the cost of ongoing border wars to the east.

21

Another scenario explores a world where citizenship is entirely digital. It becomes so removed from your place of residence that you might be a European citizen online, even though you physically live on the other side of the world. The haves and have-nots in such a world aren't defined by where they live in reality, but what they can do in virtual space. A fourth future explores a breakdown of trust, driven by "fake news", which leads to a fragmentation of European cultures and values. In that world, some parts of Europe celebrate five-person marriages, while others double down on traditional values.

Each of these scenarios show us how inequality isn't just a question of how wide the gap currently is between the haves and have-nots, and whether it narrows or widens in the future. It's also about the changing ways we understand injustice. Inequality might become a question of who has the freedom to innovate in a comfortable but conformist future. It might have nothing to do with where you live, and everything to do with how much of your life you can live online, or which digital spaces you can access. It might mean having the right to define your own values among a community of people who accept your sense of your own identity.

At IMAJINE, we invite policymakers to explore these futures, think through their consequences, and relate them back to issues in the present. These extreme, distant scenarios highlight challenges which are already emerging. Current debates over gender identity and rights highlight faultlines within our societies. Digital access already isn't just about whether you have broadband, but your ability and opportunity to use ever more sophisticated digital tools at home and work. Climate change and COVID-19 are shaking up our notion of who are the winners and losers on the world stage. Even future success and prosperity might create new and dangerous international conflicts. The one thing that's for sure is that if we don't find out where our blindspots are, we won't be ready for anything that emerges from them. That could mean we sleepwalk our way into societies that are less fair and just for all.

A potential way forward for policy-makers is to focus more on alternative ways of thinking about challenges of inequality and injustice.  Policy decisions still tend to be based on what a policy will cost and who and how many can benefit.  These economic valuations are important but they are not the only ones.  Social and cultural values also matter in that they steer our everyday collective perceptions about what is right and acceptable to our society, and to a vision of the 'good life'.  They are more difficult to evaluate in monetary terms and transfer into policy strategies but they often tell us more about what society actually believes about issues like justice, equality and fairness, and what it wants as policy responses.  Accounting for these values offers a potential way to devise policy that is broadly accepted and has capacity to be adapted to local circumstances and preferences. END.

## 8. Newstalk - The Sean Moncrieff Show

**Description**: Afternoon programme on current affairs.   Interview between Sean Moncrieff and Matt Finch on the IMAJINE Scenarios.  Listener figures for the Moncrieff Show (2019 figures): Reach 97,000.

Link to programme podcast: https://www.newstalk.com/podcasts/highlights-from-moncrieff/the-imajine-project